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John Locke argued that legitimate state authority is created when free individuals lend 
their personal power via consent to the state‟s governors. Modern Lockean A. John 
Simmons extends Locke‟s argument to conclude that, since this does not happen in the 
real world, philosophical anarchism must be accepted. I argue that classical consent 
cannot happen in the individual/state relationship. Its requirements can be met in some 
private relationships because of their special background conditions. The individual/state 
relationship, however, is not like private relationships, and the nature of the relationship 
keep classical consent‟s requirements from being fulfilled. First, state authority must 
extend over a very large set of issues, from the military and economics to education and 
 
 
health care, in order to perform its functions of mutual protection and advancement. 
Given the considerable number of state realms of power, coordinating the meaningful 
consent of thousands, millions, or billions of citizens is downright impossible. Second, 
classical consent theory requires that the consenter have an adequate understanding of 
what he is submitting to if that consent is to ground an authority exchange, but given the 
complexity of the state‟s constitution and its numerous realms of power, even the most 
intelligent person could not sufficiently comprehend the terms of the power exchange. 
Third, the state‟s directives are fundamentally different from regular interpersonal 
directives; they are final, sovereign, apply over territory, and require compliance, which 
is contrary to the voluntaristic spirit. To counter Simmons‟s argument, I argue that a 
distinction must be made between object-level governance, what state agents do, and 
meta-political activity, a category of activities performed by individual citizens that 
create and maintain state authority. Through meta-political activities, citizens are able to 
indirectly add to the state‟s constitution, in ways congruent with their mental powers, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 As I sit writing this today, the area in which I live is entering its most politically 
active season so far this decade: election season 2012.  It‟s a bit overwhelming, really.  
Television ads supporting candidates and attacking others run constantly.  The news 
outlets update watchers on the slightest details of the campaigns.  The breadth of the 
elections ranges from the national level (candidates for president) to the most local level 
(the district‟s board of education).  Not only is the election about picking candidates in 
races, but also deals with several state constitutional amendments and ballot referenda.  
While I have become well-informed about some of these issues and candidates, I have 
never even heard of others. 
 During this season, immersion in the political world is all but unavoidable.  It 
seems like, if there is any time at all that an individual can be a direct part of the political 
process, this is probably that time.  People can take part in campaigns, can advocate in 
support their favored issues, and can perform the seeming hallmark act of political 
involvement: they can vote.  Each person eligible to vote can submit his or her ballot and 
have his or her choices added to the total from which a winner will be picked (usually 
based on a simple majority, but not always).  Given the seeming intimacy between the 
individual and his state and its constitution, now seems to be an appropriate time to 
consider a central concern of political philosophy, that of consent. 
 While the topic of consent in political philosophy has been addressed by many 
excellent theorists and with a wide variety of approaches, this dissertation does not have 
the opportunity to cover such breadth.  In fact, the contents of this dissertation are 
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surprisingly narrow: I will aim only to evaluate the argument from consent made by John 
Locke and his, I believe, best modern proponent, A. John Simmons.  Briefly put, Locke 
argues that the state‟s government can rightly exercise political authority over individuals 
only when those individuals have consented to that authority.  Continuing that line of 
thinking, Simmons argues that, since few, if any, individuals actually ever give consent to 
their state‟s authority, and since one can legitimately wield power over another only via 
his proper consent, all states past and present have been illegitimate wielders of authority 
over naturally free citizens.  I will argue that, even though the Lockean argument is 
enormously appealing, and applicable in some authority-exchanging relationships, the 
dynamics of modern states make classical consent between the individual and the state 
impossible.  It is not simply that the modern world makes the give and take of consent 
impractical to the point of impossible, but also that the nature of the individual/state 
relationship is such that classical consent cannot be given and is not a coherent method of 
evaluating the legitimacy of authority. 
 
 In Chapter 2, I trace the concept of political consent to its modern introduction in 
John Locke‟s Second Treatise on Civil Government.  The second treatise begins, not by 
looking at the historical origins of political organization, but by giving what is in essence 
a moral argument.  Locke asserts that man‟s natural condition is one of perfect equality 
and freedom, and that all human organization must respect this law of nature.  It is 
sensible that we should want to live and work together to lessen our individual strains and 
make life more pleasant; furthermore, by living together, we can share the burden of 
protection of our persons and possessions.  Since resources are finite and differences of 
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opinion are bound to occur, it is logical that we should want to create an impartial, third-
party judge to oversee our disputes.  From this we create civil society, where we as a 
group (through a freely-elected government) can create impartial laws and unbiased 
judges to uphold laws and maintain order.  Even though we are seemingly under the 
power of other persons, this is only illusory, as the created government and its laws exist 
only because we lend our personal freedom to them in exchange for the benefits of civil 
society.  If the body politic acts in ways that are contrary to our natural freedoms 
(through decisions made by majority rule), we are allowed to withdraw our consent and 
return to our natural condition. 
 Simmons argues that, if consent is to have any meaning or power at all, it must 
meet certain requirements.  From Simmons‟s arguments, along with those of other 
consent theorists, I will argue that there are four requirements laid out by classical 
consent theorists.  First, the consenter must intend that his consent transfers some of his 
authority over himself to another party.  Second, the consent must be given free from 
coercion.  Third, the consent must be given via an outward sign that both parties believe 
is sufficient to signify the transfer of power.  Fourth, the consenter and consentee must be 
sufficiently knowledgeable about the terms and implications of the authority transfer.  
The four requirements work to guarantee that the value and power of the individual‟s 
authority over himself is properly transferred to its intended recipient, the state.  
Simmons rightly concludes that instances of this type of power-retaining consent from 
the individual to the state simply do not happen in the modern world.  From this, 
Simmons says we are forced to make a choice: a) we can accept that persons can be 
subject to the power of another without their true consent and reject voluntarism, which 
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amounts to denying their natural freedom, or b) we can accept philosophical anarchism, 
the view that no state authority has had or will have legitimate authority over its citizens.  
Simmons chooses the latter, as he views the former as morally unacceptable.  While I 
sympathize with Simmons‟s desire to avoid option a), I cannot help but wonder if there is 
more to the story than what he presents us with, if this truly is a simple a) or b) choice. 
 Chapter 3 will, in sympathy with Simmons‟s emphasis on freedom and equality, 
examine some real-world instances where consent is, I believe, the proper method of 
evaluating an authority exchange.  In some economic exchanges and authority transfers 
between intimates, for instance, I agree that one party exerting power over another party 
is morally acceptable only if that second party has given his or her real consent.  In these 
exchanges, the four basic requirements of classical consent theory that I outline in 
Chapter 2 are easily satisfied, but there are further background requirements, I believe, 
that are necessary for maintaining the voluntaristic spirit so essential to Simmons‟s 
position.  For example, the two parties must truly free from one another before and after 
the exchange, and they must be the sole creators and arbiters of the rules of their 
interaction.  The whole environment of the power exchange is rightly constructed so that 
the agents involved have the ability to give and receive true consent.  The basic 
requirements of classical consent theory are useful only when they take place in a greater 
atmosphere of practical freedom, the basis of Simmons‟s argument. 
 Next, I argue that these important background requirements do not and cannot 
occur in the relationship between the individual and the modern state.  The first way in 
which classical consent from the individual to the state is impossible concerns its 
practical impossibility, which I cover in Chapter 4.  First, in private relationships, the 
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realms of authority are simple and finite, but in the political relationship, the realms of 
possible authority are more numerous and open-ended.  In order to exist at all, states need 
to be able to issue laws and punish law-breakers, and deter would-be law-breakers, and 
do all of this over a large number of issues like public health and economic transactions.  
When coordinating the behaviors of thousands or millions of citizens, the realms of 
potential state authority become very complex and distant from the individual.  
Meaningful interaction between the individual and the state authority becomes 
impossible, a problem that is further compounded when locating the agent of the state 
(with which one would potentially interact).  The basic requirements of classical consent 
theory demand that an individual‟s consent be an actual event between actual agents, but 
the makeup of the modern state (an entity embodied by a government and a set of ideas, 
sometimes encoded in a formal constitution, but not always) makes the proper recipient 
of consent difficult to identify.  Furthermore, no methods of interaction between the 
individual and the state seem sufficient to transfer the consent of the individual, with all 
of its moral weight and background conditions.  The impracticalities of individual/state 
consent become even more obvious when we acknowledge that modern states exercise 
power over territories, not individuals; since essentially all of the earth‟s surface is now 
claimed by some state, and since we are all born into association with some state, 
individuals enter into the political relationship already designated as „subject‟ and remain 
„subject‟ wherever they go.  This is directly contrary to Simmons‟s voluntaristic 
argument that authority exchanges must be freely performed by two desiring parties. 
 In Chapter 5, I will make the argument that, beyond mere impracticality, 
individuals are unable to give true consent to their states because they are cognitively 
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unable to meet classical consent‟s robust mental requirements.  In order for a person‟s 
consent to be meaningful and remain true to the voluntaristic spirit, he must understand 
what powers he is giving to another and what obligations he is taking on, to such a degree 
that he does not lose any of the natural freedom so central to the Lockean argument.  It is 
my position that, since political authority may include so many realms of power and so 
many complex interactions, a person would have to have mental powers far beyond those 
of a typical individual.  To be sufficiently knowledgeable about the political realm, an 
agent would have to know a vast amount of information, and would need to be able to 
manipulate and consider various aspects of that information.  Not only do our brains 
seem naturally limited in informational and computational capacities, but our abilities to 
really understand things in our world are subject to enormous constraint imposed by time, 
attention, and motivation.  There are only 24 hours in each day, and we must allocate our 
time and attention to a variety of tasks; if other things seem more important (and often, 
they do), spending too much time on understanding the political realm without any 
obviously direct benefit will be essentially impossible for the individual.  If the complex 
cognitive demands of classical consent theory cannot be fulfilled, then any outward 
consent-like sign is voided, making classical consent impossible in the individual/state 
relationship. 
 In Chapter 6, I will argue that, even if we could overcome the practical and 
epistemic problems posed in the previous chapters, classical consent from the individual 
to his state is impossible because political authority is, by its very nature, not the kind of 
thing that is subject to consent.  Rights can sometimes be rightly transferred from one 
person to another via consent, as I argue in Chapter 3, but this is possible only because 
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those rights belong to the individual to begin with.  For instance, I can lend my doctor the 
right to have power over my body because that right is truly mine to lend.  This is not the 
case with the individual/state relationship.  The possible realms of state authority are just 
not located within individual rights.  There is no time in the individual/state interaction 
that the individual is able to negotiate the terms of the relationship or consider not 
entering the relationship at all.  Similarly, the world is so arranged that it is now 
impossible for an individual to not be a citizen of some state, which seems contrary to 
Simmons‟s voluntarism.  Furthermore, as Locke himself argues, the purpose of state 
authority is to act as a final, independent arbiter and executor; the state‟s authority cannot 
truly be final and independent if citizens are able to make it hinge on their consent.  
Political authority is its own kind of authority, and political directives are issued with the 
purpose of being final reasons for action, with the ability to trump any personal 
motivations to disobey, and this is in direct opposition to the spirit of Simmons‟s 
voluntarism.  Even if a person wanted to transfer some of his personal authority over to 
the state for the reasons that Locke describes, doing so is pointless because any power the 
state has cannot be located in the private rights of individuals. 
 Chapter 7 will be my attempt to salvage the spirit, the moral motivation, of 
classical consent theory while acknowledging that the world of modern states does not 
leave room for true political voluntarism.  When given the option between rejecting 
consent as the only basis of legitimate authority and rejecting the idea that political 
authority can ever be legitimate, Simmons chooses the latter because the former seems 
morally unacceptable.  While my goal is to argue that we do not have enough reason to 
maintain that consent is the only acceptable basis for legitimate authority, I still 
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sympathize with Simmons‟s loyalty to voluntarism.  The reason that consent theory 
continues to appeal to so many is that it makes a priority of respecting individual equality 
and rationality, and of protecting the individual citizen from tyranny.  My positive thesis 
aims to respect the spirit of voluntarism while recognizing that we cannot follow it to the 
letter in the individual/state relationship. 
 To continue the arguments made in Chapter 6, I will argue that as long as we view 
authority as a simple concept, the idea of political authority seems paradoxical.  The very 
purpose of political authority is to solve problems in an objective and final manner.  If 
political authority is the direct result of rerouting personal authority (making it dependent 
on personal authority), then it loses its finality and independence.  The only way to 
resolve this seeming paradox is to recognize that the two types of authority are 
fundamentally different, even if they are somewhat related.   
Political authority is created by citizens to solve the problems that personal authority 
cannot (adjudication of disputes, issuing objective laws, etc.) in the same way that the 
authority of a referee is the creation of game players for the purpose of ruling over 
games.  They make the rules and do the judging, and we get to play the game.  Hampton 
likens this to Tarski‟s object-language/meta-language distinction – there is an object-level 
authority (the government) that makes the laws and does the judging with finality, and 
there is a meta-level authority that both indirectly authorizes and follows the dictates of 
the object-level authority.  At the level of states, governments are created and indirectly 
authorized by private citizens and their personal power.  The dictates of governments are 
made to be final and different from private authority – to serve the cooperative 
coordination problems that arise from living together in a state.  This created authority of 
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governments is designed to be different from the private moral authority of individual 
citizens. 
The governing authority of states is created by citizens performing a variety of actions 
that give rise to a governing convention, the political atmosphere of a state, which issues 
a formal and informal rule of recognition that delineates the ways in which a government 
can operate.  Private citizens perform a variety of politically-oriented actions which, 
when taken as a whole, create the political atmosphere and empower the government to 
rule.  The two-tier approach to political authority is the correct one because it asserts the 
truth: the two realms of authority (personal and political) are fundamentally different in 
nature but are interrelated.  This is an accurate reflection of modern states in the world as 
it is today.  Political authority in modern states is not on loan from private citizens, but is 
instead a creation of private citizens.   
I believe that the two-tier approach to governance strikes the right balance between 
Simmons‟s moral ideal of political voluntarism and the fact that modern political 
authority cannot be the result of a direct transference of rights from the individual to the 
state.  There is no reason to believe that the only politically valuable act that a private 
citizen can perform is to give his or her consent.  The meta-political activities I discuss in 
Chapter 7 are real things that real people can do in real states; they are the results of 
rational deliberation and personal choice.  Shifting the focus from classical consent and 
its four stringent requirements, along with its background conditions, to meta-political 
activity maintains the spirit of voluntarism without succumbing to the obvious problems 
of consent theory.  
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Chapter 2: The Lockean Argument from Consent and the 
Move to Philosophical Anarchism 
 
 In many parts of the modern world, including the one in which I type this, the idea 
that all persons are equally valuable and deserving of equal treatment is taken as obvious 
and undeniable, and to question this truth is a great social sin, so it is easy to forget that 
this has not always been the case.  In the scope of human history, freedom and equality 
are relatively new concepts, but they are now central to how we regard ourselves as 
individuals, at least in more western cultures.  Moreover, the value of the individual is the 
centerpiece of modern political theory, and theorists focus as much (if not more) on 
individual rights as they do on individual duties and obligations.  To deny the centrality 
of the individual and his rights seems tantamount to denying a fundamental Truth. 
It is not my intent in this dissertation to deny the importance of the individual or 
the existence of rights.  It is not my intent to deny that we humans are remarkable 
creatures with nearly miraculous cognitive abilities, or that our modern world of states is 
incredible.  I do not want to argue that democratic political society is not a worthy goal or 
that we should accept unjust power when we see it.  Rather, the purpose of this 
dissertation is to examine one philosopher‟s response to another philosopher‟s arguments 
regarding governments, rights, and consent. 
I will begin this piece by looking at the political philosophy of John Locke, 
focusing on his argument that, because of the law of nature, all men are free and equal, 
and nothing can bind them to obey the power of another person except for their 
consenting to that power.  Then, I will review the response of A. John Simmons to 
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Locke‟s arguments, as he concludes that if we stay true to the Lockean spirit of natural 
freedom and equality, then we are forced to conclude that no real government in the 
world today (or ever) has legitimate political authority because the citizens of those states 
do not consent government‟s exercise of power over them.  I sympathize with Simmons‟s 
argument, with his devotion to voluntarism, but I will spend most of this dissertation 
arguing that his conclusion cannot be supported because political voluntarism is 
impossible.   
I will start this chapter by placing Locke‟s arguments in the greater context in 
which he was writing: that of the Enlightenment.  Locke‟s philosophy, including his 
political views, was a key part of a whole new way of thinking for western civilization.  
Its importance is even more brilliant when compared to the thousands of years of history 
from which it emerged. 
 
 Prior to the era of Enlightenment, which lasted from approximately the mid-1600s 
until the end of the 18
th
 century, western scholarship emphasized hierarchy and pre-
determined structure in many realms of study.  Science placed the earth at the center of 
the cosmos according to the superiority of man and God.  Religion focused on service 
and duty to God, faithful adherence to scripture, and the importance of the church as a 
necessary earthly power.  Many social and political attitudes supported the rightful 
stratification of persons, from kings and lords down to the lowly serf, and many political 
theorists in particular sought to justify the use of power and force from the higher castes 
to the lower as a matter of divine right and natural order.  As literacy and education 
12 
 
spread and a middle class came into being, though, the old ways of thinking were called 
into question and ultimately rejected.  Knowledge of the natural world grew, and with it 
grew the importance of the knower. 
 Enlightenment philosophy and political theory entwined to advance the 
importance of individual rationality, freedom, and equality.  Human reason, argued 
Enlightenment theorists, is sufficient for understanding the world around us, freeing us 
from the strict order of the old ways and allowing us humans to be the creators of our 
own existence.  According to these thinkers, the faculty of rationality makes all men 
morally and practically equal, so it cannot be that one man is naturally the rightful lord of 
any other.
1
  The only way to respect the equality of all persons is to center our actions on 
the protection of individual freedoms.  Individuals are rationally capable of deciding what 
is in their best interests, and social and political philosophy ought to emphasize the 
importance of the individual. 
Locke‟s Argument for Consent 
 It is through the lens of the Enlightenment that we ought to look at the political 
philosophy of John Locke, especially his Second Treatise on Civil Government.  Locke‟s 
contributions to political philosophy were profound, and continue to serve as the basis of 
modern liberal philosophy.  Writing in a time when English society was in upheaval 
because of revolution and torn political allegiances, and in response to Robert Filmer‟s 
Patriarcha, Locke‟s political work stands out in stark contrast to the nation‟s previously 
stalwart monarchism.  If we approach the Second Treatise as an argument that builds 
                                                          
1
 Despite the progress of Enlightenment philosophy, these concepts of rationality, equality, and freedom 
typically applied only to men, and usually only men of European heritage. 
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upon itself, Locke is claiming that, before we can understand political power, “a right of 
making laws, with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties for the 
regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community in 
the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury, 
and all this only for the public good,” we must look at the individual before he enters into 
political society.
2
  In the state of nature, all persons are in a state of equality and possess 
the “perfect freedom to order their actions”
3
.  No one person is the rightful master of any 
other, and individuals are subject only to the law of nature, whereby one man can exert 
force over another only when the latter has violated the law of nature.  Every man in the 
state of nature has the right to put a murderer to death, both to punish him for violating 
the murdered person‟s right to life and to serve as a cautionary example to other would-
be murderers. 
 For Locke, the freedom that all men have is grounded in reason, “which is able to 
instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left 
to the freedom of his own will.”
4
  As our capacity for rationality grows, so does our 
capacity for freedom and autonomy, but this does not imply that we are born as the 
rightful subject of any other individual.  Our parents, whether by birth or by adoption, are 
only temporary guardians with temporary powers which they bring upon themselves.  We 
should honor our parents and respect them and be grateful when they rear us well, but 
Locke argues that this in no way entails the duties of obedience or submission: “these two 
powers, political and paternal, are so perfectly distinct and separate, and built upon so 
                                                          
2
 Locke, John. The Second Treatise on Civil Government. Chapter I.3. 
3
 Ibid, Chapter II.4. 
4
 Ibid, Chapter VI.63. 
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different foundations, and given to so different ends, that every subject that is a father has 
as much a paternal power over his children as the prince has over his.”
5
  Furthermore, 
even though many political systems can trace their roots through history to lower-level 
fathers and elders, the rightful power of the subsequent rulers comes not from a natural 
right held by them as fathers but by the ruled sons choosing to continue to accept the rule 
of their fathers on a larger scale.  After all, the fathers had already proven themselves to 
be good leaders and providers, so the transition from father/elder to ruler only seemed 
natural. 
 While individuals possess perfect freedom in the state of nature, we are unlikely 
to find many people who prefer to remain in that state because of its many dangers and 
inconveniences; working to make food, shelter, and other needs are difficult and time 
consuming, and protecting one‟s property (including one‟s own body) may draw away 
some of that valuable time and effort.  Locke argues that, for as long as man has lived, he 
has preferred to live in groups to escape the dangers and inconveniences of solitary life.  
Furthermore, to attain a higher quality of life, man has divided and shared his efforts with 
others, like making food and building houses.  Social life requires the regular sharing of 
personal power:  
a free man makes himself a servant to another by selling him for a certain time the 
service he undertakes to do in exchange for wages he is to receive; and though 
this commonly puts him into the family of his master, and under the ordinary 
discipline thereof, yet it gives the master but a temporary power over him, and no 
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Locke argues that, according to the law of nature, we may temporarily lend our powers 
over ourselves to others, and those others can exercise that power over us only because 
we have consented to them doing so. 
 Political society arises only when men quit their natural powers to protect their 
property and punish offenders and resign that personal power into the hands of the 
community:  
And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the 
community comes to be umpire, and by understanding indifferent rules and men 
authorized by the community for their execution, decides all the differences that 
may happen between any members of that society concerning any matter of right, 
and punishes those offences which any member hath committed against the 




To receive the protection of his property (including his body) from the group, which can 
gather more force than any one person, man gives up his personal power to interpret and 
enforce the law of nature in favor of the creation of the society‟s executive, judicial, and 
legislative powers.  The content of the commonwealth‟s laws cannot extend beyond the 
law of nature or any of the personal powers held by individuals in the state of nature.  
The commonwealth comes into being when all individuals consent to form a community 
that will act as a single body, and the actions of that single body are determined by 
majority rule.  Consenting to the creation of that body politic puts the individual under an 
obligation to submit to the will of the majority. 
 At the heart of Locke‟s argument in favor of giving up one‟s private powers to a 
government is the importance of property.  Without the known, objective laws and 
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authorized judges of the commonwealth, a person‟s property is no safer than it was in the 
state of nature.  This is why the legislative and adjudicative powers of the society must be 
derived from the will of the majority – if those powers are not directly taken from the 
people, then they are in essence arbitrary and unknown, which is worse than the state of 
nature.  An unknown power has the potential to unjustly take over an individual‟s 
property, his means of survival, and without the protection of one‟s property (including 
his body), a person is left utterly defenseless.  It is true that we must give up some of our 
property, especially in the form of taxes, to the governing body so it can carry out its 
protective mission, but those taxes must be determined by the majority, to which one has 
the option of consenting. 
 Governments that do not adhere to the common good and that do not follow the 
majority will enter a state of war with their citizens.  In a state of war, the only real way 
to combat unauthorized force is with more force, so citizens always maintain the right of 
a) altering the laws and government whenever the majority deems it necessary, and b) 
revolting and forming a new government altogether when the majority deems it 
necessary.  Breaking the trust of the majority is breaking the law of nature and so makes 
the lawmakers deserving of punishment.  To ensure that the legislators and executives are 
always in accord with the will of the majority, government agents need to meet regularly, 
constantly consult the citizens and adjust aspects of government like proportionate 
representation when needed.  When governments overstep the bounds of the law of 
nature and the will of the majority, it essentially dissolves itself and loses all its authority. 
 As Locke noticed, most individuals are born into societies that already have 
governments in action, but this does not make one obligated to follow that government‟s 
17 
 
laws simply because of the accident of birth.  Even if parents have consented to the rule 
of the commonwealth, it does not follow that their children inherit their parents‟ political 
obligations, “For his son, when a man, being altogether as free as the father, any act of 
the father can no more give away the liberty of the son than it can of anybody else.”
8
  
Furthermore, Locke argues that governments do not claim authority over children until 
they reach the age of reason, and they should not attempt to do so.
9
  Even if parents have 
a child while away from their own country, that child is not the subject of any country or 
government unless he consents to such once he reaches maturity. 
 Regarding what may count as a consenting act, Locke argues that owning 
property or enjoying the goods and services of a commonwealth count as acts of tacit 
consent to that society‟s authority.  Whether travelling on a highway for a few hours or 
owning property to be handed down through one‟s heirs, enjoying the government‟s 
protection and promotion obliges one to obey that government‟s laws.  When one sells 
his property or otherwise decides to no longer enjoy the state‟s goods and services, he is 
free to withdraw his consent and leave the country to either enter another commonwealth 
or any other association of persons; at this time he is released from his obligations to 
obey the government‟s authority. 
 Also, consent derived from force does not count as a true act of consent, “because 
whatsoever another gets from me by force, I still retain the right of, and he is obliged 
presently to restore.”
10
  According to Locke, any obligation I may be a part of is regulated 
by the law of nature, which asserts that only my will can bind me.  If somebody takes my 
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property without my authorization, he enters a state of war with me, and I am allowed to 
retaliate, and the same is true of one “steals” my consent by force.  Even my own 
government is not allowed to assume my consent, which amounts to taking my consent 
without my willing it – rather, consent must always be properly given. 
 When a government‟s authority is usurped, whether from without or within, and 
the citizens are disabled from erecting a new government of their own will, then any 
consent they might seem to give to the new (illegitimate) authority does not bind them to 
obey.  Consent is valid and accords with the law of nature only if the person has a real 
option of withholding it.  Tyrannical government that allows for no other options, “is 
rather mockery than relief, and men can never be secure from tyranny if there be no 
means to escape it till they are perfectly under it.”
11
  If a person has no choice but to 
consent, then whatever consent he might give is not a true reflection of his will, as the 
law of nature demands, but rather a reflection of the enforcer‟s will. 
  
Define “Consent”. 
 Although John Locke‟s political philosophy was important and in many ways 
groundbreaking, it is also sometimes difficult to defend.  For instance, his central concept 
of the law of nature seems to rest on theological conditions that many may not accept; 
similarly, Locke‟s notion of property can come across as queer, especially in the modern 
world.  Therefore, inasmuch as this dissertation is focused at Locke‟s argument from 
consent, it is even more focused on the work of A. John Simmons, a modern Lockean.  
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Simmons‟s systematic approach to Locke‟s political philosophy yields much stronger, 
more supportable arguments than those made by Locke himself.  In terms of writing 
alone, the clarity and detail provided by Simmons exceeds that of Locke.  Most 
importantly, though, Simmons takes Locke‟s principles of consent and political 
voluntarism and follows them as far as logic allows, even if the conclusions may not be 
desirable.  I will go further into Simmons‟s arguments in the next section, but at this 
point, his elucidation of key concepts related to political consent is necessary. 
Before moving on to examine Simmons‟ arguments for political voluntarism and 
philosophical anarchism, I ought to explain the parameters in which Simmons and I 
understand the term “consent” because I believe that he renders the term much clearer 
and more concise than it is often used.  The Lockean voluntaristic tradition treats consent 
as the deliberate undertaking of obligations and creation of rightful authority through a 
particular action.  Locke and Simmons both seem to emphasize the usage of consent as a 
rights-transferring mechanism, even though the act of consent can have other 
consequences (the creation of an obligation, a show of approval, etc.), and for the 
purposes of this dissertation, I will maintain that emphasis.  The classical consent 
tradition appears to assert that an act must meet four conditions if it is to count as a 
proper act of consent, such that it can create rights and obligations: the agent must have 
the proper intent, the act must be done voluntarily, the act must be accomplished via a 
sufficient sign, and the consenter must be sufficiently informed.
12
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Proper Intent  Simmons argues that “an individual cannot become obligated 
unless he intentionally performs an obligation-generating act with a clear understanding 
of its significance.”
13
  His emphasis on the proper intent requirement indicates the 
importance of a consenting act‟s maintaining the natural freedom of the individual giving 
his consent.  True consent is never an accident, never the product of misunderstanding; a 
truly free person‟s power can only be shared with another because doing so is his will.  If 
we are born naturally free, then except for those imposed by the law of nature, the only 
legitimate obligations we can acquire are self-imposed obligations.  The proper intent 
requirement of classical consent theory makes consent stand out from other models of 
political authority and obligation.  Hypothetical consent, for instance, may reflect what an 
idealized rational agent would do if given the opportunity, but this just seems to be an 
evaluation of the quality of the government; hypothetical consent ignores the importance 
of what real agents do in real situations.  It is not enough that citizens should or would 
give their consent, but that they actually do give their consent.  Although proper intent is 
only a mental state of the would-be consenter, one that is not easily measured, Simmons 
treats this requirement as essential to Lockean voluntarism. 
 
Voluntariness  Another requirement of classical consent, voluntariness, may seem 
to be repeating the proper intent condition, but its inclusion highlights that the agent‟s 
consent not be forced or coerced.  The Lockean tradition asserts that individual freedoms 
are fundamental to proper human existence as given by natural law (unless forfeited by 
breaking the law of nature and violating the rights of another person), and if a seeming 
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act of consent is coerced, then it is not an accurate reflection of the agent‟s will.  No other 
agent is in a position to obligate us to obey the will of another, yet this is what forced 
consent does.  The two types of forced consent usually focused upon by consent theorists 
and their detractors are coercion and the possibility of only bad alternatives.  For the 
former, an act of consent that results from the threat of violence (or otherwise making the 
agent worse off than he was before) cancels any obligation he might assume.  Even if 
only in the agent‟s mind, his options for not consenting are forcibly curtailed, so any 
“consent” given is not an accurate reflection of his will.  For the latter, if the agent only 
has bad options to choose from (to be shot or walk the plank, for instance), some argue 
that whatever choice he makes, he does not assume an obligation because he was 
“forced” by the situation.   
Simmons argues that “it is not possible to be very precise about this condition, but 
there are at least obvious cases on either side of a very fuzzy line; “consent” which is 
given under the direct threat of serious physical violence is, for instance, not really 
consent.”
14
  Possible acts of consent have to be evaluated on an individual basis, but 
Simmons argues that, if we want to maintain the voluntariness of the Lockean tradition, 
then any so-called consent must not prey on the vulnerability of the individual.  For 
instance, if citizens do not want to consent to enter political society and give up some of 
their individual freedoms, some argue that they can either emigrate to another state or 
simply remain in a state of nature.  Simmons counters that, in most cases, continued 
residence cannot bind a citizen because both of the above options impose unfairly heavy 
burdens; remaining alone in a state of nature is practically impossible, and moving to 
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other territory is unduly costly in terms of time, money, and socialization.  The 
consequences of not being a part of a society are simply too harsh to be voluntarily 
chosen, so the fact that a citizen stays in his home state may not be an accurate reflection 
of his desire to take on political obligations and legitimate political authority. 
 
Appropriate and Sufficient Sign  The third requirement of classical consent is 
that any act of consent must be an actual act performed by one individual and received by 
another for the purpose of entering into an authority relationship.  The actions that count 
as signs of consent are conventional, depending on the circumstances in question, but the 
key to maintaining the voluntaristic spirit of Lockean consent is that both the giver and 
recipient know that the act in question is one that transfers authority and creates an 
obligation.  For instance, a subtle nod in a quiet auction may be a sufficient sign of 
consent, but that same nod may not be sufficient when entering a legal contract. 
 Both Simmons and Leslie Green argue that, even though a sign‟s sufficiency is 
contextual and conventional, there must also be a fitness related to the importance of the 
obligation taken and power granted.  When a potential patient is consenting to a doctor‟s 
performing surgery on him, for instance, the interests at stake are too important to be 
possibly determined by accident.  A twitch of the head could easily be misinterpreted as a 
nod, and a patient‟s health and safety should not be subject to the possibility of such a 
misinterpretation; a signed form listing the details of the power transfer is a much more 
suitable sign of the patient‟s consent.  The weightier the obligation taken on and the 
power granted, the less controversial and subjective the sign of consent should be. 
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 Simmons also argues quite convincingly that a lack of action can count as a 
sufficient sign of consent in some circumstances.  In his famous boardroom example, 
when the chairman asks for objections to holding the next meeting at 8:00, a member‟s 
not objecting properly counts as an act of tacit consent: the members are given ample 
opportunity to make their opinions known, so making no objection is an accurate 
reflection of their wills.  When the agent is presented with a clear choice situation and 
chooses not to act, his tacit consent creates just as strong an obligation as any actively-
given consent in a comparable situation. 
 
Sufficient Understanding  The final requirement of classical consent theory is 
that the agents in questions sufficiently understand the content of the interaction – the 
consenter must know what rights he is transferring and what obligations he is taking on, 
and the consentee must be similarly aware of the parameters of the relationship.  While 
no consent theorists claim that both sides be equally knowledgeable about the content 
(one does not have to be as well educated in medicine as his doctor in order to consent to 
the doctor‟s authority), the consenter must be knowledgeable enough to maintain the 
spirit of voluntarism.  Unfortunately, this requirement is the least-covered in the literature 
on consent theory as it applies to political philosophy, so we cannot directly evaluate the 
arguments made by Locke or Simmons.  However, a brief overview of the importance of 
informed consent shows that classical consent theory cannot be a coherent position for 
free people exchanging power and obligations without it.
15
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 By virtue of the law of nature, all persons are born free and equal, and they grow 
into rationality with time and experience, according to Locke.  It is important that persons 
be able to choose what they believe to be the correct interpretations of the law of nature 
and use those interpretations to guide their decisions.  When a decision is not sufficiently 
informed, it could be the case that the missing pertinent information would alter the 
agent‟s choice, so any obligation taken or authority given may be ill-founded.  Sufficient 
understanding protects agents from those who might manipulate them or abuse their 
power; a well-meaning tyrant is still a tyrant.  The saying that „knowledge is power‟ must 
be supported by consent theorists.  When a would-be consenter is ill-informed, especially 
if important information is withheld by the would-be consentee, the lack of information is 
itself a type of coercion.  Any consent given is not assuredly an accurate reflection of the 
agent‟s rational choice, so it cannot be called voluntary. 
 
Simmons‟ Edge of Anarchy 
Simmons argues that, if we take Locke‟s arguments to heart and follow them to 
their logical conclusions, we are forced to conclude that citizens cannot have political 
obligations and states cannot have the right to rule.  Classical consent theory holds 
enormous intuitive appeal, Simmons argues, and I must agree with him.  He claims that 
“consent (voluntary alienation) is a convincing source of our political ties for both Locke 
and ourselves, because, more than any other, consent is a clear and uncontroversial 
ground of special obligation and right-transfer.”
16
   True consent stands as a protector of 
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the individual from unauthorized force and allows citizens to resist when they are so 
forced.  According to Simmons, it affirms the reality of the individual‟s natural right of 
self-government, and although no government can allow complete liberty, consent theory 
allows governments to come close to embracing the moral importance of individual 
choice. 
The problem with Lockean consent theory, though, is not its intuitive appeal, 
argues Simmons, but its lack of realism.  Since true consent, the kind that fulfills the four 
requirements above, is so rarely given and the posited alternatives fail to convey the spirit 
of true consent (more on this below), there are no real acts performed by citizens 
sufficient to legitimate state authority and obligate individuals to obey the state‟s 
directives.  Simmons argues that a true Lockean must uphold voluntarism as essential; all 
persons are born with “natural freedom (i.e., moral freedom from political authority and 
the de jure authority of others),” and only voluntaristic political theory respects this 
natural freedom
17
.  If the political relationship between the individual and state could be 
rendered voluntary and the acts of governments could truly be the result of a freely-given 
individual will, then citizens could have political obligations and de jure political 
authority could exist.  However, since the world is currently arranged the way it is, 
Simmons argues, we are forced to accept philosophical anarchism, the position that 
citizens have no political obligations and states do not have the right to rule. 
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The Failure of “Tacit” Consent  Simmons posits that Lockean voluntarism 
definitely includes all instances of clear and deliberate rights-transferring and obligation-
taking like promising, contracting, and expressly consenting.  However, when it comes to 
the individual/state relationship, very few individuals ever actively give up rights and 
take on obligations.  Locke must have noticed this, and consent theorists since have also 
noticed it, so “the real battleground for consent theory is generally admitted to be the 
notion of tacit consent…it is on this leg that consent theory must lean most heavily if it is 
to succeed.”
18
  In the Second Treatise, Locke seemed to imply that acts like purchasing 
land and the enjoyment of state services count as acts of tacit consent to the state, 
obligating persons to obey the state‟s laws as long as the individual continues owning the 
land and enjoying the services. 
 Simmons rightly concludes, though, that no plausible interpretation of tacit 
consent can include the very passive non-actions listed by Locke.  For instance, there is 
no reason to believe that when a person purchases a parcel of land, he intends that that 
purchase proves his desire to enter into civil society, authorize the government‟s power 
over him, and obligate himself to obey the state‟s laws.  Similarly, nothing about 
travelling along a highway or drinking clean water can be characterized as an attempt to 
enter into a consensual, authority-sharing relationship with the government.   
If any act or lack thereof is to count as a sign of tacit consent, it must be done with 
the proper mental attitude: the intent to voluntarily give up one‟s personal powers to the 
state and the will to take on a political obligation to obey the law.  To say that Locke 
simply casts too wide a net over a person‟s actions is charitable, because the argument 
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(unintentionally?) implies that all persons are obligated for all of their lives simply 
because they were born and raised in that state.  The too-loose conception of tacit consent 
winds up undermining the very notion of voluntarism, argues Simmons, because so much 
of the passive residence and enjoyment of the state would obligate the individual without 
him ever having the right intent, which runs counter to the notion of natural freedom.  If 
most of the ground of political obligation and state legitimacy rests upon the tacit consent 
of the governed, and if tacit consent cannot actually obligate citizens and authorize the 
state‟s use of power, then it follows for Simmons that few, if any, citizens are obligated 
to obey their governments, and no states have legitimate authority to rule.  We are forced 
to accept philosophical anarchism. 
 
The Failure of Majority Rule  A further problem arises from Locke‟s dependence 
on majority rule, according to Simmons.  Even if we could work around the failure of 
tacit consent to a point where all citizens really did meet the four requirements of 
classical consent, majority rule defeats the spirit of voluntarism.  On the model that 
Locke presents, when individuals want to leave the state of nature, they give their 
voluntary consent to the new civil society; after that, if the government acts, it does so at 
the will of the majority of the citizens.  Thus, the actions of the government are twice 
removed from the actions of the individual – the individual authorizes the majority and 
the majority authorizes the government.   
Although Locke is correct that the government, if it is to move as a single body, 
can only move one direction, it is not obviously correct that the direction ought to be 
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decided upon by the majority of the citizenry.  Majority rule is a useful decision-making 
convention, but it isn‟t the only one, and the fact that it is a prevailing convention does 
not imply that it is the best possible option.  For instance, it could be the case that 51% of 
a population was in favor of doing x, but only mildly so, while the remaining 49% was 
strongly opposed to doing x.  Even though there is a numerical majority in favor of x-ing, 
there might be much more force of will against x-ing.  If this was the case, majority rule 
might be a less-valuable convention because the technical majority may be different from 
the majority of spirit. 
For Simmons, the failure of Locke‟s majority rule argument seems to rest on a 
second, inexplicit act that chooses majority rule as the favored form of governance.  After 
all, that is how all conventions are arrived upon – individuals happen to do the same thing 
enough, without formal binding, to the point that a large-enough percentage of the 
population does that thing.  Conventions are unintentional features of groups, so there is 
no reason to believe that they are the products of consenting acts strong enough to bind 
citizens and legitimize governments.  There is no reason to believe that majority rule is 
the result of a double act of consent by an individual citizen.  If most citizens never 
perform an explicit act of consent to join civil society, then most citizens also never 
perform a second act of explicit consent to authorize majority rule.  Therefore, 
philosophical anarchism must be accepted because the guiding principle behind a state‟s 






Simmons concludes On the Edge of Anarchy by presenting the following 
dilemma: since pure political consent theory fails, a person motivated by the true spirit of 
Lockean voluntarism must either (a) reject explicit voluntarism as the basis of political 
obligation and state authority, or (b) accept the truth of philosophical anarchism, that few 
citizens have political obligations and no states have legitimate authority.  For Simmons, 
(a) is not an acceptable option.  He supports the claims that all persons are naturally free, 
that part of this natural freedom is the right not to be bound by any will other than our 
own, and that voluntarism is the only theory of obligation and legitimacy that adequately 
respects individual freedoms. 
I believe that Simmons‟ preference for option (b) is understandable, as there are 
some situations where classical consent theory is appropriate for evaluating the 
legitimacy of authority-sharing relationships.  Chapter 3 delves into some of the more 
subtle nuances as to why classical consent theory is consistent with voluntarism, beyond 
the four traditionally-given requirements.  Examination of these further background 
requirements, along with the traditional requirements themselves, shows that while 
classical consent theory can be appropriately applied in some situations, it cannot make 
sense of the individual/state political relationship.  Not only are there far more practical 
problems than Simmons acknowledges (Chapter 4), but citizens are also unable to meet 
the sufficient understanding requirement (Chapter 5).  Furthermore, the political 
relationship is of a fundamentally different kind than those in which classical consent 
theory is appropriate, so expecting the political relationship to fit the voluntarist model is 
wrong-headed (Chapter 6).  So, while Simmons‟ argument for rejecting option (a) is 
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understandable, doing so is incorrect, which makes philosophical anarchism unnecessary.  
Chapter 7 is devoted to an alternative way of approaching the individual/state 
relationship, one that properly deals with the practical, epistemic, and ontological 
problems of classical consent theory while attempting to maintain some of the original 




Chapter 2: Robust Consent in Private Relationships 
 
 The Lockean argument that, if we are to respect the natural freedom and equality 
of individuals, voluntarism ought to be the basis of a government‟s rightful authority, is 
understandable.  Similarly, Simmons‟s argument that all state authority is bound to be 
illegitimate because citizens rarely or never give consent, is also understandable, because 
citizens never really give this kind of consent to their states.  As I will argue in this 
chapter, classical consent theory provides arguments that cohere with an intuitively 
appealing moral understanding of human independence because they respect and elevate 
human rationality and equality.  However, as I will later argue, the Lockeans wrongly try 
to extend classical consent theory‟s authorizing powers to an arena that they just do not 
belong: the individual/state relationship.  Actual consent makes sense of authority 
exchanges in some instances, so it seems reasonable that one would want political 
authority to rest on such foundations, but these types of relationships are different in very 
important ways from the public relationship of the citizen and his state.  To see why this 
is so, I will begin by looking at cases where classical consent theory does authorize 
authority exchanges while maintaining the personal power of the consenter, which I 
believe to be the moral undercurrent of classical consent theory. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to explore the finer points of why classical consent 
theory might be a correct yardstick in some power exchanges.  I believe that these finer 
points are assumed in the classical consent theorist‟s arguments, and that these conditions 
must be present if the power exchange is to be legitimate.  The requirements for the 
rightful transfer of authority listed in Chapter 2 are all necessary, but they only deal with 
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the most obvious requirements for properly giving and receiving an individual‟s personal 
power.  The further underlying conditions that I discuss are, I believe, just as relevant as 
the obvious ones in legitimating authority exchanges.  The fact that classical consent 
theorists only focus on the superficial requirements explains why they wrongly attempt to 
apply classical consent to the individual/state relationship and why some come to the 
conclusion that philosophical anarchy is justified. 
 
4 Examples of Private Relationships 
 In order to distinguish the individual/state relationship from those relationships 
whose authority exchanges are legitimated by classical consent, I am calling the former 
public relationships and the latter, private relationships.  The examples of private 
relationships that I use are boring; they involve normal people interacting in ordinary 
ways, in a non-political context.  I have chosen these examples because they are as 
uncontroversial as possible; no matter what one‟s position on liberal natural rights or 
communitarian ethics is, these examples seem to be coherent and plausible relationships 
that happen in most of our lives.  Power exchanges can be grand or minor, and whichever 
level they occur on, they shape our lives in profound ways.  The first two private 
relationships are examples of intimate relationships, to use Onora O‟Neill‟s phrase, 
where the agents are involved in long-standing amicable interaction.  The second two 
private relationships are examples of private economic relationships, and the agents are 
engaged in impersonal, limited time exchanges.  I understand that, given the world as it is 
now, all persons stand in a political relationship to one another as a matter of fact, but I 
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consider these relationships private in that we really don‟t specially reference that 
political relationship as establishing the grounds of the interaction. 
 The first relationship is that of good friends Heidi and Betsy.  Right now, they 
want to go see a movie together.  Since Heidi does not have a particular movie in mind, 
and Betsy, the film buff, always has great taste in movies, Heidi tells Betsy to pick the 
film they will see.  Given Betsy‟s good track record in choosing movies, Heidi decides 
that she (Heidi) is likely to enjoy whatever Betsy picks, so she won‟t bother making her 
own choice.  Good friend that she is, Betsy takes into account Heidi‟s dislike of horror 
films, and chooses the new alien-invasion blockbuster.  The ladies purchase the tickets 
and go into the theatre. 
 Heidi‟s consenting to Betsy‟s choice of movie has met classical consent theory‟s 
basic requirements as well as its spirit.  Heidi was not forced to see the new alien-
invasion blockbuster.  She could have changed her mind, withdrew her consent, after 
Betsy made the choice if she was afraid that the alien-invasion movie seemed too similar 
to a horror film for her comfort.  Her ticket purchase was made knowingly, free from 
coercion, and through a clear sign because Betsy said that they should see that movie.  
Betsy‟s authority covers only Heidi‟s film-watching in this instance; Betsy cannot 
perform surgery on Heidi or force her to change her shoes if she (Betsy) did not like 
them.  If Heidi quits her job and runs away with the circus, Betsy cannot stop her, and 
can only attempt to dissuade her.  In the movie-watching scenario, Heidi obeys Betsy 
because doing so “provides…an instrumental justification for accepting another‟s 
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determinations as one‟s own: consenting [is] the best means to achieve an independently 
specifiable end,"
19
 her desire to watch a movie tonight. 
 Suppose that Heidi changed her mind after agreeing to see whichever movie 
Betsy chose.  Has Heidi performed any wrong by refusing to obey and, if so, would Betsy 
be allowed to punish Betsy?  Most persons would agree that Heidi might be somewhat 
wrong by withdrawing her agreement, as it could be the case that Betsy rearranged her 
plans for the evening because she and Heidi were going to go to that movie.  This wrong, 
however, is fairly minor, more inconsiderate than immoral, and while Betsy may be 
angry and refuse to go to the movies with Heidi in the future, it seems wrong to conclude 
that Betsy could have a right to punish Heidi for her refusal to obey.  Betsy cannot force 
Heidi to pay for any wasted time, and she cannot prevent Heidi from ever going to the 
movies again. 
 Another instance of an intimate consenting relationship would be that of husband 
and wife, Mike and Karen.  Assuming their marriage is a typical Western one (not forced, 
arranged, or the result of a simple business transaction), Mike and Karen have consented 
to spend their lives together.  They share finances, possessions, children, and their bodies 
(to certain extent), and they plan to do so for the rest of their lives. 
 Their arrangement covers a wide variety of transactions that are prima facie 
implicitly consensual, like when Karen buys groceries using their joint checking account.  
Suppose that their 30
th
 wedding anniversary is coming up and Mike asks Karen to pick 
where they will go to celebrate, seeing as he chose the destination for their 25
th
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anniversary.  Karen knows that Mike wants to go to Australia, but since she is horribly 
afraid of flying, she chooses Las Vegas because it is within driving distance and offers 
many exciting activities.  Mike is disappointed with her choice, but he tries to enjoy 
himself.  Even though he never said the words “I consent,” there is strong reason to 
believe that Mike has performed a consenting act, both by asking Karen to pick the 
destination and by driving to Las Vegas.  He knew of her fear of flying and that she 
might not be willing to travel to Australia, yet he still gave her his consent with the intent 
of allowing her to pick their anniversary destination.   
Despite the extent of their relationship and the fact that they go through many 
power-sharing acts on a regular basis, their consent to one another‟s authority is not all-
encompassing or irrevocable.  One assaulting the other would still be wrong, even though 
marriage usually involves partners touching one another without getting explicit consent 
prior to each touch.  If a couple decides to divorce, many of their prior implied 
consentings (shared money, for instance) are nullified. 
 What if, when Karen revealed Las Vegas as their destination, Mike gets upset and 
refuses to go?  After all, he did want to go to Australia for their anniversary.  Most of us 
would say that he would be acting wrongly by withdrawing his prior agreement.  Mike 
would be cold and uncaring to expect his desire to visit Australia to be sufficient to 
override his wife‟s absolute fear of flying.  However, his poor character in this instance 
would not give Karen the right to punish him by locking him in a closet or forcing him to 
give her money – although a few nights on the couch might be called for. 
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 My first example of a private economic relationship is the doctor and patient 
relationship.  Billy wants to have a certain kind of minor, elective surgery, and he hears 
that Dr. Doug is the best surgeon to meet his needs.  Billy meets with Dr. Doug and they 
discuss Billy‟s case, including the risks and benefits of having the surgery.  Dr. Doug 
asks Billy, “Are you sure you want to go through with this surgery?”  Billy says yes.  Dr. 
Doug asks, “Should I go ahead and book an operating room for such and such a date at 
such and such a time?”  Billy, again, says yes. 
 I believe that Billy, in this instance, has given his consent to Dr. Doug to perform 
the elective surgery.  Billy‟s consent meets all of the obvious criteria of classical consent 
theory: he knowingly (after discussing and reading pamphlets, and perhaps some internet 
searching; see the section on informed consent in Chapter 2) gives his permission to Dr. 
Doug through a clear sign (saying yes and then, presumably, signing many, many forms), 
free of any coercion, with the intent of authorizing Dr. Doug to do the operation.  Both 
sides know that their relationship begins and ends with Billy‟s medical needs; Dr. Doug 
will perform the operation and give any other related medical treatment, but he cannot 
rightfully demand lodging in Billy‟s home or have any control over Billy‟s love life.  If 
Billy changes his mind at the last minute and decides to not have the surgery, Dr. Doug 
cannot force the procedure on him anyway.   
 Suppose that, despite Dr. Doug‟s orders to the contrary, Billy plays squash only 
days after his surgery and rips his stitches.  Has Billy committed a moral wrong by 
refusing to follow Dr. Doug‟s orders?  Most of us would say no, of course not.  The only 




 Since Billy is conscious and able to make informed decisions (as opposed to 
being unconscious and in the emergency room), Dr. Doug has no right to strap Billy to 
his bed at home and force him to remain inactive, nor may Dr. Doug destroy Billy‟s 
prized possessions as punishment.  Their relationship is purely economic, and is not 
bound or defined by any intimate emotional investments.  Billy pays Dr. Doug for his 
medical services, and not for legal advice. 
 A final private economic relationship to look at is that of an employee, Darren, 
and the various officials of the company he works for, Hi-Bek Precision Spring 
Company, Ltd.  It is part of Darren‟s contract that he works forty hours per week in order 
to qualify for his medical and retirement benefits, and Darren would like to keep his 
benefits.  Suppose that Darren has used up all of his sick leave and vacation time, but he 
decides to miss work to attend a week-long sporting event.  Hi-Bek suspends his benefits 
because Darren‟s absence makes him only a part-time employee.  When Darren goes to 
the emergency room because he is injured at the sporting event, his visit is not covered 
and he is forced to pay the full hospital bill out of pocket. 
 Although this relationship differs from the previous three because it is between an 
individual person and a group, the company, classical consent theory is still an 
appropriate lens to evaluate the authority transfer between Darren and Hi-Bek.  Assuming 
that Darren was not coerced or mislead into taking the position, Darren‟s signing his 
contract gave Hi-Bek authority over certain areas of Darren‟s life, including his wages 
and benefits.  Even though Darren is a spring-maker and not a legal expert, he is 
intelligent enough to understand the details of his contract and the consequences of 
violating the terms. 
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 If Darren and Hi-Bek‟s consenting exchange meets classical consent theory‟s 
conditions, as it seems to, then Darren did consent to having his benefits suspended, 
albeit indirectly and probably begrudgingly.  Darren and Hi-Bek both understand
20
 that 
their relationship only goes so far as the terms of the contract; Hi-Bek cannot force 
Darren to stop enjoying sports and Darren cannot force the spring manufacturer or its 
executives to re-carpet his house.  When Darren refuses to follow the rules of his 
contract, Hi-Bek can only punish him according to the contract. 
Pairing Relationship Subject of Authority Transfer 
Heidi and Betsy Best friends Decision of what movie to watch 
tonight 
Mike and Karen Married couple Decision of where to go on 
anniversary vacation 
Billy and Dr. Doug Patient and Doctor Power over Billy‟s body for elective 
surgery 
Darren and Hi-Bek Employee and Employer Power over the payment of Darren‟s 
medical benefits 
 
Fulfilling Classical Consent Theory‟s Stated Requirements 
 To show that classical consent theory is a good indicator of the rightful exchange 
of authority in some private relationships, such as the four I have just discussed, I want to 
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 A group, such as Hi-Bek, can have an “understanding” of something insofar as it is stipulated in the 
terms of the contract, the group‟s constitution, and the executors of those rules.  As I will discuss in 
Chapter 4, even if the information and the human understanding of it are diffused over many different 
individuals within a group, the coordination of those individuals can make that knowledge cohesive. 
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start by showing how those authority exchanges fulfill the theory‟s stated requirements as 
outlined in Chapter 2.  I believe that classical consent theory‟s fitness as a measure of 
legitimacy – rightful authority – goes much deeper than these four criteria.  Locke, 
Simmons, and many others are right to value classical consent because of these factors. 
 
Freedom from Coercion  None of the consenting acts described before were 
performed under coercion.  While Mike and Darren were faced with difficult choices 
(Mike gave the decision-making power to his wife even though he knew it would 
probably entail not going to Australia, and Darren gave up his benefits to attend the 
sporting event), their duress does not seem to be substantial enough to void their consent.  
Darren may have to pay large medical bills if he gets hurt, but there was no real need for 
him to attend the sporting event in the first place.  Furthermore, it is a stretch to say that 
the possibility of future high medical bills could have somehow coerced Darren into 
working instead of taking off.  Mike could just have easily opted to plan a holiday 
together with his wife, but he instead chose to give the reins to Karen.  Betsy did not hold 
Heidi‟s cats hostage in order to obtain her consent, and the option to just stay in for the 
night was equally tenable as going out.  Dr. Doug did not threaten Billy‟s family in order 
to perform the surgery, and the procedure itself was voluntary and unnecessary, 
medically speaking. 
 
Sufficient Signs  All four of the agents in these examples expressed their 
consent through sufficient signs, as is required by classical consent theory.  The 
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participants in intimate relationships gave their consent verbally, Darren gave his consent 
through the signing of a contract, and Billy‟s consent was expressed both verbally and 
through a contract.  Also, all four of the relationships rely heavily on a Simmons-like 
notion of tacit consent.  Neither Heidi nor Mike withdrew their verbal consents after 
Betsy and Karen made their respective choices, even though they had ample opportunity 
to do so, even though those choice opportunities were not formally announced and 
enforced by Betsy or Karen.  Since there were no signs of coercion between the times 
when Betsy and Karen made their pronouncements and Heidi and Mike obeyed, then 
both pairs had clear choice situations “when objections or expressions of dissent are 
invited or clearly appropriate, and the acceptable means of expressing this dissent [is] 
understood by or made known to the potential consenter.”
21
  Similarly, neither Billy nor 
Darren made attempts to withdraw their consent and sever the economic relationship 
from Dr. Doug or Hi-Bek before having the surgery and missing work, respectively, 
when both were possible. 
 It is also important to note that the signs of consent in these examples fit their 
respective circumstances.  For the informal exchanges between intimates, verbal 
agreement and tacit consent are enough to transmit the moral weight of the consent and 
ground the new power exchange.  It would be odd indeed for Heidi to express her consent 
to follow Betsy‟s movie choice by putting her hand on a bible and swearing a public oath, 
or if Mike and Karen had a signed and notarized document confirming Mike‟s agreement 
to go with Karen‟s vacation choice.  On the other hand, because Billy and Darren‟s 
consentings are not between intimates and do involve the exchange of goods and 
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services.  Because abuse of the power transferred could have significant consequences, it 
is appropriate for them to make their signs of consent more public and official. 
 In order for the formalization of a compact or other act of consent to occur such 
that both parties, consenter and recipient, could be aware of and understand its terms, that 
power transfer could not cover a near-infinite number of rules and technicalities to the 
point where it would be meaningless to the parties.  When Darren took the job at Hi-Bek, 
he probably got an employee handbook as an addendum to the contract he signed.  Even 
if it is an enormous company, Hi-Bek‟s handbook cannot be so large that Darren could 
not possibly understand all of its nuances enough to follow them all (to hold up his end of 
the contract), or that Hi-Bek‟s executives could not possibly enforce the rules (to hold up 
their end of the contract).  The forms that Billy files with his doctors cannot be so 
numerous or complex that Billy is unable to comprehend exactly what he is consenting 
to.  If the power-transferring acts are too complicated, then the sufficient understanding 
requirement of classical consent theory cannot be satisfied, rendering any act performed 
by either party null and void. 
 
Sufficient Understanding  This leads us to the third formal reason why 
classical consent theory is able to legitimate some private authority exchanges: because 
our consenters have sufficient understanding of what they are getting themselves into by 
consenting to the others.  Presumably, Heidi is aware of plenty of the movies currently in 
the theaters, and Mike is familiar with Karen‟s taste in holiday spots.  They both know 
that, by consenting, they are binding themselves to pay the accompanying expenses of 
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their joint ventures, so when Betsy and Karen make their respective choices, there are no 
surprises to the consenters.  Meeting the sufficient understanding requirement may be 
more difficult in some private economic exchanges, but Billy and Darren‟s cases show 
that doing so is entirely plausible.  Darren may not be a legal scholar, and so may not 
know the nuances of what his employment means as well as Hi-Bek‟s executives, 
lawyers, or human resources personnel, but he is intelligent enough to understand the 
terms of his contract and accompanying employment information.  And what‟s more, 
there is nothing for him to know that isn‟t already in the contract; adding a new clause to 
Darren‟s contract would require another consenting act.  Finally, even though Billy‟s 
understanding of the procedure is not nearly as thorough as Dr. Doug‟s (we should hope 
that Dr. Doug is more knowledgable on this account if Billy is not a physician, too), Billy 
can do research and read Dr. Doug‟s information brochures to gain sufficient knowledge 
of the object of his consent.  While informed consent is a hotly debated issue in medical 
ethics, Billy is capable of meeting the generally accepted standards.  Part of Dr. Doug‟s 
job (the service that he is providing, as well as his moral duty) is to make sure that Billy 
is cognizant of: 
1)The patient‟s diagnosis, if known; 2) The nature and purose of a proposed 
treatment or procedure; 3) The risks and benefits of a proposed treatment or 
procedure; 4) Alternatives (regardless of their cost or the extent to which the 
treatment options are covered by health insurance); 5) The risks and benefits of 
the alternative treatment or procedure; and 6) The risks and benefits of not 




Since Billy‟s elective procedure is minor and he has done his research prior to coming to 
Dr. Doug, Billy easily meets the sufficient understanding requirement for classical 





consent theory‟s proper transfer of power, and an imbalance of knowledge is not 
detrimental to Billy‟s autonomy. 
 
Intentionality  Finally, all of our consenters meet classical consent theory‟s 
intentionality requirement, which holds that the agent must intend for the act of 
consenting to bring about a change in power.  Given their understanding of the object of 
consent, the agents give their signs to achieve a change in normative status between 
themselves and the recipients.  Because she wants to make it clear that she is authorizing 
Betsy‟s power to make the movie selection, Heidi tells Betsy to make their movie choice; 
because he wants to make it clear that he wants Karen to decide where they are going on 
their anniversary vacation, Mike asks Karen to make the choice.  Billy and Darren sign 
their contracts so that, in exchange for the respective surgery and employment, Dr. Doug 
and Hi-Bek can exercise authority in realms in which they were previously impotent.  
Because all of our agents are aware of the personal powers they are giving up and 
because they intend to give up those powers, they perform the appropriate consenting 
acts. 
 
Classical Consent Theory‟s Implied Requirements 
 I believe that the four previous cases show that there are some relationships for 
which classical consent theory can provide the appropriate standard of evaluating the 
rightfulness of the authority exchange.  In all of these cases, if the agents had not given 
their consent as dictated by the theory (with the correct intent, sufficiently informed, 
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through a clear and appropriate sign, and free from coercion), then the respective 
exercises of power would be illegitimate and immoral.  However, I believe that there are 
further, implied requirements behind these state four.  Simmons is right to stick by 
classical consent theory because it is appealing due to the picture it paints of the 
individuals involved and their relationship; the agents are special and valuable apart from 
their usefulness to others, and the relationship is only acceptable when that special value 
is preserved and supported.  If the independence of the individuals and their relationship 
is to be honored, a richer background of circumstances must be present, beyond the stated 
four requirements.  By exploring these further, implied requirements, we will see why 
classical consent theory determines the legitimacy of some private power exchanges so 
well, and – more importantly – why classical consent theory simply does not apply to the 






  I think it is important to begin with the pre-
constitutional autonomy of the agents in the relationship, as this differs from the 
individual/state relationship; one of the traditional problems with consent theory is that 
we are almost always “born into” our state‟s authority, making the possibility of pre-
constitutional autonomy untenable.  Prior to the consenting event, the parties in private 
relationships involved had no power-exchange or power-sharing.  Their lives (or 
existences, for companies or groups) were, practically speaking, separate from one 
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 This term is borrowed from James M. Buchanan; the pre-constitutional phase is the time before an 
authority relationship is established, and the post-constitutional phase is the time after that relationships is 
established or constituted. 
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 For this section and the next, I use the term „autonomy‟ in a loose, practical manner regarding the 
independence that the parties have from one another.  I have no need to delve into deeper, Kantian ideas 
about practical reason here. 
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another.  The agents in our examples can be regarded as being autonomous in the pre-
constitutional phase, before the authority relationship is established.  Much like a 
Lockean state of nature, it makes sense to say that, with regard to one another, our agents 
are independent of one another and have no common authority over them on the matter of 
these particular exchanges.  Before Heidi consented to Betsy‟s movie-picking authority, 
Heidi was autonomous with regard to her movie-picking, along with most
25
 other aspects 
of her life.  Before Billy consented to Dr. Doug doing his surgery, we can say that he 
(Billy) had some real authority over what happened to his body.  Nobody other than Mike 
was allowed to make Mike‟s holiday choices until he asked Karen to do so; in fact, Mike 
had control over most of his life choices before he married and agreed to share some of 
his decision-making powers.  Our examples show that there may be real rights that can be 
given up.  This point may seem redundant to the supporter of classical consent theory, but 
it is important to remember.  Legitimate authority relationships can be established only 
where real autonomy and rights have previously existed, and if there is no right to x in the 
first place, then that right cannot be lent to another person. 
To go along with the idea of pre-constitutional autonomy, we should also note 
that all of the persons and groups in these examples, rational and competent agents, 
entered their respective associations willingly – doing so was not necessary.  Billy did 
not need the surgery to begin with, and even if he did, it could have been the case that he 
approached another doctor.  Heidi did not need to leave her home tonight, to go to the 
movies, or to be friends with Betsy at all.  Mike and Karen did not have to marry; Karen 
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 I am purposely shying away from claiming that our agents were 100% autonomous before entering into 
these specific power-sharing relationships.  We presumably enter into many power-sharing relationships 
throughout our lives, and it is useful to speak of personal independence in these cases. 
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could have run off with her dance instructor, or they could have decided to remain just 
friends.  Darren could have turned down Hi-Bek‟s offer and taken the plunge into the 
world of professional curling.  Still, in spite of these „could haves,‟ our agents decided to 
enter into power-exchanging relationships, as we are all bound to do. 
 The fact that the parties enjoy pre-constitutional independence and then willingly 
come together effectively eliminates the possibility that their consenting act might be 
tainted by some original unwilling association.  It is not enough that the agents simply be 
making a freely-chosen decision right now.  If the relationship is founded with some lack 
of willingness on the part of one participant, then that might mitigate the willingly-chosen 
status of the current exchange.  For instance, I believe that even though I am a fully-
grown adult now, I may not be as able to say „no‟ to my parents if they needed something 
from me, as opposed to somebody else.  This mitigated freedom is not necessarily a bad 
or dangerous thing, but it seems reasonable to argue that their former (benevolent) 
dominion over me might have impacted my current willingness to do as they wish.  In a 
more negative light, the same could be said for slaves and victims of Stockholm 
syndrome.  Even though a slave may eventually accept his current situation to the point 
that he consents to do a specific chore, the fact that he did not consent to the relationship 
in the first place mitigates at least some of the legitimacy of a current consenting act.  A 
hostage or kidnapping victim may eventually develop a positive, empathetic relationship 
with his captor, but the present willingness of the current situation is undermined by the 
forced nature of the relationship, to the point where we may not hold a victim of 
Stockholm syndrome fully accountable if he commits a crime for his captor. 
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Possible Substantive Post-Constitutional Autonomy
26
  The four examples 
that I have given also highlight another important requirement for legitimate consent: the 
ability to withdraw one‟s consent and end the authority that was held over him.  Not only 
do the consenters retain independence over other facets of their lives, but they also retain 
morally significant authority over the facet of their lives that they “lend” to others.  While 
we expect both sides to commit to the terms of the contract (morally speaking), it is also 
imperative (morally speaking) that each member of the relationship should be allowed to 
exit when they wish, if the spirit of voluntarism is to be maintained.  The consenter needs 
to be able to withdraw his consent, and the authoritative body needs to be free to 
relinquish its authority.  Forcing a party to remain in the relationship is tyrannical, “a vain 
and contradictory convention,”
27
 and defeats the spirit of classical consent.  Billy can 
decide to find another doctor, or Dr. Doug can decide that he doesn‟t want Billy as a 
patient.  Assuming that both parties are independent before the consenting event, as 
classical consent theory requires they be, the purpose of consent is to keep the consenter 
“as free as he was before” a la Rousseau.
28
 
 This should be recognized as more than some moral platitude.  For independence 
to be real and meaningful, withdrawal of consent must be a practical possibility.  Properly 
construed, consent creates only a contingent, default power structure, and consent is to be 
used for the betterment of the consentee.  Handing over bits of personal autonomy is 
necessary for meaningful survival, but it is odd to think that these bits should be 
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having serious mental deficits, etc.) act independently from one another and are thus autonomous.  It is 
useful to talk this way about people, even if I am dubious about any argument that advocates a deeper, 
more fundamental personal independence. 
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permanent.  How queer it would be for Heidi to forfeit her movie-watching autonomy for 
the rest of her life, only to satisfy tonight‟s interest.  Building a meaningful life in civil 
society (which I believe is the purpose of classical consent as Locke, Rousseau, and 
others imagined it) means being part of the give and take of authority over oneself while 
maintaining the importance of the individual agent.  Classical consent theory is the 
appropriate measure of legitimate authority in the examples I have given because those 
relationships were constructed so that the power-holding was never meant to be 
permanent.  The possibility of withdrawal of consent is practical and necessary, for how 
could Billy continue his life if Dr. Doug had permanent authority over his body? 
 These private relationships allow for mobility and the possibility of the agents 
meeting their needs through others.  If we maintain the idea that one can enter a 
consenting relationship and remain as free as before, then the agents must be able to 
withdraw from their relationships and pursue other avenues in order to meet their 
interests.  As I stated earlier, sufficient understanding in the pre-constitutional phase 
entails that the consenter needs to be aware of other potential authorities and must be able 
to pursue those others if desired; the complement to this in the post-constitutional phase 
entails that the consenter needs to remain aware of other potential authorities and be free 
to withdraw his original consent and pursue them.  The examples of private relationships 
that I have given are such that, because of the terms of the original consent (that they 
were not established with the desire that the authority be given over forever), they allow 




Possibility of Open Communication and Adjustment  In all of the cases that I have 
used, from Billy‟s surgery to Heidi‟s movie-watching, classical consent theory is the 
correct evaluator of legitimate power because the agents have the option of open, regular 
communication and adaptation.  With Billy‟s and Darren‟s cases, establishing this would 
be part of the original constitutional construction.  Even if Hi-Bek is a large company 
whose chief executives are far removed from normal employees, Darren can interact with 
his immediate executives; it is with them that he signs his contract and makes 
arrangements for benefits.  Because Darren‟s bosses are rightful executors of Hi-Bek‟s 
orders, and because Darren does actually consent with full understanding of his contract, 
the consenting act legitimates the authority.  If he has questions about the nuances of his 
contract, he is able to ask his manager and get the correct answer so he can avoid 
breaking the rules.  If Darren has problems with his contract, he can raise his grievances 
with his bosses, who can eventually consult the chief executives, making it possible for 
Darren to alter the very terms of his original consenting event. 
 In a similar vein, we can see Mike‟s consent to Karen‟s choice of holiday 
destination as an instance in a larger consenting structure, that of husband and wife.  Of 
course, we expect them to have sufficient knowledge over the contents of their original 
marriage vows, but the written or spoken words of their ceremony do not begin to cover 
what married couples consent to.  Much of the power that they share over one another is 
consented to only indirectly or implicitly.  Their agreement is more open-ended than 
economic relationships, and new topics are constantly up for discussion.  Mike will buy a 
new DVD with their common money, Karen will commit them to a dinner party, and yet 
we do not think that either has committed a wrong by not obtaining express consent in 
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this instance.  Classical consent theory is still the correct basis for their relationship 
because the very nature of their relationship involves regular, face-to-face contact and 
communication.  They consult with one another on new items of interest, and their 
commitment to old items of interest is regularly up for renewal.  If Karen disapproves of 
Mike‟s spending on DVDs, or if Make has to work late on the night of the dinner party, 
the disagreements can be instantly registered and adjusted for. 
 The cases of Darren and Karen and Mike show that for consenting relationships 
that extend over a period of time, beyond a single exchange, the possibility of 
communication and adjustment are required if the power exchange is to be legitimate.  
No relationship exists in a vacuum, so there is bound to be the need to adjust for 
unforeseen circumstances.  Karen may have to break an appointment that Mike made on 
her behalf, and Hi-Bek may have to call Darren in for an emergency meeting outside of 
his normal schedule.  Therefore, in authority relationships that exist over time, 
adjustments may have to be made if the parties are to truly remain as free as they were 
before.  The rest of an agent‟s independence isn‟t suspended simply because he or she has 
entered into a single authority-sharing relationship, so that authority-sharing relationship 
must be flexible if it is to truly respect the agent‟s freedom in the spirit of voluntarism.  
The only way to achieve this flexibility is to have open lines of communication.  
Therefore, communication and the capacity to adjust are implied requirements of 




Private Subject Matter  As all of my examples show, the objects of consent 
in private relationships are private issues, aspects of what we normally refer to as our 
„private lives
29
‟.  Our actions do affect others in the world around us in obvious and not 
so obvious ways, sometimes with far-reaching consequences, but many of our private 
interactions are limited by our arm‟s reach.  Billy‟s surgery essentially impacts only Billy 
and Dr. Doug (and affiliated medical persons) because Billy‟s body is a private matter 
and he is able control what happens to it.  Heidi and Betsy are capable of controlling their 
free time, and their watching the new blockbuster (because of Heidi‟s consent to Betsy‟s 
authority) has minimal impact on the world outside of their private lives.  I will discuss 
another, non-private way of looking at these relationships, but for now – and for most 
aspects of our lives – I can say with confidence that our typical way of regarding one 
another is as private citizens.  My normal, day-to-day actions are not going to be affected 
by whether or not Darren works at Hi-Bek, since very little of my life has to do with 
springs, and even if I was truly connected to the spring-making world, it may not matter 
to me whether it is Darren doing the work or somebody else, as long as I get my springs.  
If Darren is a stranger and not directly part of my life, whether or not he loses his benefits 
does not impact what kind of shoes I will buy; the fact that Karen controls the family‟s 
spending is of no direct concern to the world at large, nor are most private authority 
relationships. 
 Classical consent theory is the appropriate arbiter of legitimacy in these 
relationships because all of the units of authority up for transfer are, in an important way 
of speaking, under the purview of private persons.  I can only give to another my power 
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 As mentioned earlier, I use „private‟ as a useful shorthand to mean not political, something that is not 
generally evaluated as part of a greater system. 
52 
 
over x when I actually have power over x to begin with.  You can only have my authority 
over x when I give it to you and you are capable of exercising that authority.  So, 
classical consent theory requires that the object of consent be a finite, specific right that is 
definitely held by one agent and that can be fully and properly transferred to another 
agent. 
 
Self-Legislating and Adjudicating  Because many relationships can be viewed 
as private affairs concerned with private matters, there is a strong sense in which the 
agents are their own rule-makers and judges.  When it comes to tonight‟s movie 
watching, the only relevant decision-making participants are Heidi and Betsy; if Heidi 
does not approve of Betsy‟s film choice, she will only air her grievance with Betsy 
herself.  If Mike does not want to go to Las Vegas for his wedding anniversary, it is up to 
Karen and him to settle the dispute.  Especially between intimates, it is normal and useful 
to view the agents themselves as the only and final legislators and arbiters.  It would be 
odd if Betsy looked to Vincent for back-up in trying to enforce her authority over 
tonight‟s movie-watching.  Since he was not part of the original constitution of this 
private authority relationship, Vincent does not have any say-so, and because it is proper 
to regard Heidi and Betsy as autonomous in this situation, Vincent‟s opinions have no 
standing.  If Heidi and Betsy had appointed Vincent as their arbiter in the pre-
constitutional phase (they asked and he willingly accepted), he would have the authority 
to settle the dispute in that case, but only in virtue of the ladies asking him to be, and not 
because of any pre-existing movie-watching authority of his own.  Similarly, Mike and 
Karen may agree to appoint a third-party arbiter to settle their dispute (which is, 
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apparently, the basis for NBC‟s show, The Marriage Ref), but any power that that third 
party had exists only because Karen and Mike transferred that bit of their own autonomy 
to him or her. 
 In private business matters, it is not as obvious that the consenter and consentee 
are the only relevant agents in the authority relationship, but I believe that we can say 
they are most of the time.  Most disputes between employer and employee are settled by 
those two parties alone, and as long as they keep the matter between themselves (and 
possibly their respective lawyers), they are their own arbiters.  If Darren does miss work 
to go to the sporting event and loses his benefits, Hi-Bek is the sole enforcer of this loss.  
If Darren objects to losing his benefits, he will take the issue up with the company itself; 
having courts intervene in the matter is not the norm, and when this does happen, the 
rules of the game change – a different, public authority becomes a player.  Throughout 
the process, both parties have the option on severing the authority relationship, 
withdrawing consent. 
 Classical consent theory implicitly requires that the agents‟ authority relationship 
be self-contained if both parties are to remain as free as before.  By being the only 
relevant parties in the constitutional process, the agents can make rules that they both 
deem appropriate, keeping them on an even level.  No other types of power are involved 
than those chosen by the participants, so we can be sure that any exchanges made are the 
sole result of the free agents.  If some third-party, outside authority becomes involved in 
the constitution and maintenance of the relationship, imposing restrictions not chose by 
the participants, then the original agents lose some of their relevant autonomy, 




 Classical consent theory presents a compelling and inspiring picture of human 
nature and human interaction, and I believe this is the reason that Simmons supports it to 
the point of philosophical anarchism.  The theory requires that the agents involved be 
rational and autonomous, capable of managing their life affairs.  It demands that 
participants be treated as independent and valuable, apart from their usefulness to others.  
It maintains that the rights of a person are inviolable and that power can exercised over 
him only when he allows it.  The idea of human freedom is no trivial matter, so I 
understand why Simmons holds so strongly to classical consent theory. 
 Furthermore, because I acknowledge that personal value and autonomy may be 
real, I wanted to find situations where classical consent theory and all of its requirements 
is the appropriate measure of legitimate authority.  For the examples I provided, I believe 
that classical consent correctly evaluates the rightness of one person‟s power over 
another.  However, we cannot simply evaluate, for any given situation, whether the four 
basic requirements are fulfilled in a vacuum.  Context matters, and I believe that the 
background conditions I have given are essential to considering the legitimacy of an 
authority exchange.  Classical consent theory requires more of agents and their situations 
than the four stated conditions (freedom from coercion, sufficient understanding, right 
intent, and sufficient sign) if it is to be coherent – it requires that the agents and their 
interactions conform to a certain worldview.  We must be able to show that the agents are 
autonomous in substantive ways, exercising real power over the facets of their lives that 
are up for trade.  In scenarios where people can have real autonomy, in a manner of 
speaking, I agree with the Lockean that they should have real autonomy, and attempts to 
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impinge on that personal power are wrong unless they are authorized by the person in 
question.   
I believe that my divergence from Simmons begins with my consideration of a 
greater consenting context.  To disregard the real choosing situations that agents are in, I 
think, makes real consent start to look like hypothetical consent, which is nothing more 
than a thought experiment with no authorizing power.  Freedom cannot exist in a 
vacuum, or in name only.  Freedom has value only in situations where can truly be 
exercised.  As I will go on to argue in the next chapters, just because we have freedom in 
one aspect of our lives, we cannot automatically assume that we have freedom in other or 
all aspects of our lives.  Just because we think we should have some kind of power 
doesn‟t mean that we really do have that kind of power.  I believe that Simmons conflates 
different types of personal power into a single thing called „freedom‟.  By assuming that 
this one „freedom‟ exists and is inviolable and can only be transferred by classical 
consent, he wrongly concludes that state authority over individuals cannot be justified 




Chapter 4: Functions of the State 
And the Practical Failures of Classical Consent Theory in Public Relationships 
 
 
 In order to understand the several reasons why classical consent theory cannot be 
the basis of state authority by grounding the power exchange between the individual and 
state, we must first understand the areas of life over which states claim and exercise 
authority.  The acts of state power, the authoritative acts that it performs on or in 
conjunction with the individual, will be the objects of any possible consent.  In order for 
the individual citizen to even consider giving consent, he must sufficiently understand 
what powers he is consenting to, form the right intent to authorize the state‟s power over 
him, and then give that consent through a sufficient outward sign whilst free from 
coercion. 
 I will be starting with the minimum realms of power needed to constitute a state 
authority, and show that these realms can entail much more extensive exercises of power 
than Hobbes, Locke or any classical liberal may have considered.  I will show that, in 
order to exist at all in a form we can reasonably call a state (and not any other private 
group, large or small), the state must have the possibility of exercising power over 
multiple facets of individual citizens‟ lives, beyond the minimal realms assumed by the 
liberal tradition.   
From here on out, we must keep in the back of our minds the idea of the political 
relationship – the exercise of legitimate political authority over multiple areas of a 
person‟s life – as the potential object of consent.  In later chapters, I will argue that 
political authority is of a fundamentally different kind than private interpersonal 
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authority, so one cannot be derived from the other, but for now, I want to mention that I 
find it interesting and, truthfully, telling that more of the attention of modern political 
philosophers has been paid to the justification of state power over individuals, than to the 
justification of private authority between individuals.  Hobbes begins Leviathan with a 
treatise on the nature of man, and this soon develops into a work on man‟s necessary 
interactions; all is private and there is no public.  From there, however, Hobbes arrives at 
the need, not just for private arbitration in private disputes, but at the need for “a common 
Power to keep them all in awe.”
30
  Given that individuals cannot rightfully be subject to 
the power of another (because there are no rights in a state of nature), 
 
Before the names of Just, and Unjust can have place, there must be some coercive 
Power, to compell men equally to the performance of their Covenants, but the 





In the state of „warre‟, private interpersonal power exchanges are bound to occur, but the 
invention of the commonwealth is necessary to control these previously-interpersonal 
power exchanges and bring about peace.  Similarly, Locke argues that it is not “every 
compact that puts an end to the state of Nature between men, but only this one of 
agreement together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politic.”
32
  
The Law of Nature (which governs private interaction) is, I believe, treated somewhat 
superficially, especially given how integral it is to the entirety of Locke‟s argument.  
Some private interpersonal authority has one set of rules, those that can and should be 
legitimated by classical consent theory, as discussed in the previous chapter, but I will 
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argue that an entirely new and different kind of authority is created by entering into 
political society, and that this new authority cannot and should not be legitimated by 
classical consent.  I mention this now because, as we begin discussing how classical 
consent theory‟s demands aren‟t met in public relationships, we should notice that these 
failures do not arise simply because of inconvenience, but because of a deeper rift. 
 For the first parts of this chapter, I will be outlining the minimum areas over 
which states can rightfully exercise power, according to classical consent theorists (and I 
cannot help but agree).  If the state is to really exist at all and perform the desired services 
(the most basic of which are detailed below), then rational, previously free and private 
persons will come together and mutually agree to lend (or permanently give, for Hobbes) 
their personal rights to self-protection over to another entity, says the story.  This other 
entity will use the lent rights to protect the individuals, gaining force from numbers and 
legitimacy from the consent of the lenders.  After outlining these most basic realms of 
rightful state authority, I will then go on to argue that, if we are right about the basics, 
then several more realms of rightful state authority may be implied, beyond those few 
desired by the liberal minimalist. 
 
The Minimum Realms of State Authority 
Security of Persons and Possessions  According to early consent theory, the 
primary reason for individuals joining together and creating a state has been for mutual 
security of persons and possessions.  Whether we approach the pre-state scene as 
Hobbes
33
 did, as an ever-present threat of war of all against all
34
, or as Locke did, as a 
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simple lack of assurance of security for an individual‟s body and the products of his 
labor
35
, persons are motivated to leave the state of nature and give up their “swords” to a 
powerful, common authoritative body.  Even if one does not support the story of the 
emergence from a state of nature as a historical truth, the fact remains that one of the 
primary purposes of the state is to provide security for its citizens.   
There is not an infinitely large amount of goods, and people cannot always get 
what they want.  Where there is a scarcity of resources (an inevitability of earthly living), 
disagreements over ownership may occur; from that comes arguments and stealing, and 
from these conflict.  Persons will try to form mutual security bands, so those who want 
protection from those who would harm them and their possessions can join with like-
minded individuals and agree to contribute monies to a security force for them all to 
share.  Therefore, one of the primary or „original‟ rightful realms of state authority is that 
of protection over persons and objects, via force if necessary.  This is likely to include a 
police force for protection between the state‟s citizens, and a military force for the 
protection of citizens from outside threats. 
 
Adjudication of Disputes  As Nozick argues, in “states” that consist of only 
minimalist police protection, there is still the chance of conflict between members of 
private cadres and between members of competing cadres.  Hopefully impartial judges, 
preferably external to the groups
36
, can be appointed by group members to settle 
conflicts; still, there is no assurance that disputes will be settled and judges will be 
effective.  Who is correct, my judge or yours?  Even if yours is correct, why should I 
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abide by his decisions?  Mutual protection associations will combine to form even more 
powerful groups, but the problems of enforcement and adjudication remain.  Therefore, 
even a minimal state requires a judicial system with the authority to settle disputes and, 
hopefully, prevent further aggression between individuals and groups. 
Presumably what drives people to use [a] state‟s system of justice is the issue of 
ultimate enforcement.  Only the state can enforce a judgment against the will of 
one of the parties.  For the state does not allow anyone else to enforce another 
system‟s judgment.  So in any dispute in which both parties cannot agree upon a 
method of settlement, or in any dispute in which one party does not trust another 
to abide by the decision (if the other contracts to forfeit something of enormous 
value if he doesn‟t abide by the decision, by what agency is that contract to be 
enforced?), the parties who wish their claims put into effect will have no recourse 





The Extension of Authority over State Territory  Even though persons may 
form mutual protection associations and voluntarily pay for their services, and even 
though these associations may grow to be very large, a state does not emerge until the 
enforcing body takes on the characteristics of a final, singular entity, culminating in what 
we now call a state.  According to Morris, the modern state (as opposed to earlier forms 
of political organization) is partially delineated by its territory, “with relatively 
unambiguous geographic boundaries,” which distinguish it from other political entities.
38
  
Because of this geographic component, all citizens are equally protected by the state‟s 
political powers, as opposed to private protection schemes, where only those who 
voluntarily contribute receive the protective services.  Territoriality is not a necessary 
component of political existence per se, but this is how the modern world has worked out, 
and there are real advantages to citizenship being determined by location.  When millions 
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or billions of people are involved, states determining and confirming the citizenship of 
every individual with one another is bound to be unreasonably complex and time-
consuming, whereas determining citizenship by location eliminates conflicts of allegiance 
and unnecessarily complicated factors (lineage, for example). 
 
Punishments and Incentives  Because of the need for security and the 
adjudication of disputes, we have a justification for the most minimal state, consisting at 
least of protective, legislative, and adjudicative bodies.  However, true social stability 
requires a proactive stance, and the state alone has the capacity to make laws and punish 
offenders in a socially effective way, according to early consent theorists.  As the 
ultimate power-of-protection holder, the state can carry out punishments in an impersonal 
manner, as retribution, whereas both individuals and members of voluntary mutual 
protective schemes are more susceptible to personalized revenge.  The retribution carried 
out by the state is in response to a wrong done to the whole society, and not just to the 
particular aggrieved parties.  The state also has the unique capacity of formalized, 
impersonal deterrence punishment, of taking steps (making laws, providing incentives 
and disincentives, etc.) to change a would-be criminal‟s reasons for action.  Individuals 
and members of voluntary but private mutual protection associations can provide 
disincentives and the like, but the cost of doing so can be too much to take on, whereas 




To sum up, the minimal state rightfully protects individuals from those that would 
harm them in the form of police force, and makes laws to prevent future conflicts via 
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judicial and legislative systems.
40
  Also possibly necessary are a military force and an 
internationally-oriented government, to prevent similar conflicts from outside.  If a state 
is to exist at all, and not fall into anarchy, then these protection systems must function 
minimally well at the disposal of the state.  And, if all of this is true, then the state must 
have the ability to assert power over its citizens to potentially a) stop them from harming 
one another via physical restraint or other punitive measures, b) take some monies in the 
form of taxes to support the protection systems, c) strongly discourage future 
wrongdoings via sanctions and disincentives, and possibly d) draft individuals into 
protective services.
41
  Therefore, the objects of possible political consent are both to the 
state exercising power in these domains over individuals and to the individual giving up 
any rights he might have had to self-protection and retribution. 
Some libertarians/classic liberals will argue that these are the only justifiable 
political powers, that power exercised by the state over other areas of life is naturally at 
odds with individual freedoms, and that that state‟s authority, therefore, is illegitimate.  
Because the liberal‟s central concern is protection from the violation of personal rights, 
the sole reason for having a state is just the protection of those rights, for persons to work 
together and protect one another.  Any other power held by the state is bound to infringe 
upon some citizen‟s personal rights, and is therefore unjustifiable.  From this come ideas 
like laissez-faire economics and the privatization of education and other social programs.  
Since the education (or lack thereof) of another individual, for example, poses no 
immediate threat to my body or possessions, then forcing me to pay for his education 
amounts to stealing from me (through taxes) without protecting me – I am less free than I 
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was before.  Libertarian ethics and social theory make strong arguments for the 
importance of independence and valuing the individual agent, so I understand some of the 
theory‟s allure, and there are obvious theoretical ties to support for full consent forming 
the basis of legitimate state authority.  If it is truly the case that any kind of power can 
only be exercised over me when I consent to it, and if I do not consent to any other 
authority than that which protects me from immediate danger from others, then it is 
reasonable to conclude that any force exercised over me without my consent harms me 
and violates my personal freedoms. 
 
Minimal states are merely protective from direct threats, but many of the dangers 
of modern life come at us indirectly, through less-obvious methods.  The supporter of the 
minimal state seems to boil down all threats worth preventing to acts of force and 
coercion, which would make governments exist for mainly coercive purposes (laws to 
punish offenders, laws to threaten would-be offenders, etc.).  This is short-sighted.  
Perhaps it harkens back to a simpler time, when social and political groups were smaller 
and people just performed fewer activities than they do today, but as the world becomes 
more complicated and interconnected, the impacts of our actions can reach much farther 
than we could ever imagine.  Private citizens are simply not equipped to understand this 
or deal with this interconnectedness and all it entails, whereas states are in a position to 
see a bigger picture and operate on a larger scale. While a loner, independent type of 
existence may be logically possible (as in not involving a logical contradiction), an 
overwhelming majority of the world‟s population lives and have lived with others in 
communities and larger social structures.  Conflicts between individuals need not be 
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intentional in order to pose threats to persons and possessions.  People may desire to 
work pleasantly with others, but conflicts and confusion are going to occur anyway.  On a 
more nuanced interpretation, the protective function of the state will also be concerned 
with coordination of behaviors – and even more so than with coercion and direct threats.  
The coordination of citizen behaviors not only allows for greater protection but allows 
society to be productive.  Therefore, if the minimal, protective state is justified, then the 
more robust, productive, and forward-thinking state must also be acceptable.   
 
The Modern Productive State 
The following areas of potential political authority are implications of the original 
area of authority – protection.  If we accept that a protective state‟s authority can be 
justified, and I think we should, then many more realms of authority seem just as justified 
when we really explore what “protective” means.  There are so many ways that people 
can harm one another, accidentally and on purpose, directly and indirectly, so minimal 
states that focus only on preventing direct, purposeful harm are neglecting the nuances of 
what it really means to be protective. 
 
Public Agenda Creation  Supporters of minimal state authority seem to 
interpret “harm” somewhat narrowly, but the interconnectedness of modern society, both 
within states and internationally, has created a world where “harm” must be interpreted 
much more broadly.  While it is obvious that attempting to murder a person involves 
harm and the attempt to directly violate a person‟s rights, other possible types of harms 
are so indirect and covert (whether intentional or not) as to seem invisible.  For instance, 
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minimal state functioning may also rightfully include security and development to 
common areas and resources under the heading of providing for common protection.  A 
state must be able to, when necessary, stabilize and secure the common lands and 
resources from which citizens draw their personal wealth in order to protect individual 
citizens.  For example, a manufacturing company may not be directly interested in or 
planning on harming the environment in which their factory is located, but sometimes 
toxic chemicals are the byproduct of manufacturing practices.  If they dump destructive 
chemicals into public waterways, then local fishermen might lose their livelihood because 
the fish they harvest have become contaminated.  If the state ought to have the authority 
to prevent robbing a businessman at gunpoint, then it follows that it ought to have the 
authority to prevent robbing a fisherman by destroying his fishing grounds.   
Similarly, the state must have the option of exerting some control over public 
health and other areas of safety in order to prevent harm to individual citizens. For 
instance, a chicken farmer may not have the intention of harming the general public (of 
human citizens) while running his farm, but the unintentional impacts of chicken farming 
can severely harm people: our kind farmer can destroy the land and waterways that all 
citizens depend on, and his neighbors can have adverse reactions to the fumes and 
pollution.  If the state ought to have the authority to prevent somebody from poisoning a 
person with cyanide, then it follows that the state also ought to have the authority to 
prevent somebody poisoning another with ammonia; although one is intentional and the 
other is not, they can both be injurious.   
Related to this is the issue of the state‟s need to be involved in public health.  For 
better or worse, much of the world‟s population lives in densely inhabited areas, and 
66 
 
when one individual gets ill, he might spread that illness to others simply by proximity.  
Since many illnesses can be spread before the carrier is showing any symptoms, a person 
that wants to prevent the spread of illness can still infect others without ever meaning to.  
While I have a strong immune system and can survive the flu, an elderly or 
immunocompromised person may be killed by that disease.  Even though some will make 
the argument that all individuals have the right not to have certain actions forced upon 
their bodies, an equally strong argument can be made that we must sometimes force 
citizens to be vaccinated against infectious diseases for a greater good.  Because the 
health and well-being of individual citizens can be determined by other individual 
citizens, and because the state has an interest in protecting its citizens from harm and 
preventing future harm, it follows that public health is a proper realm of potential state 
authority. 
Therefore, if a rightful arena of state authority is protecting individuals from harm 
by their fellow citizens, and if it is true that harm can come in many shapes and forms, 
both direct and indirect, intentional and unintentional, altruistic and malevolent, then it 
follows that many areas of common, public interest are also rightful arenas of state 
authority.  This includes allowing for the powers of legislation, punishments, sanctions 
and disincentives, and other punitive measures for (potential or actual) violators. 
 
Economics and Social Welfare If it is the case that the protection of citizens is the 
proper realm of state authority, then we can conclude that the state might need to wield 
power over some economic arenas.  Although these will vary between states based on 
their individual needs, governments may need to help ensure the stability of markets and 
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security of means of economic existence.  Individuals can cause great harm to others 
indirectly by damaging how people make their livelihood.  The modern world is highly 
interconnected, economically, and much more complex and far-reaching than, say, 
Locke‟s time.  Even if the connections are not intentional, the economic activities of a 
person can have a significant impact in the lives of others.  As has been proven many 
times in recent history, one person or company‟s economic improprieties can devastate 
many lives – think of the global effects brought about by Bernie Madoff and AIG.  
Although many modern libertarians argue that government interference in economic and 
business matters encroaches on the personal liberties of some and causes harm (and I can 
appreciate this as at least plausible in some respects), we know from experience that 
economic and business matters can also cause great harm.  Even if it was the case that all 
persons and businesses were altruistic and never meant to harm others, the far-reaching 
consequences of modern economics cannot necessarily be seen or understood and 
prevented by those persons and businesses.  States have a much better vantage point from 
which to evaluate economic activities, and to protect the lives and livelihoods of citizens, 
it is often the cause that states must interfere with their economies.  Given limited 
resources and the imbalances of power and property, persons can easily exert profound 
control (good or bad) over others.  This poses risks both to the individuals directly 
affected, and to the society at large; if enough persons lose security over their possessions 
due to market forces, large scale social unrest is likely to occur. 
 Along these lines, the state must have the option of regulating social welfare 
programs
42
 and the distribution of resources for the protection of citizens from harm.  
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Whether or not these programs and plans will benefit the least well-off, the market forces 
and the means of production influence who will have what.  If the peace and security of 
the public is endangered, the state may need to distribute resources so that the above 
mentioned concerns (public health, transportation, environment, public safety, and crime 
prevention) can be satisfied and individual citizens can be protected.  If people are so 
dissatisfied with their lots that they pose a threat to others, the state may need to act to 
prevent the threats from escalating.  Although the nuances of this are not my concern 
here, the state has a profound interest in social and economic stability.  If gross harms or 
injustices occur, civil unrest is likely to follow, and this leads us back to the basic, direct 
threats of direct harm to persons and possessions.  Therefore, the state may need to 
exercise power over citizens by controlling a) the manner in which they conduct their 
business affairs (laws restricting business behaviors and punishments for violators), b) the 
value of their services and products, and c) their wealth (redistribution of monies for 
social welfare programs and other measures). 
 
Education Another potential realm of state authority is both a public and private 
matter – the education of citizens.  J. Buchanan and Morris do not mention this, but I 
believe that education is one of the most important components of a society‟s well-being, 
since it is a determining factor in all other components of that well-being.  Especially in 
this increasingly connected world, the dissemination of information is becoming more 
and more possible, and the education of citizens has a profound impact on the state of the 
state.  Whether they provide free education to all citizens outright, impose guidelines and 
requirements for private individuals and groups to follow, or something else altogether, 
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states have an interest in what knowledge their citizens have.  A decent education leads to 
greater individual, personal success (financially and socially), reducing the need for 
social welfare programs, redistribution of wealth, and coercive law enforcement.
43
  
Increased citizen education reduces personal and social threats of all kinds, and so should 
be looked at as a public safety concern.  Since this is the case, the state has very good 
reasons to exercise some power over what its citizens know. 
 
From the power of “the sword” of the commonwealth and a more detailed 
understanding of “harm”, many other equally important realms of state authority can be 
derived.  These are, at minimum, the domain of interaction between individuals and the 
state.  All of this can be derived from a classical liberal point of view: if the state is to 
exist at all and provide security to its citizens, it must have the option to exercise power 
in these realms because they all involve aspects of life where persons can seriously harm 
one another.  If consent by the individual to the state is to be possible, then all of these 
powers may be the possible content of consent.  If the individual citizen could want to 
enter into a binding relationship with the state, he must intend to possibly authorize all of 
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The Composition of the Modern Productive State 
The type of state that is being discussed here is a modern, Weber-ian entity that is 
definite and distinct in its territory.
44
  Today, if we want to find a particular state, we look 
at a map or atlas, and we will see that it is delineated from all other states by political 
markings.  We can point to China on a map, and see that it is bordered by Mongolia, 
North Korea, Kazakhstan, Nepal, Burma/Myanmar, and so on.  If a person is in China, 
then he is not in those states, nor is he anywhere else in the world.  The modern world is 
lain out so that essentially all of the world‟s land is claimed by some state or other.  The 
modern state‟s power is also highly centralized and exercised top-down over its citizens, 
where the state executives exercise more political authority than local leaders.
45
  
Furthermore, as the previous argument concludes, the contents of state authority can 
cover multiple aspects of life while still keeping within the protective mission.  A 
productive state‟s realm of authority, then, involves massive, large-scale coordination of 
behaviors; the number of citizens per state multiplied by the number of state power 
applications will result in a very large to-do list for each state.   
Who is to do the acting on the state‟s behalf?  A government, and one that is 
bound to be made up of only a tiny percentage of the citizenry.
46
  Despite pure direct 
democracy‟s theoretical allure, where each individual could directly participate in the 
creation and enforcement of the laws to which he is subject without the need for 
representation, the cost of having each person directly contributing to each political 
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decision is much too high to be practicable.  Even more minimalist states are bound to 
have hundreds or thousands of laws covering all of the areas of potential authority, and 
having all citizens be part of the creation, enactment, and execution of those laws would 
demand more time for each person than is even possible.  Therefore, each state must find 
an acceptable balance of representation, a ruler to ruled ratio, if it is even to be useful.  
My point here is not to argue in support of one form of government or another, but 
merely to point out that the wills of individual citizens can rarely be directly related to the 
production of the laws of their states because of sheer impracticality: if it is true that a) 
there are many citizens per state (thousands, millions, or billions), b) high transaction 
costs prohibit direct democracy on the state level, and c) laws are made (written) and 
executed by real persons, then it follows by necessity that most to all of the laws that 
apply to us are not made by us.  Elected or not, rulers are rulers, and citizens are subjects; 
it cannot be case that all people are rulers.
47
   
The laws of states are usually the product of the wide discretionary powers of 
bureaucratic personnel
48
; taking into account all of the wishes of all citizens would be 
almost as impractical and time-consuming as direct democracy itself.  Also, state laws 
have the potential to be at least in part accidental and arbitrary
49
. For instance, American 
law mandates people drive on the right side of the roadway not because it is the morally 
worthy thing to do or because it was directly decided by the state‟s people, but because 
somebody along the way enacted a law.  Even if many Americans were driving on the 
right side of the road due to convention before the law, conventions are by their nature 
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informal and arise in a variety of ways, whereas the enacting of the law for right side 
driving came to be for its own social reason: the solving of a social coordination problem. 
Although I will discuss this more in depth later, the point I want to draw attention 
to is that the potential content of political consent may (and probably will) be something 
wholly unrelated to or derived from the individual citizen in will or design.  This 
imbalance of power does not necessarily arise because the ruler(s) think(s) that the 
individual citizen is unimportant and not worth considering, but rather because rulers of 
states have so many citizens to consider, that any act or legislation done cannot take the 
citizens into account.  The costs of decision making and the disproportionate relationship 
between rulers and ruled ensure this. 
Apart from moral considerations, governmental bureaucracy is an especially 
useful solution for large-scale coordination problems.  I say „apart from moral 
considerations‟ because I believe that the justification for a government‟s existence is a 
separate issue from our evaluations of the quality of its execution.  Abuses of power and 
over- or under-centralization concern our moral assessments of already existing 
governments (their legitimacy), but do not necessarily cancel out the need for state 
authority.  State bureaucracy makes possible cooperative interaction on a much larger 
scale than almost any private organization:  
Government is a productive process, one that ideally enables the community of 
persons to increase their overall levels of economic well-being, to shift toward the 
efficiency frontier.  Only through governmental-collective processes can 
individuals secure the net benefits of goods and services that are characterized by 
extreme jointness efficiencies and by extreme nonexcludability, goods and 
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The existence of state authority (which will be exercised by a government) can be 
justified because it fulfills public needs, like protection from harm in its many forms, and 
probably does it better than any private (voluntarily opted-into) organizations, but this 
comes at the “cost”
51
 of individual input and direct governance.  This becomes even truer 
as the collective good becomes larger.  If consent could ever be given to the modern state 
as it is, then the potential content of consent will be a multitude of laws which the 
individual citizen was never involved in creating. 
 
The Practical Failures of Classical Consent Theory in Public Relationships 
 Now that I have hopefully made clear what possible realms of state authority exist 
and why they need to be that way, I will now cover the reasons why the public 
individual/state relationship cannot meet classical consent theory‟s requirements.  The 
first set of concerns, to be covered in this chapter, are practical, beyond those put forth by 
Simmons and other philosophical anarchists; the very structure of the modern state and 
the public relationship prevents the two parties from giving and receiving real consent.  
The second set of issues, to be covered in the next chapter, is epistemic; neither agent in 
the public relationship is capable of being in the cognitive state required by classical 
consent theory.  The final set, to be covered in Chapter 6, is ontological; the nature of 
political authority is not of the right type to be legitimated by consent.  I contend that 
Simmons addresses only superficial practical concerns, and does not do so with adequate 
consideration of their complexity, and furthermore, the practical concerns are the least 
interesting, least important ones.  The individual/state authority relationship, the possible 
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subject of individual consent, needs to be evaluated on its own, proper terms, and the 
classical consent tradition has not done this.  I believe that, when we look at just the four 
basic requirements, consent should be viewed as an interactive process – a two-way 
street, with both parties impacting the content of the would-be consent.  The sufficient 
sign requirement, especially, specifies that there be an aware recipient of a persons‟ 
consent; if the recipient is not engaged in the consenting process, then an appropriate sign 
would not be needed.  Simmons, however, seems to regard consent as only a one-sided 
operation, the act of an agent at another agent.  
 
State Agency  The first practical reason why classical consent theory cannot 
apply to public relationships has to do with the agency of the state and the individual.  As 
we saw in the discussion of private relationships, consenting acts take place between two 
distinct bodies.  Billy, clearly an individual, consented to Dr. Doug, also clearly an 
individual.  Each was acting as his own agent; each represented himself and his interests 
during the consenting act.  When we look at the individual/state interaction, though, 
specifying each agent is not as easy.  An individual may act publicly on his own behalf, 
representing his own public interests, but he doesn‟t always do this.  He is also part of a 
family and a community; he is a father, son, neighbor, and business rival.  While each 
person does not always act only with the best interest of the entire community in mind, he 
doesn‟t only act with his own best interest in mind, either.  He is both himself as an 
individual and part of a social group, a “we,” and he will probably ground his thoughts 
and actions accordingly.  When I put forth my positive account in another chapter, I will 
discuss this more thoroughly, but for now, I just want to point out that there is a blurring 
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of the lines between individual and group, including the group of the body politic.  For 
the sake of argument, however, I will leave this issue of individual, personal 
identification to the side.  It seems quite reasonable to say that the agent on the side of the 
individual citizen is that same individual citizen, so I will leave it at that for now. 
 On the other side, the agent of the state is much more complex.  Who could be the 
consentee?  Is it a single entity – the state – that would act with a single will in 
coordination with the consenter?  Is the state nothing more than shorthand for every 
individual citizen, acting with diverse interests through some sort of aggregating 
mechanism?  Neither?  I believe that, in a way, the state is both of these things, and this 
poses a serious problem when trying to “locate” the recipient of potential consent.  States 
have governments (which are institutions, not humans, not territories) that exercise 
authority in the arenas discussed earlier, and the roles specified in the state‟s governing 
constitution (written or not) are filled by individuals, but it seems wrong to conclude that 
the state‟s agent and possible recipient of consent is simply one or more of those 
individuals because their filling of their roles seems to disregard the larger context in 
which they operate.  Similarly, it is wrong to equate the state‟s agent with its government 
– the institutions established by the state‟s governing constitution – because government 
is not merely a bureaucracy but also the embodiment of certain ideas; after all, much of a 
state‟s governing constitution is an unwritten, amorphous collection of practices and 
preferences
52
.  Furthermore, it seems wrong to confuse the agent of the state with the 
citizenry, a collection of persons living in a certain territory, because their association 
seems to be the result of geography more than any intentional, personal union.  Rather, as 
much as we can nail down anything called the state‟s agent/exerciser of authority, the 
                                                          
52
 Hampton, Political Philosophy, pg. 82. 
76 
 
word “state” ought to be associated with all three things: the government, the whole 
citizenry, and the set of institutions, or more accurately, the interplay of all three.  The 
state is a constantly-changing body that has both physical (persons, territory, etc.) and 
conceptual (laws, conventions, etc.) parts. 
 All of this goes to show how hard it is to figure out who is interacting with whom 
in the public relationship.  In private relationships, we have clear cases of “us” and 
“them”
53
, Billy and Dr. Doug, Mike and Karen, or from the first-person perspective, me 
and not me.  The individual/state relationship is not a case of me and not me; it involves 
me, us, them, ideas, and many other things, with all these concepts bleeding into one 
another.  In order for classical consent to be given, we need definite parties having 
knowledge, having intent, giving and receiving signs.  Even if we assume that individual 
citizens could give the appropriate kind of consent through an appropriate sign, the 
complexity of the state‟s agency muddles where that consent would land, obscuring who 
would be authorized to exercise power.  While the government‟s agents would 
theoretically do the acting if the consent was given (as the government‟s agents are the 
only human beings directly related to political power), the consent would not be given to 
those persons, but to the whole arrangement – governmental actors, fellow citizens, and 
constitutional structure.  Real consent demands a fair amount of structure and background 
conditions as far as agents go if we are to figure out whether the parties are taking the 
proper steps in transferring power.  The inherent fluidity and complexity of agency in 
public relationships hinders proper consent in ever finding the appropriate bodies to take 
foot, so it is not at all clear if the individual/state relationship can meet classical consent 
theory‟s requirements. 
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Territoriality and State Agency The issues arising from the state‟s being based in 
large part on geography further complicates matters.  The fact that we partially identify a 
state by its borders shows us how non-personal the state is
54
, despite its ability to exercise 
agency.  In the past (middle ages and before), political units were associated with 
particular persons; kings and, more importantly, local lords governed by their wills over 
their people.  There was a closer connection between ruler and ruled and the rules, and 
the majority of governance was done on the local level.  In modern states, though, this is 
no longer the case.  There is no person or persons that we can readily identify the state 
with, even in monarchies.  Since we now identify states geographically, governance is 
mostly done by institutions – positions that usually just happen to be filled by particular 
persons – and kept steady by the rule of law.  Non-personal rule has led to higher degrees 
of centralization, and local government officials have much less power than state 
officials.  Power is top-down, so there is practically no direct association between 
primary (top-level) legislators and executives and most individual citizens. 
 The fact that states are defined in part by location, not personal will, makes robust 
consent in public relationships impossible.  Consent, if an individual felt the desire to 
give it, would have to be to some active body, and the state cannot provide a definite, 
appropriate consent-receiving entity.  Because the state is geographic entity, because it is 
unified and defined by its laws and terms of association, the real recipient of consent 
would have to be the state‟s constitution – the whole arrangement, and not a particular 
person or group of persons.   
On the other side of the relationship, an individual person may be able to have 
some interaction with local leaders and may be involved with local politics, to the point 
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that the relationship might seem close to private and involving personal will.  Some, such 
as Barber and Alperovitz, argue that such local participation ought to be encouraged, and 
that small-scale democracy (economic democracy in the workplace, for instance) is 
necessary for respecting human autonomy.  However, while local governance is 
important and useful in many spheres, this is insufficient for legitimating state authority.  
First, the local leader could not be a proper recipient of the citizen‟s consent to the state; 
he has only limited power over a small jurisdiction.  Above him are more and more 
broadly empowered legislators and, more importantly, more and more powerful laws that 
cover greater and greater amounts of territory.  The scope of the state‟s power becomes 
grander and the seat of that power (the law) becomes more abstract the further it goes 
from the local level.  Even if we could think that some proper consent-like action might 
be possible between an individual and a lower-level official, any consent-empowered 
authority that could reach the top level, where political authority is actually held, would 
be completely perverted from its original context.  The structure of the modern state 
makes it the case that local governance can operate only within the bounds of larger 
governance.  Smaller jurisdictions can exercise only the powers afforded them by larger 
jurisdictions.  While states can never, will never, and won‟t want to fully control the 
goings-on of its smaller constituent parts, the top-down power structure prevents an 
individual‟s possible consent from going where it would need to go to legitimate all 
political authority exercised over him. 
 
Sufficient Signs The next set of practical reasons why public relationships cannot 
meet classical consent theory‟s robust requirement of the proper giving and receiving of 
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appropriate signs of consent are nothing new, but bear repeating.  In private relationships, 
sufficient outwards signs of the individual‟s consent to the new authority figure are 
standard and, typically, obvious.  Nodding, shaking hands, signing contracts, verbal 
confirmation, etc., are all regular methods of conveying consent.  As we know, what will 
count as sufficient will vary depending on the context, but even given that, most persons 
can still agree that this or that was a proper sign, and disagreement is not major; what 
really matters the most is that both parties to the power transfer agree to the sufficiency of 
the sign.  This is not the case with what would count as a sufficient sign for an 
individual‟s consent to the state.  Is voting enough?  Paying one‟s taxes?  Obeying the 
law most or all of the time?  Remaining in the state?  Paying one‟s taxes and following 
the laws might be done just to avoid punishment – if they‟re done at all – so they may not 
be enough to meet the uncoerced and free requirement of classical consent theory.  
Voting can be infrequent with some people and nonexistent with others, whether or not 
they would want to consent if they could.  And, the “choice” to stay in one‟s home state 
is a complex phenomenon that has only some bit to do with the desire to authorize that 
state‟s governing power.  Most importantly, though, these acts are hardly ever done with 
the proper intent of conveying classical consent: permitting the exercise of the state‟s 
authority over the acting individuals.  True consent is distinctive because of its strong 
emphasis on outward performance, but that performance is only the last step in the 
consenter‟s journey.  Not only are there no obvious candidates for the „sufficient outward 
sign‟ criterion for robust consent to the state, but there is also no reason to believe that 
any of the candidates are regularly or universally done with the appropriate intent, free of 
coercion, and with full understanding of the impact of the agent‟s decision. 
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 To go along with this, there is the corresponding difficulty of the state‟s ability to 
register certain acts as its citizens‟ signs of consent to their authority.  Obviously, the 
usual candidates mentioned above can be registered: votes are counted, taxes are 
collected, lawbreakers are fined or imprisoned
55
, and the census can be taken and 
immigration can be tracked, although none of these seem to be done completely 
accurately, even if only because of human fallibility.  But can these be enough to ensure 
the state‟s rightful claim to authority?  If the giving of sufficient outward signs is difficult 
or impossible for individual persons, then the receipt and registering of those signs is 
going to be just a difficult or impossible. 
 The thing that Locke may have neglected to notice is also the thing that the 
philosophical anarchists so rightly did notice: signs of consent must fit with and be 
appropriate to their tasks.  It is quite possible that, in some circumstances, paying money 
(like one‟s taxes) is a true consenting event.  If both parties knew beforehand – had 
agreed on such beforehand – that, if the potential consenter paid his taxes in a clear 
choice situation, then the potential consentee would gain a particular type of authority, 
and all of the other requirements adhered, then the tax paying event properly establishes 
the authority relationship.  In Simmons‟ boardroom example, the participants are in clear 
choice situations where their voting or abstaining from voting count as real consent; both 
are equally able to convey intent and bind relationships, so long as all bodies are aware of 
the terms.
56
  In some situations, doing absolutely nothing physically is a proper 
consenting event.   
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The individual/state relationship cannot meet classical consent theory‟s full 
requirements, though, because there is no sign of consent that is given and received that 
is also appropriate to the situation.  The more critical the outcome and the graver the 
issues that hang in the balance, the stricter we must adhere to true consent‟s requirements.  
The content of the political relationship, possibly including many profound facets of an 
individual‟s life, is too important to fudge around.  The loose, implied consent that Heidi 
gives to Betsy is sufficient because the authority Betsy receives is not so critical and so 
permanent that great steps must be taken to recognize its reality and delineate its bounds.  
Or, to put it another way, Betsy‟s authority is just not that big a deal, especially when we 
compare it to other kinds of authority, like Dr. Doug‟s authority over Billy or, more 
importantly, the authority of the state over the individual citizen.  The number of people 
involved (citizens and rulers) combined with the importance of the political relationship 
makes the requirement for a sufficient sign more important yet practically impossible.  
Even if we could find an appropriate sign, the task of cataloguing all of the givings and 
receivings would be too large to be feasible when dealing with modern states, which can 
have hundreds of millions or even billions of citizens.  I somewhat understand 
Simmons‟s expectation that a sufficient outward sign for consent to the state be the same 
kind of act that is a sufficient outward sign for consent to a private individual (because 
we know they work in real situations to legitimate authority).  However, because he also 
considers the fitness between sign and situation to be important, I find it odd that he stops 
with the fact that traditional outward signs of consent (shaking of hands, signing of 
contracts, etc.) just do not happen in individual/state interactions.  There is a good reason 
that they just do not happen: we know that doing so is completely inappropriate.  There is 
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a good reason why other consent theorists keep trying to argue that things like voting, 
paying taxes, and continuing residency are sufficient outward signs of consent to the 
state: we actually do and can do them in interaction with the state. 
If it is difficult to clearly give and receive a sufficient sign once between 
individual and state, this is only compounded if we must account for many consentings to 
many topics between individual and state, and further so if this has to happen between 
many individuals and the state.  A further difficulty arises when we consider the ever-
changing-ness of both the possibly consenting population and the powers of the state.  Is 
the state to seek the consent of every person comes of age on every object as he comes of 
age?  Is the state to go to all persons and re-seek their consent every time it would like to 
change the state‟s powers over them?  All of this goes to show that any account of 
consent that makes every exercise of state power an object of consent is beyond 
impractical to the point of nonsense given the reality of the massive modern state.  
Therefore, whether we look at the object of consent as one thing (some amorphous “state 
authority” as a whole) or a collection of many things (this, that and the other exercise of 
authority), there is essentially no way to coordinate all of the givings and receivings of 
sufficient signs of consent, making the possibility of grounding the state‟s legitimacy in 
the consent of its citizens practically non-existent. 
There seems to be no way, then, to nail down that all-important consenting event 
for a public relationship that is so clear and distinguishable in private relationships.  
Many marked interactions between the individual and the state are negative (violations of 
the law), and those that are neutral or somewhat positive are not regular and regulated 
and positive enough to clearly indicate the robust, obvious, intention-laden consent 
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required by classical consent theory.  And because public relationships lack the clear 
outward giving and receiving of consenting signs, there cannot be an enduring record of 
the transaction.  When a dispute arises, neither party can hearken back to that specific 
time or that particular act as a reminder of the terms of their agreement.  There is no 
initial agreement to begin with, no original setting of boundaries, no pre-constitutional 
and constitutional phases.  The outward sign of the consenting act and the fact that it can 
be recorded have a purpose – they cement the pact in a unique way, for the benefit of 
both parties, by establishing the bounds of the relationship.  If the boundaries of the 
relationship cannot be properly established, then the likelihood that authority can be 
misused or abused rises, and the likelihood that the individual remains as free as he was 
before diminishes. 
 
Unintentional, Unavoidable Association  The next practical reason why 
classical consent theory is impossible concerns how our relationships with our home 
states begin.  Entry into association
57
 with a state, much less entry into a contract, 
especially in the modern world, is hardly ever voluntary:   
“We find every where princes who claim their subjects as their property, and 
assert their independent right of sovereignty, from conquest or succession. We 
find also every where subjects who acknowledge this right in their prince, and 
suppose themselves born under obligations of obedience to a certain sovereign, as 




Immigration and naturalization are still exceptions to state association, rather than the 
rule.  The fact is that virtually all land on the planet is claimed by some state, and part of 
what defines a state (what makes it a state and differentiates it from other states) is the 
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physical area it exercises authority over
59
.  As all people are born within the territory of 
some state, all persons are „claimed‟ by some state at birth.  So, whether or not one would 
ever think of consenting to a state‟s authority at a stage in life when consent is possible, 
one has already entered into association with some state.  Furthermore, this association is 
typically long-lasting, usually for the duration of the individual‟s life.  Again, fleeing 
from the authority of one country and becoming a citizen of another is not the norm for 
the individual/state relationship, and the consideration of what most people do or can do 
is important to the possible legitimacy of states.  There is overwhelming pressure to 
continue association with the state, stay where one is and how one is.  Emigration is 
costly and difficult, and the problems with transplanting one‟s whole life are well-known 
– and this really only applies to adults who could voluntarily emigrate, and who have 
already associated with a state.  Also, severing all ties with society and becoming a 
recluse is extremely difficult and very rarely attractive, when compared to the long-
espoused reasons for “exiting the state of nature” and becoming part of civil society. 
All of this goes to show that an individual‟s association with a state is inevitable.  
All persons are born in states, most persons remain in those states for the duration of their 
lives (even if they do not want to), and those that do emigrate enter automatically enter 
into association with other states.  So, if consent to the state could ever be possible, it 
could not happen after the informal, pre-constitutional period typical of some private 
relationships – the period where the individual would contemplate whether he should or 
shouldn‟t consent to the state‟s authority.  Strong reasons for being a part of civil society 
are already present at birth, simply in virtue of the impossibility of existing alone.  On the 
part of the state, association with the individual is also generally automatic.  Since states 
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claim authority over lands – and therefore the people born in them – they are not in a 
position to consider whether they want to be the power-holder over each particular 
individual. 
The fact that the public relationship always precedes one‟s cognitive capacity to 
give robust consent is a critical reason why classical consent theory cannot apply to the 
individual/state relationship.  The terms of the relationship are not up for evaluation or 
emendation.  As Pateman argues,  
Consent…must be to something.  In the case of [political] obligation, it [would 
be] consent to an already existing relationship of obligation…The content has 
already been defined by others, and the individual has to decide whether or not 





Even if an individual wanted to take on this obligation, he would not be able to negotiate 
any of the terms before or during the constitutional phase.  One of the things that made 
classical consent theory appropriate for measuring legitimacy in the examples of private 
relationships I gave was the possibility of wiggle room, of the consenter‟s ability to work 
out the minutiae before taking on the obligation and giving or receiving personal 
authority.  So, any consent possibly given to the state would be completely without the 
personalized character so important to real consentings.  Consent to the state and any 
obligations it would impose would be a one size fits all, take it or leave it deal.  This 
hardly seems consistent with classical consent‟s aim of maintaining the personal 
autonomy of the individual. 
 One might object that this is the case for many authority-based relationships, 
especially that of employer/employee.  After all, with many jobs, employers are looking 
to fill a position of their choosing; they want somebody with x skills to perform y tasks, 
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and they will not hire until they find a candidate that agrees to the job‟s specifics.  I agree 
that this is true.  Hi-Bek wanted somebody who would make springs their way, and that 
would agree to their rules, codes of conduct, and any other conditions.  It just so 
happened that Darren wanted employment and was willing to agree to the pre-established 
terms.  These cases (Darren/Hi-Bek and individual/state) are not comparable, though, 
because of the impossibility of pre-constitutional autonomy.  Before Darren considered 
going to work for Hi-Bek, he was still a free person in an important sense of the word.  
He existed apart from that employer, from any employer.  He could have decided that 
traditional employment just wasn‟t for him, and gone into his own spring-making 
business. 
 Issues of emigration aside, the modern world is set up so that no individual can 
flee from the existence of states.  Even if a person decided that citizenship just wasn‟t for 
him, that does not change the fact that he is a citizen – he is born in and will live in the 
territory of some state.  Since persons cannot help but be citizens, the idea of pre- and 
post-constitutional autonomy is an empty one.  Classical consent theory is the appropriate 
measure of legitimacy in some private relationships because the idea of autonomy has 
substance; there is a strong sense in which they are regarded as “ineluctably separate” 
units
61
.  This cannot be the case with regard to the individual in public relationships, 
simply because of the set-up of the modern world.  Most individuals will continue to 
reside in their birth-state, not because that state is so wonderful and meets the 
individual‟s needs particularly well, but because the cost of not doing so is too large to 
bear.  States will continue to claim authority over most individuals, not because those 
individuals are particularly desirable citizens and they long for continued partnership, but 





because doing so is easier than weeding through all persons and choosing whether they 
ought to remain citizens.   
 
 Because of problems with agency, territoriality, sufficient signs, and unavoidable 
association, classical consent theory does not fit the structure of the individual/state 
relationship.  These problems indicate that classical consent theory‟s supporters 
(including Simmons) either overly idealize the choice situation where consent would 
possibly be given, or ignore the importance of context altogether.  Real consent is 
possible only when real, distinct, autonomous agents are able to give and receive proper 
signs of their consent.  The modern world, filled with modern states, is simply not set up 
so that this could happen in public relationships.  Simmons undoubtedly notices the set-
up of the modern world, but does not consider or allow for the possibility that changing 
the context of a consenting event might change the methods in which the consent is given 
and received, believing it is better to stand firm on the mandates of the basic 
requirements.  Simmons gives us an A or B situation, and he chooses A, but he never 
considers whether or not A is an actual option in that situation.  The plausibility of the 
options cannot be evaluated apart from the context in which they might apply.  The 
principles of classical consent and their underlying motivation (respect for the autonomy 
of the individual) should not be chosen simply because they are, in fact, very appealing, 
but also because they are real and appropriate.  It just so happens that, in Karen and 
Mike‟s relationship, and in Billy and Dr. Doug‟s relationship, classical consent theory 
provides a sensible method of evaluating the legitimacy of the authority relationship 
because it just so happens that those relationships are set up where robust consent‟s 
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principles have the potential to be met.  Similarly, it just so happens that, in the public 
relationship, classical consent theory does not provide a sensible method of evaluating 
the legitimacy of the state‟s authority because it just so happens that the relationship is 
set up where robust consent‟s requirements cannot be met. 
 The classical consent tradition is founded upon the belief that individuals can be 
viewed as completely autonomous-with-regard-to-the-state, as possessors of natural 
freedoms, such that they can act as their own agents and be valuable participants in some 
kind of constitution-making.  The set-up of the modern world (into which we are all born 
nowadays) is not arranged so that this is an option, despite its attractiveness and 
usefulness in private relationships.  Individuals are regarded by states as citizens before 
they are able to make choices about consenting to the state‟s authority, and there is 
virtually no way of opting out of citizenship in some state.  Furthermore, modern states 
are complex entities composed of persons and laws, and while governments are able to 
act on the behalf of states, it is not at all obvious that they are able to interact with 
individual citizens so that the giving and receipt of robust consent could be possible.  It is 
also not obvious that governments as institutions are the appropriate recipients of 
consent, since governments are made of people while states are not so simply defined. 
 Finally, while modern states have methods of interacting with individual citizens 
(voting, law-following and breaking, punishment, etc.), no method is fully able to capture 
and convey the contents of would-be consent.  Apart from the epistemic obstacles (which 
will be covered in the next chapter), no current methods of interaction can account for all 
of the state‟s realms of authority.  A vote for a legislator or bond measure covers only 
that issue, and perhaps other things directly related, but it does not extend to all of the 
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things that states do.  While I may actually want to have the proper intent, that this 
particular legislator have the authority to enact certain laws and have certain powers, it is 
not obvious that this extends to my intent, and thus my consent, to the whole system of 
which the particular legislator is only a small part.  Furthermore, modern states are not 
equipped to accommodate instances where would-be consenters change their mind or 
similar variances, and as the world currently stands, the costs (labor, time, money, and so 
on) of accommodating all individual wills on all particular issues is simply too great, to 
the point that full consenting interactions are impossible. 
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Chapter 5: Bounded Rationality and the Cognitively-Limited Citizen 
 
 Critiques of classical consent theory as applied to the individual/state relationship 
have primarily focused on its impracticality.  According to the traditional argument, the 
legitimacy of the authority transfer hinges on the success of the consenter‟s expression of 
his thoughts, and on the mode and environment of the consenting event.  We concentrate 
on the nuances of express, tacit, and implied consent, how they differ, and whether or not 
one act or another will be sufficient to communicate the consenter‟s intentions to enter 
into and participate in the political relationship.  If, in fact, a citizen‟s consent is the only 
way to legitimate the state‟s use of authority over him, then we as political philosophers 
(and citizens, and humans, for that matter) must be clear on what counts as consent, when 
the use of political power is appropriate, and when our states are treating us in ways 
inconsistent with our natural freedom.  Supporters of consent theory assume that people 
are capable of and sometimes do perform acts sufficient for entering into the political 
relationship.  Philosophical anarchists like Simmons, as well as other critics of consent 
theory, contend that consent theory fails primarily because of its lack of practicality. 
 What do these approaches have in common?  Given the four basic requirements 
for real consent (sufficient knowledge, proper intent, sufficient signs, and lack of 
coercion), they all assume that the cognitive requirements can be fulfilled.  The 
arguments for or against classical consent theory begin with the unwritten assumption 
that we as individuals are capable of a) understanding the terms of our consent to the state 
and b) forming the proper intent of entering into an authority relationship with the state.  
After all, the genesis and continuing allure of consent theory are tied to its respect for 
91 
 
natural human freedom: Given that all persons are born free and equal, any unauthorized 
use of power over them is unacceptable. 
 This chapter will focus these assumptions a) and b), and will conclude that, 
because they are only assumptions, the argument for classical consent as the basis of state 
legitimacy cannot be supported.  To the best of my knowledge, there has been little work 
done in political epistemology and meta-epistemology, but I feel that such an 
examination is necessary because consent begins as a mental phenomenon.  Consent 
theory and political philosophy hinge on so many separate aspects of general analytic 
philosophy, like morality, pragmatics, and philosophy of mind and epistemology, but so 
little attention has been paid to the latter that the theories are often the poorer for it. 
 It is my contention that one of the main failures of classical consent theory as 
applied to the political relationship is its lack of appreciating real persons and their 
cognitive capacities.  This flaw is, I believe, a far more serious one than the practical ones 
recognized by Simmons, for it takes issue with the very nature of the project of consent 
theory, and much of political philosophy in general.  I will not be arguing that typical 
citizens are irrational, stupid, or cognitively defective in any way.  Rather, I argue that the 
epistemological underpinnings of classical consent theory overly idealize the would-be 
consenter, assuming that he has mental abilities and attitudes that he does not have, and 
assuming he is in a choosing environment that is unlike his own.  If a citizen is unable to 
meet classical consent theory‟s high cognitive demands, then any outward consenting 
sign he might give cannot have sufficient legitimating power.  My project is not 
pessimistic, but only realistic.  After all, the point of much of analytic political 
philosophy is to examine features of real-world institutions and agents and, in many 
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cases, how to improve the quality of those institutions and the actions of those citizens.  
Overall, we are looking for practical and moral fitness, and this must begin with cognitive 
fitness. 
 First, I will review the specific cognitive capacities that the idealized political 
agent must possess; these are the features that are implicitly required in order for classical 
consent theory to legitimate power exchanges.  Since so little has been written on the 
particular mental faculties of political man, much of this will be supported by the models 
of idealized agents of other disciplines: economic agents, agents in theoretical 
psychology and philosophy of mind, as well as the agents in rational choice theory and 
game theory.  My intent is not to create a straw man of political man.  I believe that these 
features are required if the classical consent model is to be consistent in its cognitive 
demands, rather than vacuous.  Then, I will make the argument for a more naturalized 
political epistemology, based on what we know about the mind‟s capacities in real-world 
settings and common-sense observations about motivation.  Finally, I will argue that, if 
my arguments are sound, then full consent to the state is beyond the mental capacities and 
personal motivations of most, if not all, citizens.  As was defended in Chapter 3, the 
robust consent of classical consent theory is possible in some private relationships in 
large part due to their easily meeting the sufficient knowledge and proper intent 
requirements.  It should become clear that the person in the individual/state relationship 
lacks the complex cognitive faculties that make robust political consent possible. 
 The inspiration for this chapter comes in part from Minimal Rationality by 
Christopher Cherniak, Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart by the ABC Research 
Group, Bounded Rationality by Gigerenzer and Selten, and primarily from Herbert 
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Simon‟s classic works, Administrative Behavior and Reason in Human Affairs.  It is from 




 This section will cover the features of idealized agent implied by so many 
disciplines, particularly the social sciences and philosophy. 
 
Knowledge Requirements  An idealized agent is aware of facts that are relevant 
to the choice he is making, starting with the layout of his situation and his place in it.  
Take Bill the business man, for instance.  Bill needs to decide whether or not to give all 
of his employees a raise this year.  In order to make this decision, he needs to know a 
variety of key facts, like his company‟s number of employees, how much they currently 
earn, how many employees he might hire in a given time frame, what his company‟s 
current income is, what the company‟s projected income is over a certain period of time, 
how stable the economy is, how well the company is prepared to deal with changes of 
many kinds, and so on.  If Bill is to behave rationally, to act in the best interest of his 
company, his decision must be well-informed on all of the pre-existing (for lack of a 
better term) facts.  Although Bill is not omniscient (and nobody is asking that he be so), 
he is suitably knowledgeable. 
 Furthermore, according to some in rational choice theory and many aspects of 
economics, the idealized agent should have a reasonably consistent and well-ordered set 
of preferences.  Bill needs to rank his options according to what he thinks the company 
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needs the most, or which will be the most beneficial to the company‟s welfare and 
increase its overall profits.  In order to achieve this, Bill should have something like an 
ordinal utility function, where the value of each option has some relation (better than, 
worse than, or equal to) to the other options, and where applicable, how combinations of 
options might be compared to others.  Possible options should be able to be ranked (this 
is the completeness requirement), and must remain fairly fixed in value amongst 
comparisons (this is the consistency requirement).
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Implied in all of this is the idea that relevant facts and goals are easily accessed by 
the agent, and that he can keep them at the forefront of his mind when he is making a 
choice.  It cannot be the case that, when Bill is in the process of making his decision, he 
forgets that the computer system is in need of upgrades.  If he forgets or omits something 
so important, his understanding of the situation is flawed.  All of these things must be in 
place before the decision is made, and are not part of a process of discovery or creation.  
Assuming the goal is fixed, like increasing profits or winning a competition, the idealized 
agent will base his preference ranking on whatever strategy best reaches that goal. 
 
Inferential/Computational Requirements  Understanding facts and goals are 
critical to an agent‟s being rational, according to the idealized account, but perhaps even 
more important are the agent‟s abilities to deal with the facts before him.  Rational 
agency is not concerned just with the facts that the agent knows, but also his ability to use 
those facts to make an informed, well thought out choice.  The fields that work by 
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idealizing agents are rational choice theory, game theory, economics, psychology, and 
philosophy.  In order for the agent to truly be rational, according to many, he needs to 
have god-like or “demon-like” (to use the ABC Research Group‟s phrase) inferential or 
computational capacities.  However, even if we take the requirement for demon-like 
cognitive powers as hyperbole, rational agency still requires that agents be able to 
manipulate information adroitly.  As I argued in Chapter 2, a lack of sufficient 
understanding of the object of consent may alter an agent‟s choice, which decreases the 
chance that any consent given is not an accurate reflection of the agent‟s will. 
 Depending on the situation, a rational agent is required to have an accurate 
understanding of relevant alternatives, possibly including some generations of 
consequences that follow.  Bill‟s case seems on the face of it fairly simple, but much 
more is going on under the surface.  If he is considering hiring new employees, he must 
be fairly sure that his future revenues will enough to cover all his new and old expenses, 
that the company will have the space and resources for new associates, and so on.  If he is 
considering putting his money in advertising or new technology, Bill should be able to 
forecast whether or not the company will actually benefit from the expenditures, whether 
they will have the manpower and other resources to deal with the influx of new business 
if the investment pays off, and so on.  To know any of these things, Bill will have to put a 
lot of time into research and planning; the idealized rationality approach suggests that 
guesswork or playing it by ear will not be enough to get the job done. 
 The requirement for the ability to process chains of consequences remains in 
place, even if the choice scenario is complicated.  In order to perform these complex 
tasks, game theory would have us make decision trees or game trees, depending on the 
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number of players involved (decision trees involve only one agent, while game trees 
involve two or more).  Each decision to be made or option to be weighed creates a fork, 
and others that follow from each option create more forks, leading to an increasingly full 
tree.  The rational agent must be able to construct the tree and investigate the branches 
before making an informed choice.  In situations of competition, these decision trees will 
also have to include the rival‟s anticipated moves, and the agent must be able to construct 
a table to figure out the value of each choice or option as viewed by all parties (like the 
classic prisoner‟s dilemma).  It is only after the agent has made these computations and 
inferences that he can make an informed choice.
63
  For game theory and other social 
sciences, these are a critical part of thinking rationally, and are to be part of our everyday 
operations and functioning.  Even if we don‟t follow the game theory model of decision 
trees or use other complex computational apparati, the ability to think ahead and plan for 
contingencies seems to be a key piece of sensible decision-making.  If an agent was to 
only include his current situation in his choice, neglecting the possible consequences of 
his decision, we could hardly call his choice well-informed or well-thought-out. 
 As stated above, the agent makes his decisions based upon his previously-
determined preferences, and these preferences are also subject to the standards of 
idealized rationality.  In order for his preference set to be established, the agent should 
perform the same analysis about what he wants, along with the facts of the matter.  In 
some cases, his preference set might be very simple; the agent could simply want to 
increase his profits for his business, or pick the driving route that will most quickly get 
him from point A to point B.  If more factors come into play in the latter situation, 
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though, the preference calculation becomes much more complex.  For instance, if cost, 
convenience, and mode of transportation are also involved, along with time, then the 
agent must examine each possible combination to determine the best overall arrangement.  
Taking an airplane from A to B might be the quickest and most convenient, but the cost 
may be too much, whereas the cost of taking a bus might be the lowest, but can be 
outweighed by its lack of convenience.  Taking the train might be in the middle as far as 
cost and time go, but the peace and relaxation of the quiet rail car can be very 
compelling.  Idealized rationality requires the agent coordinate his knowledge of the facts 
with his preference set to achieve the most desirable result. 
 To arrange his preferences, the agent must rely on his faculties of imagination and 
mental simulation.  Take the travel example again.  Suppose that, even though our 
traveler has never been on the train or a non-local bus, he is including both among his 
options, along with airplanes and renting car.  When deciding how to rank the train, he 
must imagine what the experience will be like, given facts that he already knows.  
Depending on the time schedule and popularity of the train he is considering, he may 
have to imagine how it would feel to be stuck in a train car with many other travelers, 
including persons shouting on their cell phones, babies crying, everyone competing for 
personal space, crawling over one another to get up and move about.  He must also 
imagine how he would feel taking the long-distance bus, with even less personal space 
over a longer time, along with the possible temperaments of his fellow passengers.  Are 
the bus passengers more or less likely to be louder and cruder than the train passengers?  
Will the loudness and crudeness outweigh the stress and cost of driving a rental car alone 
through what is bound to be awful traffic?  Depending on his knowledge of the facts of 
98 
 
each mode of transportation, more or less effort will have to be spent into research and 
mental simulation of the experience.  This imaginative process may seem like a 
negligible effort, especially given the example of transportation choices, but the task 
becomes more difficult the less familiar the agent is with the experiences.  
No matter the particulars, the idealized agent is expected to perform whatever 
mental tasks are necessary for him to envision his possible ends.  Once he has done this, 
when he has performed all of his inferences and computations, when his preference set is 
consistent and his knowledge of all facts is complete, he then simply has to pick the best 
branch on the decision tree.  If he has done all of his tasks correctly, then the choice 
should be easy. 
 
Other   I must briefly discuss here a few other factors that seem to be relevant for 
the idealized rational agent of many of the social sciences and philosophy.  First, the time 
for acquiring knowledge and performing mental computations does not appear to be an 
obstacle for the agents.  It is not as though theorists writing about rational choice, game 
theory, economics, or other disciplines claim that the agents have infinite amounts of 
time to do their rational duty – they simply do not mention time at all, and merely assume 
that the agent is able to perform his tasks.  Second, the choosing environment is also 
unimportant, but is implicitly assumed to be conducive to the agent‟s needs.  Again, the 
focus is on the details of the mental tasks, not external variables.  Third, the agent is 
assumed to have the stamina to perform, for lack of a better term.  The tasks of 
knowledge acquisition and computation are not mentally or emotionally or physically 
taxing.  The idealized agent is not one bogged down by other worries, and can devote 
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himself to solving the problem at hand.  Finally, the motivation for performance is 
simple, self-evident, and complete for the agent.  The fact that the problem needs solving 
is necessary and sufficient for the agent‟s desire to solve it.   
 
The Idealized Agent in Classical Consent Theory  As I have so far argued, the 
argument for consent to legitimize political authority is motivated by the Lockean‟s 
valuing of the individual and his natural freedoms; if it is true that individual citizens are 
rational and free and equal, then any power exchanges made must maintain those 
qualities.  If a power exchange is done without the sufficient knowledge and proper intent 
of the citizen, then any exercise of power over him is illegitimate because only he has the 
right to determine what happens to him.  Since classical consent theory‟s notion of 
consent is quite cognitively demanding (as I will argue below), I believe that the theory 
operates under the implicit assumption that the would-be consenter is something like an 
idealized agent.  As I argued in the previous chapter, an idealized external (to the agent‟s 
mind) choice situation is required for agents to be able to give their consent through 
sufficient outward signs; the theory needs idealized circumstances to work, and it 
becomes untenable in the actual world of modern states.  Similarly, I believe that the 
agent must have idealized mental capacities often assumed in the social sciences and 
humanities if he is to give his sufficiently-informed, intentional consent. 
 Consider classical consent theory‟s requirement that the agent‟s choice be made 
free from coercion.  Coercion would obviously invalidate any consenting act because the 
consent-like act would not be rooted in the agent‟s chosen will, and would instead be 
rooted in the agent‟s fear of the consequences he is being threatened with.  However, 
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many consenting acts are free from coercion, and for those that are so free, classical 
consent theory implies that any consent given is rooted in the will of the agent.  If the 
consenting sign is given on purpose, it is because the agent has made it so.  From what I 
have read of the literature, coercion is the only real cognitive obstacle for the rational 
agent discussed; the other two requirements (sufficient understanding of the object of 
consent and proper intent) are assumed to be achievable in the political realm.  If this is 
the case, then the agent‟s mental faculties seem highly idealized because, as I will argue, 
the sufficient understanding and proper intent requirements (especially the former) 
impose cognitive burdens that are simply too large for citizens to bear. 
 The requirement for sufficient understanding of the object of consent relies 
heavily upon the mental powers of an idealized political agent.  This is especially true 
when we imagine the position of the modern citizen in a modern state.  As argued in the 
previous chapter, the number of realms of modern state authority is sizeable, and the 
number of laws and statutes that apply to the citizen is considerable.  The anthropological 
concept of scale theory shows us the sheer number of laws and statutes for an 
organization (in our case, the state) have almost law-like properties.  Anthropologist 
Robert Carneiro “found that the number of organizational traits (N) in a given community 
could be expressed as the square root of its population (P), as in the equation (N= ”
64
  
For example, if a group has 100 members, then there are 10 organizational traits to 
remember, and if there are 10,000 members, then there are 100 rules governing it.  If this 
rule of Carneiro‟s is true, then the amount of organizational traits for the United States in 
2012 (approximately 300 million citizens) is around 17,320 at the federal level alone.  
The trend in the modern world is globalization and incorporation, including more and 
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more people in the idea of a body politic, so the number of organizational traits that apply 
to a citizen shows signs of increasing.  If we include the fact that citizens are also part of 
smaller groups (states, cities, neighborhoods, companies, etc.), we can see that 
individuals are part of incredibly complex networks governed by incredibly complex 
structures.  This is true even if Carneiro‟s calculation is off quite a bit. 
If the consent of the citizen to the state is to be meaningful, he has to sufficiently 
comprehend what he is really consenting to.  Even if it is not clear what the citizen could 
consent to (entry into/remaining in civil society, the rule of leaders, particular laws and 
codes, etc.), the content of the consent would have to be strongly related to the law and to 
the state‟s realms of authority.  Consent to something other than these, something less 
important than these, negates the entire purpose of state-related consent, which is the 
building of an informed, authoritative relationship between the individual citizen and his 
state.   
The theoretical purpose of consent is to legitimize the exercise of authority, to 
differentiate just power from tyranny, and to bind the citizen to the state in some way.  
The sufficient knowledge requirement is the first step in safeguarding the citizen from 
surprises, to protect him from unwittingly “authorizing” exercises of force that he does 
not consent to, and from obligating himself to obey.  If it is the case that sufficiently 
informed consent is the only way to authorize political power, and if it is the case that the 
content of political power is enormous, then it follows that citizen must understand a 
huge number of facts before he is able to give meaningful consent. 
Along with the large quantity of facts, the would-be consenter would also have to 
have the impressive computational ability of an idealized agent.  This capacity is required 
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in order to “get” the system of the state, for the agent to understand the interrelatedness of 
the many functions of the state.  If we are talking about the citizen voting for or against a 
particular law or act, then he must consider alternatives and be able to track into the 
future to their possible consequences
65
.  In order to figure out the consequences of saying 
yea or nay, and assuming that one‟s vote will be efficacious, a citizen will need to some 
real thinking about his decision if he is to be a rational, informed voter; not thinking 
about the effects of his vote seems to be neglectful of the duties of a rational agent. 
If the potential object of consent is the authority of a certain person, then another 
set of facts and inferences are required of the consenter.  A rational agent will have to 
determine what his priorities are when choosing a ruler (including considering alternate 
candidates), what qualities he prefers and what public issues he wants addressed.  Once 
he figures out his preferences, what effects each candidate‟s winning would make 
(through inference and imagination), and that his knowledge and computation set is 
sufficient, he can make his choice and vote, in the hope that he is in the majority.
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If the potential object of consent is the state‟s authority as a whole
67
, then the 
citizen has the cognitive task of understanding that object.  This would have to include a 
decent understanding of the state‟s constitution and overall structure, as well as the 
workings of the legal system.  Every area that the state claims authority over and every 
area it might claim authority over, by virtue of the state‟s constitution, are the possible 
objects of consent.  The idealized citizen, according to classical consent theory‟s 
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sufficient understanding requirement, must be a bit like a constitutional scholar.  He must 
know the facts and be able to perform the inferences to figure out what might be, in order 
to really “get” the state and give informed consent.   
If the object of political consent is consent to the state‟s authority as a whole, and 
since almost all of the land on earth is claimed by some state or other, then our idealized 
agent should understand not only the political system he was born into, but also those of 
other states that he might want to immigrate to, if he is to be sufficiently informed about 
which state‟s rule he will consent to.  He would have to investigate his various citizenship 
options (would he want to be a resident alien in another state, or divorce himself from his 
home state completely?), evaluate his preferences for what he wants from a state, and 
figure out which state satisfies his preferences the best.  He must also factor in the costs 
of each of his options, and not just the financial ones; would he be able to have a good 
life in another land, perhaps without his family and friends?  Classical consent theory as 
espoused by Locke and others does present emigration as a valid alternative to consenting 
to one‟s home state‟s authority, so giving informed consent to one‟s home state would 
have to involve this research and consideration, preference evaluations and behavior 
assessment and planning.  The fact that so much knowledge and inferential ability is 
needed in order for classical consent theory to be consistent gives one strong reason to 
believe that the theory envisions the would-be consenter as an idealized citizen, like that 
of rational choice theory and economics. 
Closely related to the sufficient understanding requirement is the proper intent 
requirement, and this too depends on idealizing the would-be consenter.  Once the citizen 
has a sufficient understanding of the object of his would-be consent, he must decide and 
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will that his consent authorize the state‟s possible exercise of its power over him.  The 
proper intent requirement relies less on the idealized knowledge capacity (as knowledge 
of what constitutes the proper intent has already been done in the investigational phase) 
and more on the computational and proper environmental factors.  Like the freedom from 
coercion requirement, the willful act of intending to enter into the political relationship 
with one‟s state must be done for the right reasons: given all that he knows, the agent 
earnestly intends to be a citizen of that state, authorizing its power and taking on his own 
political obligations.  And, like the sufficient understanding requirement, most consent 
theorists do not portray the fulfilling of this requirement as taking place in the real world, 
in real time.  While some persons may not need much time to make the decision to enter 
into the political relationship, it is not at all obvious that all potential consenters would be 
this way.  Aside from information-gathering, internal deliberation could take a good deal 
of time and mental effort, even if the agent‟s only options are to consent or to not 
consent.  The choice would be a weighty one, I think – the state‟s power deeply impacts 
many facets of an individual‟s life – and so care must be taken by the rational agent to 
make sure that his decision is the right one for him.  Because classical consent theory 
devotes so little attention to the time and environment required to form the proper intent 
to enter into the political relationship, one must conclude that the theorists are idealizing 
the agent‟s choice situation.  Belief and intent formation do not happen instantaneously 
and in a vacuum, and therefore the agent typical to political and social philosophy is not 
portrayed in his actual choice situation. 
Classical consent theory has a good reason to idealize the would-be consenter: he 
must be free and rational if his consent is to carry its full weight.  Since he is able to 
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perform complex cognitive tasks of considering the power of the state and the possible 
relationship he might have with it, he is capable of having his consent really be his own.  
The allure of consent theory has always been its recognition of the individual as a free 
and capable entity, able to make his own choices with regard to his own well-being.  If he 
is to remain as free as he was before the consenting even, then the only excusable reason 
for exerting force over him must ultimately stem from his allowing it.  Therefore, we 
must conclude that the agent necessary to make consent theory coherent is an idealized 
agent in idealized circumstances. 
 
Bounded Rationality and the Naturally Limited Citizen 
As I have argued in previous chapters, the argument in favor of classical consent 
theory is intuitively compelling and, in some instances, appropriate for legitimating 
power transfers.  For some areas within the social and psychological sciences, as well as 
fields like computer science and artificial intelligence, the postulation of an idealized 
agent is quite useful.  Idealizing agents and environments in rational choice theory, say, 
or economics can improve our decision-making.  If the idealized agent would make such 
and such an economic decision, then maybe we ought to try that as well; if the idealized 
agent would make such and such a decision in a confrontation with another agent, then 
maybe we, too, should consider making that decision.  Abstracting away from the 
particulars of our personal situations (and all of the baggage that accompany them) may 
give us insight into what may be objectively superior, unbiased preference rankings.  
When we deal with the purely theoretical realm, the sky is the limit as to how we 
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construct our environments and conceptualize our agents, and there is no real harm in 
doing so.   
Thought experiments are useful for shaping and guiding our intuitions, but 
classical consent theory is by its nature an attempt at practical application.  The 
requirement of consent is supposed to be the safeguard for real citizens from their real 
states, not for imaginary citizens in theoretical states.  Idealizing agents and governments 
can help us when considering how we may want things to be; we might wish that all 
citizens be of high intelligence and well-informed on political and economic matters, and 
we might want to imagine alternative ways for states to be structured and how they might 
interact if they had no practical boundaries.  However, political philosophy ought to 
respect the ways that individuals and states actually are, and not simply postulate how we 
want them to be.  Facts of human cognition (including the environments that agents act 
in) must be taken into account if we are to give an accurate account of human agency in 
group settings, facts concerning limits on human knowledge and cognitive capacities, 
time and attention.  Classical consent theory aims to legitimate exchanges of authority, 
but it does not take into account real world constraints and limitations. 
In order to understand why classical consent theory fails as a measure of 
legitimacy in the political sphere, our political epistemology must be naturalized.  I do 
not want to argue that normative epistemology must be done away with, since working 
towards better standards for justification and promoting greater rationality seem to be 
worthwhile pursuits, but these pursuits cannot be done without regard to the facts of 
human cognition.  We should start with the empirical facts of cognitive science, and from 
there consider the traditional epistemological problems of justified belief and rationality.  
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Once we see and keep in mind that humans are boundedly rational, we will see that 
classical consent theory as espoused by Simmons implicitly overreaches the very real 
limitations on human knowledge capacities and motivational structures by not 
considering real persons in their real choosing environments. 
 
Limited Knowledge Capacity  As compared to the idealized agent of so many 
areas of study, real individuals have only a finite knowledge capacity.  This is not to say 
that we are, on the whole, unintelligent or irrational, or that we are forgetful or 
epistemically lazy, but only that compared to the total amount of truths and possible 
intentional states, the number of things that we will know or believe is fairly limited.  
Even though the human brain comes well-equipped to collect and store data, we are not 
capable of collecting and storing all or even most extant information.   
The agents of idealized rationality are assumed to already have sufficient 
information from which to make their decisions, but real agents do not have this 
advantage, especially when we treat them as single and isolated agents.  In the real world, 
knowledge acquisition is time-consuming and energy-consuming; even if some 
knowledge is innate, much of it requires real effort with a lot of learning through trial and 
error.  Persons in developed societies may spend large portions of their lives getting 
formal educations on a variety of subjects, and informal educations are also extensive.  
Still, no matter how much time we devote to knowledge acquisition, there will always be 
much to learn. 
A cooperative naturalized epistemology à la Cherniak tells us that evolution will 
tend to provide us with limited cognitive capacity for efficiency‟s sake: “I think that 
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recent work in the field of computational complexity theory raises the possibility that 
there may be another “critical mass” for a knowledge representation, a maximum size 
threshold above which belief systems must in effect disintegrate.”
68
  It is not in our 
interest, evolutionarily speaking, to have overly-large cognitive capacities because 
processing beliefs and desires (considering them, checking for consistency, comparing 
them to one another, evaluating them for truth, etc.) is costly in terms of time and 
exertion.  Even though it takes up only about 2% of one‟s body weight, the human brain 
uses approximately 20% of the body‟s energy; gaining more mass would demand greater 
energy usage by degrees.
69
 
Furthermore, the modern human in modern society has much more information to 
process and many more beliefs to form than his more primitive cousins.  Besides all of 
the beliefs required for biological survival, modern humans must have beliefs and desires 
to aid his social survival.  The sciences are ever-growing and society is ever-changing.  
We have jobs, friends, families, hobbies, goals, and all of the cognitive states that go 
along with all of these facets of our lives.  Even though we are currently evolving, 
biologically speaking, there is no reason to believe that our knowledge capacities and the 
computational capacities needed to process beliefs are keeping up to the point that we are 
able to know significantly more than our primitive ancestors.  While there may have been 
some real steps forward in human brain development, within the last 20,000 years, our 
brains have not been able to keep up with the demand.  The amount of knowable 
information has been growing geometrically, even exponentially.  In the face of the 
modern world and its information overload, our only outlet for intellectual stability is 
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selective knowledge acquisition – although the selection process is not often in our hands.  
The world comes flying at us, and we do what we can to get by and to thrive. 
The picture becomes even more complicated when we look at individuals instead 
of at the species as a whole.  Knowledge capacities vary from person to person, as does 
the allocation of mental space per area of interest per person.  The instances of brilliant 
individuals are rare, and even geniuses are not really optimal agents or brilliant in all 
areas.  People are, on average, average and therefore boundedly rational, limitedly 
knowledgeable, just like those on both ends of the intelligence spectrum. 
Success in learning and information gathering, according to Simon, is subjectively 
based.  There is no objective standard of knowledge, no set amount of facts, which all 
persons try to reach.  Individuals seem to have predetermined aspiration levels relative to 
their desire for information, and the aspiration levels are bound to vary between areas of 
interest.  Though being more knowledgeable about cars and their maintenance is 
probably in my interest as a car owner, I really have very little desire to learn much about 
cars.  I just want it to work correctly, to get me from point A to point B safely and 
comfortably.  When my car is not working properly, I‟m not interested too much about 
why – I just want it to work again, so I take it to a mechanic.  My desire for automotive 
knowledge is low, so I only learn enough for basic maintenance, and once I reach that 
level, I‟m quite satisfied and I stop learning.  This stands in contrast to my high level of 
desire for knowledge about cooking and baking, where I try to learn as much as I can as 
often as I can, and I see no ceiling where my desires might be satisfied.  The ideally 
rational agent is always sufficiently informed to solve his given problem, and the measure 
of knowledge acquisition success does not vary widely between agents.  Removing the 
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personal element of information gathering might be fine when considering problems in a 
theoretical setting, but carrying over the objective standard to apply to agents in the real 
world poses an inappropriate expectation.  We might recommend that people become 
more knowledgeable in this or that area – and sometimes they really should – but this is 
not the same as expecting an objective (usually very high) measure of success.  Even if 
that person does readjust his standard, it is still his standard, and it still may be far from 
full or sufficient information. 
The totality of knowledge must be subject to a division of labor if individuals and 
society as a whole are to survive and thrive.  We see this in Locke‟s account of the 
formation of societies, and it becomes even more necessary the more complicated the 
world gets.  You learn how to make houses so I won‟t have to; I learn how to bake bread 
so you won‟t have to.  Specialization of knowledge is fundamental to taking us beyond 
the hunter/gatherer stage, where we merely subsist, to true society, where we develop and 
evolve.  In Administrative Behavior, Simon talks of the horizontal division of mental 
labor in terms of businesses and corporations, where necessary tasks must be divided 
amongst mental laborers so that they may all be completed, as well as the vertical 
division of mental labor, where specialization is necessary for coordination and 
communication between mental laborers.  While this is obviously necessary for business 
success, Simon‟s approach works even better as an analogy for the world of knowers in 
general.  The division of mental labor goes hand in hand with the naturally bounded 
limits of knowledge for individuals; we are, collectively, much more successful knowing 
if each person knows a few things very well than we are with individuals knowing many 
things poorly and without real depth. 
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Government and other kinds of collective organizational structures are the 
essential complements of our naturally limited knowledge capacities, not our adversaries, 
so it is very problematic when political philosophers and other social theorists attempt to 
analyze the citizen in a mental vacuum.  Classical consent theory expects a large amount 
of political knowledge from the individual if he is to be able to give consent to the state‟s 
authority, but this is an almost backward understanding of political knowledge, which is 
as subject to the horizontal and vertical divisions of labor as many other types of 
knowledge are.  Governments and the accompanying bureaucracies arise so we do not 
have to know as much individually, and so that our political knowledge can be 
coordinated with that of others.
70
  All of the pieces of political knowledge are too great in 
number for me or any other individual citizen to ever sufficiently understand on my own, 
so we create structures to help us with some of the mental work.  We cannot all be 
professional politicians or constitutional scholars.  Society and states have come so far 
from our primitive origins because some people bake the bread and build the houses, 
giving others the opportunity to write laws and enforce them (instead of baking bread, 
building shelter, or hunting beasts). 
Classical consent theory presents the potential consenting situation as one where 
the agent has sufficient knowledge of his alternatives, but it does not deal with where this 
knowledge comes from.  This cannot be the case with real agents gaining political 
knowledge.  All political facts and alternatives are external to the agent, and most of them 
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are greatly removed from his immediate situation.
71
  Very little political knowledge can 
be acquired through simple empirical observation, and only a small amount more can be 
acquired simply through conversations with others.  As there is no single repository for 
political facts and possibilities, many things will have to be learned through out-and-out 
research, through the deliberate setting aside of other ventures of knowledge and 
investigation, if such knowledge is to be attained at all.  The mental labor involved is 
bound to be intense, and when compared to the perceived results (sufficiently 
understanding the political landscape), perhaps not worth the effort. 
A more conservative, boundedly-rational approach acknowledges that performing 
this exhausting mental feat for the sake of possibly consenting to the state‟s authority is 
implausible and highly unattractive to most individuals, especially when states will assert 
power over them anyway.  Gaining political knowledge is done at the loss of other areas 
of knowledge for individuals, and too many people devoting too much of their 
information-gathering to gaining a sufficient understanding of the constitution (written 
and unwritten) of the state will pull cognitive resources from other important tasks.  A 
boundedly rational approach recognizes the fact that the success of knowledge 
acquisition is measured subjectively, that we ought to be content with varying levels of 
political knowledge between individuals, and that this subjectivity can be valuable so 
long as the overall knowledge investment is secure and leads to the advancement of the 
body politic.   
Simon‟s notion of satisficing asserts that not all people are required to have all 
knowledge of present facts and future consequences at all times, and that many situations 
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call for just enough information to get by.  I believe that the political arena is one in 
which most people having satisficing knowledge is acceptable and expected.  As long as 
we have specialists in this area, like professional politicians, constitutional scholars, and 
judges, political knowledge and possibilities can be advanced without too great a 
sacrifice of mental effort on the part of the body politic.  While specialists cannot be 
expected to be ideal (or idealized) agents in the sense often employed by social theorists, 
their knowledge capacity for political facts can be (and hopefully will be) larger and more 
finely tuned.  Dixit uses the example of a chess grand master to explain how some 
individuals with large stores of specific knowledge see and understand their fields in 
ways radically different from average, non-expert individuals.  I admit that I am horrible 
at chess.  In the past, I tried to play but always did poorly.  Very poorly.  I could never 
think of my moves as part of any larger plan.  Although few people are as profoundly bad 
at chess as I am, most recreational players have the same fundamental problems as I do.  
Rules are not easily remembered and smoothly employed.  Individual moves are 
individual moves, separate fragments, and not part of a cohesive, all-encompassing 
thought about the game.  The chess master (so I‟m told) does not think of moves as 
separate actions, but sees the whole game as a much smaller, more cohesive unit.  
Multiple options are present in the mind of the master at a given time, and those options 
are constantly adjusting with each move of the opponent.  The master‟s opponent‟s 
options are just as obvious as his own.  As Halford et al. argue, the expert may have the 
same knowledge capacity as the non-expert, the same ability to process the same amount 





  The master can easily assess his goals and give preference rankings 
to options with minimal effort. 
Expertise is the result of a lot of time and cognitive effort, and can only come 
about where there is a division of mental labor.  Natural aptitudes and particular training 
help individuals think in special ways, ways different from the non-trained and perhaps 
ungifted (like me with chess).  A division of mental labor allows individuals to develop 
some type of knowledge while allowing them to neglect or merely satisfice in others.  
Even if political professionals never reach the “grand master” or genius level of political 
knowledge, they may still reach very advanced levels of understanding in their particular 
sector.
73
  The well-trained economist‟s specialized knowledge allows him to understand a 
state‟s financial nuances, what options are available for encouraging job growth, say, or 
decreasing the state‟s debt.  His knowledge capacity of state financial matters is much 
more likely than the average citizen‟s to be robust, easily accessible and fluid.  He is 
substantially less likely to be mistaken about the relevant facts, and he is in a better 
position (due to the vertical division of labor) to relay key pieces of information to 
decision-makers higher than him.  If we were to accept classical consent theory‟s demand 
for sufficient understanding of the object of consent, the only people that could even 
come close to being able to give real consent would be these kinds of specialists, but even 
they are unlikely to be fully successful. 
Even when we look at the state as a whole, we see that there is no single body 
doing the knowing.  There are no persons who are experts on all political matters; there is 
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no way to be a political grand master, since there is just too much to know.  All we can 
hope for, and all we really need, is an analog to Simon‟s business model: horizontal 
division of labor allowing for specialized expertise, and vertical division of labor 
allowing for coordination between fields.  As long as this is done satisfactorily, most 
citizens cannot and should not need to devote too much of their limited knowledge 
capacity to the specific facts of the political landscape. 
This division of mental labor, carried out by specialists, does not mesh well with 
the aims of classical consent theory.  The sufficient knowledge requirement of classical 
consent theory places an unrealistic and wholly inappropriate demand on individual 
citizens regarding understanding the state and its constitution.  While attempting to be 
complementary by recognizing and trying to promote the intelligence and worth of 
individual citizens, the demands are too high for the boundedly informed citizen of the 
modern state.  Most citizens will never be in a position to gain anything more than a 
superficial understanding of state affairs, and even those that are political professionals in 
one sense are not political geniuses in all senses.  If the sufficient understanding 
requirement is to be taken seriously as a safeguard against illegitimate exchanges of 
power, then classical consent to the state‟s authority cannot be given. 
 
Limited Inferential Capacity  Research and common sense both indicate that the 
average individual‟s capacity for problem solving and complicated reasoning are just as 
subject to cognitive limitations as the knowledge capacity.  Again, this does not mean 
that people are irrational or epistemically lazy, but that our computational capacities are 
often well below the “ideal” set out by the traditional view of the social agent.  Given the 
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vast amounts of political facts and options, and the bounded scope of our inferential 
capacities, the robust cognitive requirements of classical consent theory (sufficient 
knowledge and proper intent) cannot be fulfilled.  This seems to extend over many types 
of reasoning. 
 First, we are often limited in figuring out means/ends relationships, and this seems 
to be true both with respect to individual ends as well as in the integration of ends into 
some larger view.  This is not simply a problem with a lack of knowledge, but has also to 
do with sub-optimal predictive powers.  Bounded cognitive success involves effort from 
day to day, from month to month, and even though this is the most we can expect of 
individuals, it pales in comparison to understanding of means to ends gained after years 
and decades.  Also, we are limited in the amount of variables that we are able to handle in 
decision-making: “the number of variables that can be integrated into a single cognitive 
representation is a major constraint on cognitive and neuropsychological processes.”
74
  
Halford et al. found that our information processing abilities dropped sharply as variables 
in problems were added (say, from 4 to 5), and this was true no matter the individual‟s 
level of expertise. 
 The integration of ends is similarly subject to bounded rationality:  
The means/ends hierarchy is seldom an integrated, completely connected chain.  
Often the connections between…activities and ultimate objectives is obscure, or 
these ultimate objectives are incompletely formulated, or there are internal 





Persons do not always think of their ends as parts of a unified whole, and problems are 
rarely presented to us this way.  Some of my ends today are writing four pages my 
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dissertation, preparing for teaching, cleaning my apartment, preparing dinner, and so on.  
While I hope to get all of this done, the chances of it actually happening are not 
spectacular, and conflicts are bound to occur.  Working on the dissertation is, I believe, 
more important than some of the other things, since completing it is integral to my long-
term goals, but being ready to teach is a more pressing goal, since I have to be prepared 
by tomorrow morning.  My hierarchy of ends is muddled and lacking cohesion; doing 
what I can when I can in order to get by is often the greatest success I can ask for. 
 When we look at the citizen‟s cognitive states regarding his home state, the same 
means/ends sub-optimality probably will be particularly pronounced.  The average 
person‟s intended political ends run the gamut between specific and vague; the specific 
ends very well may conflict with one another, and the vague ends may be too ill-defined 
for the individual to conceive of any way of reaching them.  Suppose that Lizzie wants 
her state to increase the availability of safe and affordable birth control to the 
underprivileged.  She may write her congressperson and urge them to provide monetary 
support to women‟s health clinics, but it is not at all clear that this is the best option for 
Lizzie.  It might be more efficacious for her to become personally active in Planned 
Parenthood, but doing this will conflict with her other community service work.  Which 
is more important to her, women‟s health or community service?  Lizzie herself may not 
be able to decide.  Suppose she wants to vote for a new political candidate based on his 
social justice and poverty works, but it turns out that the same candidate has no interest in 
advancing birth control rights.  Should she still support the candidate, or should she 
endorse another?  Lizzie‟s being able to come to a fully rationally deliberated choice 
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seems highly unlikely, given the complexity of the situation, even if she devotes a good 
amount of her cognitive attention to it.   
The state‟s realms of authority are many and complex, and are therefore delegated 
to many departments that often work independently of one another; one group deals with 
the environment, another with energy, another with finances, and another with social 
welfare (to grossly oversimplify things).  One group writes laws, and another (probably 
with its own agenda) enforces those laws.  Given the complexity of modern state 
bureaucracies, it is unlikely that a very well-ordered, internally consistent hierarchy of 
state ends could exist.  Just like within individual boundedly rational persons, state goals 
are valued separately, pursued separately, and often are not united as a cohesive whole.  
If the state wants to improve the environment and augment its power supply, it is very 
likely that the means to meeting these ends conflict, or the ends conflict with one another; 
windtricity development and oil production, for example, will result in environmental 
damage.  International security and domestic financial strength may both be highly 
valued state ends, but protecting the state through military power is costly, and lowering 
the costs of government is another separately valued and conflicting end. 
If it is the case that consistent, well thought-out goals are implausible at the state 
level, and if it is the case that most individuals are not sufficiently informed about the 
working national constitution, then it is implausible, essentially impossible, that average 
citizens could be sufficiently able to derive the best actions for their states or what 
political actions they ought to take themselves.  Like with subjective knowledge 
aspiration levels, individuals are not likely to aim for ideal levels of information-
processing powers, nor should they want to, nor would they ever achieve them.  It is not 
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in the average citizen‟s powers or interests to devote great time and attention to the 
particulars of achieving state ends.  Lizzie may devote a good deal of her time and mental 
effort to improving women‟s health care, but she ought not be faulted if her 
understanding is sub-optimal, if she does not make the best possible choices, or if she 
does not recognize that pursuing this goal will conflict with some of her other goals.  
Conscientious person that she is, Lizzie is likely to do well through a boundedly rational 
standard, but her understanding of the state‟s authority will fall short of idealized 
rationality‟s (and classical consent theory‟s) strong cognitive demands. 
  Even though rational choice theory and other areas of interest would say 
otherwise, in some decision making scenarios, it is not in one‟s best interest to construct a 
detailed decision tree for every single factor that might be relevant to a choosing 
scenario, or make causal predictions on a large scale, especially if one‟s knowledge of 
these areas is also suboptimal.  Bounded rationality implies a more limited, imperfect, but 
useful mechanism with which to make decisions based on causal understanding.  
Gigerenzer‟s account of Charles Darwin‟s decision of whether to marry is a particularly 
incisive and entertaining example of the oddness and not-very-useful nature of overly 
detailed decision making: 
Marry: Children – (if it please God) – constant companion, (friend in old age) who will feel 
interested in one, object to be beloved and played with – better than a dog anyhow, Home, and 
someone to take care of house – Charms of music and female chit-chat.  These things good for 
one‟s health.  Forced to visit and receive relations but terrible loss of time.  My God, it is 
intolerable to think of spending one‟s whole life, like a neuter bee, working, working, and nothing 
after all. – No, no won‟t do. – Imagine living all one‟s day solitarily in smoky dirty London 
House. – Only picture to yourself a nice soft wife on a sofa with good fire, and books and music 
perhaps – compare this vision with the dingy reality of Grt Marlboro‟ St. 
 
Not Marry: No children, (no second life) no on to care for one in old age…Free-dome to go where 
one liked – Choice of Society and little of it.  Conversation of clever men at clubs. – Not forced to 
visit with relatives, and to bend in every trifle – to have the expense and anxiety of children – 
perhaps quarrelling.  Loss of time – cannot read in the evenings – fatness and idleness – anxiety 
and responsibility – less money for books etc – if many children forced to gain one‟s bread. – (But 
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then it is very bad for one‟s health to work too much)  Perhaps my wife won‟t like London; then 
the sentence is banishment and degradation with indolent idle fool –  
 
Darwin concluded that he should marry, writing “Marry – Marry – Marry Q.E.D.” 
decisively beneath the first column.  On the reverse side of the page he considered 
the consequences of his decision for his personal freedom, ending with the 




Such a detailed causal-predictive analysis on such an intimate and emotional decision 
strikes us as strange, and doing such analyses on a regular basis on many different topics 
is both mentally infeasible (given our limited knowledge and inferential capacities) and, 
often, a waste of time and effort.  Since our lack of true expertise in so many areas limits 
our accuracy in causal understanding, detailed decision analyses are often useless and 
wasteful. 
 As argued in the previous section, an average citizen‟s actual political knowledge 
is bound to be limited, and if this is true, then the average citizen‟s causal understanding 
of the political realm is also bound to be limited and, therefore, suboptimal.  This 
becomes clearer the farther from the individual the public issue goes.  For instance, a 
citizen might be able to readily predict the effects of altering the speed limit near this 
school or placing a stop sign at that busy intersection if these are in his own community.  
Given that the typical citizen drives regularly, including near the school, he will probably 
have a good understanding of his local traffic patterns, leading him to conclude that 
accidents and injuries will likely go down if the alterations are made.  However, since we 
are not experts on most political issues, our long-term, large-scale causal-predictive 
powers will be very limited.  I cannot predict whether a new economic program will 
actually stimulate the economy overall (since I know so very little about economics), 
                                                          
76




much less whether it will helps small businesses, diminish the federal deficit, impact the 
country‟s relationship with China, or cause problems with Social Security for the next 
three generations.  Devoting too much of my brain power to understanding economics at 
this time is most definitely not in my interest, so my ability to develop my predictive 
faculties is going to be severely restricted.  Most of my political causal predictions are 
going to be shots in the dark, and while this is not really problematic for me and my 
lifestyle, it does pose a problem to reaching the robust intellectual requirements of 
classical consent theory.  Informed consent, in the traditional sense of the term, is highly 
unlikely partially because being informed must involve being able to make use of 
knowledge – including making projections about the future. 
 Another realm of bounded inferential capacities is the average person‟s use of 
preference rankings.  While preference rankings are common in many areas of 
consideration, well-developed systems of coordination and weighing are not very 
common, especially when compared to their rigorous use in optimal rationality-
employing fields.  I always prefer mocha ice cream to banana-flavored ice cream, but 
never prefer mocha ice cream over chocolate ice cream.  When we consider simple things 
that are common in our lives, like ice cream flavors or vacation destinations, the task of 
ranking preferences seems fairly easy, but only as long as we keep our list of alternatives 
relatively short.  I‟m not going to consider every possible flavor of ice cream available on 
the market when deciding what my favorite is, but only which one to buy out of those 
that are being sold right now at my local market (it tends to sell a few Ben and Jerry‟s 
and some Häagen Dazs).  Full consideration of many possible alternatives in many 
possible situations is both mentally implausible (given our limited knowledge capacities) 
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and wasteful of our time.  Instead, we make our preference rankings situationally, based 
on what information is available to us and how important such rigorous rankings really 
are to achieving any given goal.   
Efforts at mental computation tend to satisfice, not maximize, and work only so 
hard as to reach our subjectively determined goals.  Furthermore, cognitive research tells 
us that the quality of these efforts is likely to go down the more abstract and far-removed 
the ends are from us and our expertise.  My ice cream flavor ranking might be pretty 
robust and consistent since the value of each option (how good the ice cream tastes to 
me) is completely subjectively determined – no real expertise is needed besides my 
tasting the flavors.  By contrast, my car preference ranking is going to be uninformed 
(since I know very little about cars) and therefore spotty and inconsistent.   
The haphazard nature of preference ranking computations for political matters is 
much more likely to resemble the car case than the ice cream flavor case for most 
citizens.  The purpose of the requirement of consent to a state‟s authority is to protect 
“not primarily the individual himself, or his interests, but rather his freedom to choose 
whether to become bound to a particular government.”
77
  Locke argues that persons must 
weigh relevant considerations like freedoms given up and benefits received when 
deciding to enter into civil society, and this assumes some kind of preference evaluation 
for each option.  If a person‟s consent is to be sufficiently informed, the evaluations put 
into the choice ought to be more complicated than simple, unreflective tastes like those of 
ice cream flavors.  As discussed earlier, the areas of state authority are numerous, and the 
facts, considerations, options, etc., of each realm are even more complicated.  Well-
informed consideration and valuation of the whole of the state is quite implausible for 
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any boundedly rational human being, and even if we break down our mental work to the 
level of particular laws and policies and areas of interest, the task is still tremendous.  
Citizens do not approach the political realm as a single, interconnected web of issues and 
tasks (only partially because states themselves do not weave such well-formed webs), but 
rather as unconnected chunks that are brought up at different times and with different 
degrees of emphasis.  Since our knowledge of things political is suboptimal and our 
capacity for mental calculations is suboptimal, our political evaluations are going to be 
spotty and decisions made from them will be similarly suboptimal.  While this 
suboptimality is not always a problem in the way of getting political tasks done, it does 
pose a problem for attaining a citizen‟s sufficiently-informed consent. 
In some ways, bounded rationality manifests itself in our inability to manipulate 
facts and accurately derive consequences from them, like the imperfect causal-predictive 
powers mentioned before.  In other ways, though, bounded inferential capacities are not 
simply about not understanding facts and mechanisms, but have more to do with limited 
imaginative capabilities.  When Darwin was making his marry/do not marry list, he 
considered the value of possible future experiences like child-rearing, lack of attachment, 
and later-life situations, and while he thought he had good reasons to value these things in 
certain ways, our imaginations are not often accurate predictors of future values.  How 
could they be?  Currently, in my mind, I want to have children in the future because I 
expect being a parent would bring me happiness (along with some unhappiness), but very 
little of my life so far has given me real insight into what it might be like to be a parent to 
my own child.  Many of our future imaginings are cognitive shots in the dark, so to 
speak, because our current level of experience is insufficient to generalize from.  While 
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we obviously need to make decisions about the future based only on our shot in the dark 
generalizations, it would be wrong to say that we actually know what we are doing. 
When applied to the political realm, the accuracy of our future valuations is likely 
to run the gamut, often tending more toward inaccuracy.  Even the most competent 
political professional does not easily predict future events and assign appropriate values 
to them, because it is often hard to get an appropriate imaginative jumping-off point to 
start with.  When a citizen is deciding who to vote for, he might try to base his decision 
on facts he already knows about the candidate, like their previous voting record and 
policy suggestions they are making for the future.  Is this enough to really know how the 
candidate will act in the future if elected?  Clearly not, both because we cannot know 
what is actually in the candidate‟s mind (if the candidate is a stranger; we would have 
much better insight if the candidate was an intimate), and because the future will be filled 
with events we cannot begin to imagine.  Not only are there too many alternatives to 
consider, but there might be no way to accurately imagine these possibilities in order to 
give them proper, valuable consideration.  In some cases, sufficient understanding based 
on imagining the future is quite plausible (in cases like ice cream flavor imagining), 
while in other cases, gaining sufficient understanding is highly unlikely (like how 
political candidates would deal with unforeseeable major disasters). 
As with limited individual knowledge capacities, limited individual inferential 
capacities are aided by the division of mental labor.  Maybe even more so than knowing 
facts, problem-solving becomes easier when persons are able to devote special attention 
to developing particular faculties.  Specialists in car repair can use their superior 
inferential capacities to solve car problems better than I could.  Because I can trust 
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(hopefully) the mechanic to do car-related problem solving for me, I can devote more of 
my mental efforts toward other, non-car-related ends.  While his knowledge and problem-
solving abilities will never be perfect, they are much better than mine and are sufficient 
for resolving car-related problems. 
Similarly, while political professionals are not perfect political problem-solvers in 
any way, they can be significantly better equipped for such tasks than many non-political 
professionals.  While I do not want to argue that individual citizens can never be a part of 
the process or are incompetent, I do want to argue that this very important aspect of 
knowledge (problem-solving) is almost always going to be quite suboptimal when 
considering the robust requirements of classical consent theory.  Average citizens are 
largely unfamiliar with the detailed work that goes into managing a state.  I do not really 
understand the job of the Federal Reserve System, much less whether an adjustment to 
some interest rate or another will have a positive effect on the economy, and I do try to be 
decently informed.  If we expect citizens to give informed consent to their states (or to 
withhold such consent), then their knowledge and problem-solving abilities would have 
to be substantial if the “informed” clause is to have any substantive meaning.  While 
individuals can be very knowledgeable and informed in many different fields, real 
knowledge of the state and its workings by some or most of its citizens is untenable – 
there are simply too many other things that we must focus our abilities on.  Projections 
and problem-solving are plausible only on a smaller scale, project by project, individual 
by individual, as compared to “getting” the state as a whole, with its large number of 
functions and duties. 
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As I have argued, ascribing idealized rationality to agents might be acceptable 
when dealing with the purely theoretical realm, but it cannot be appropriate for evaluating 
real-life agents in real-life scenarios.  Although we can make recommendations that 
particular persons become better-versed in this area or that, wide variations in 
deliberation and talents in inference will remain the norm, and this must be the case, 
especially when considering an individual‟s knowledge and problem-solving capacities in 
the political realm.  Because of this sub-optimality, private individuals will not be able to 
meet classical consent‟s requirement of sufficiently informed consent. 
 
Environmental Constraints  The fact that persons are naturally limited in 
knowledge capabilities and inferential capabilities poses a problem for idealized 
rationality, but natural cognitive capacity is not the only issue.  Just as important, if not 
more important, are the factors external to the individual‟s brain – environmental 
constraints.  There is no clean slate or vacuum in which real persons think, deliberate, 
learn, or solve problems.  Even though many or most persons are naturally inquisitive and 
intelligent, our environments have a great deal of control over how we think and what we 
think about. 
 While individuals are capable of thinking up new options and alternatives when 
learning and deciding, pre-determined answers and options are valuable problem-solving 
tools.  When deciding where to go for dinner this evening, I have the option of spending 
hours flipping through the phonebook and researching the possible value of each 
restaurant I come across.  Doing more work means I am more adequately informed in my 
decision-making – but it also means that I wind up very hungry.  It is much more useful 
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to me to ask friends for recommendations, to consult a favored website, or to just go to a 
place that I have already dined at and enjoyed.  In this instance, as with others, I am 
thankful that my environment can and does present me with a limited set of options; so 
long as my decision about dinner locale meets my personal standards of quality, I am not 
overwhelmed with cognitive tasks. 
 Many individual choices are made in contexts of “givens,” pre-determined and 
pre-valued options, and this is especially valuable in public life.  It is not in my interest to 
consider all citizens when determining who will be the best senator or president, and it is 
not in my interest to contemplate all possible solutions to all public problems.  Through 
the mental (and physical) division of labor, others can devote a significant portion of their 
time and mental effort to narrowing down alternatives and giving them some sort of value 
so that I may devote a significant portion of my time and mental effort to other tasks that 
many other people can benefit from.  If others do some of the work for me and present 
me with “givens,” I can vote for one of four political candidates or support one out of 
several movements to clean up the environment.  Furthermore, I am more likely to be 
knowledgeable about my choices if I am presented with a finite number of options than if 
I have to do all the work for myself.  Given that I have limited knowledge and inferential 
capacities, “givens” often help me allocate what mental resources I do have, and use them 
to greater benefit. 
 It may seem problematic to personal freedom that we must depend on the work of 
others for our thinking, especially since these others may be wrong, ill-informed, or just 
unintelligent.  Even though we always run this risk when we rely on others to construct 
our thinking environments for us, doing so is still necessary.  If we, as individuals, are to 
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move much beyond hunter/gatherer subsistence, we need to be dependent on one another, 
not just in physical labors, but also in mental labor.  Having a pre-set structure of 
“givens” is necessary and useful for depth of thought, even if it takes away from some 
misguided notion of independent cognition.  It takes a lot of brain power to form and run 
a state, to allow individuals to work in concert with others.  Some might construe the 
division of political mental labor as coercive or manipulative, since the point of consent 
theory is to ensure that power may not be exercised over individuals except by their 
“free” choice.  However, this sharing of the mental labor is quite preferable to attempting 
to do all of the political thinking as individuals, undoubtedly failing because we are 
overwhelmed, and ultimately getting nothing accomplished.  Consent theory is therefore 
fundamentally flawed because it gives a higher value to an unattainable, so-called 
sufficient understanding than to attainable shared, suboptimal knowing. 
 In truth, it is only by accepting and valuing our environments as they actually are 
that rationality can occur.  As argued earlier, a division of mental labor (both horizontally 
and vertically) increases the general knowledge and problem-solving base, and a well-
organized environment is what allows this to occur.  Although environments will never 
be optimally organized, they are still significant improvements over the individual‟s lone 
powers.  To use Simon‟s business model, greater mental work, both in quantity and 
quality, is accomplished by having people specializing in different areas and by having 
some people coordinating the efforts of the group; a cabinetry business that only attends 
to its bookkeeping, and not its cabinet making, is not a good cabinetry business.  The 
analogy is especially apt for political knowledge.  By working in a pre-set environment, 
more things are known and they are known better.  If I am to know anything about state-
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level energy issues, it is only because of the mental work of others (energy professionals), 
and the better they are at knowing the facts and coordinating their efforts, the more likely 
I am to have quality knowledge about energy issues. 
 Furthermore, the more complex the topics become, the better organized the 
environment must be.  If my business only makes springs, all I have to know is how to 
make the springs and how to sell them to others for profit.  For an organization as 
multifaceted as a state, though, the division of labor must be more specialized and better 
coordinated, to the point that even the most intelligent, well-versed political professional 
will not know or do much beyond his own sub-specialty.  If this is true for that 
professional, then the likelihood of the average citizen being truly informed is near-zero.  
Organization of the environment and group efforts are good at increasing overall 
knowledge and efficiency, but they tend to limit the breadth of knowledge and problem-
solving capacities for any given individual. 
 
Time and Attention Constraints Our environments clearly impact what we can know 
and how we can know it, but further constraints are apparent when we take into account 
all of the forces impacting the individual‟s time and attention.  The fact that humans are 
finite creatures living in finite time is often left aside in social and philosophical 
discourse.  Even if we had substantially more brain power, where we could know larger 
amounts of facts and solve even more complex problems, there are still 24 hours in a day 
and multiple tasks competing for our attention.  Although we are capable of achieving 
real depth of knowledge in specific areas, perhaps in the way of professions or important 
hobbies, a variety of day-to-day tasks still demand our time and attention.  I devote a fair 
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amount of time to writing this dissertation and to my job, but things like cooking, 
cleaning, paying bills, taking care of the cat, and being a good family member and friend 
regularly push themselves on me, taking me away from my primary areas of rational 
development, and my life is simple compared to most.  If life forces me to regularly shift 
my attention from task to task in real time, then my chances of gaining deep knowledge 
in many areas become slimmer and slimmer. 
 As Simon argues, most potential agenda items, in business and in life, are 
problems and opportunities.  Besides the fact that the environment limits or controls 
much of what we are exposed to, the things that we must cognitively deal with present 
themselves to us with varying degrees of importance and seriousness (or, to make things 
more complicated, we sometimes must assign degrees of importance to them – another 
cognitively draining task).  When considering our expectations of rational agents, we 
must remember that all persons live in real time, and our lives often revolve around 
survival and subsistence, and non-necessary cognitive tasks must sometimes take a back-
seat.  Even well-ordered environments cannot make serious dents in the necessary tasks 
that people must deal with.  Being well-ordered is only a matter of degree, and does not 
negate the large-scale chaos of the real world.  As Cherniak argues, most organisms (not 
just humans) must deal primarily with external disorder rather than internal, mental 
disorder.  Working to have a consistent and coherent set of beliefs is not a good use of a 
person‟s time when he must deal with paying the bills and getting food on the table 
(unless that cognitive work pays the bills and puts food on the table).  For most people, 
even “simple” tasks are cognitively draining.  Sitting in traffic is draining, having a 
conversation with a family member is draining, and watching the news on television can 
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be draining.  If one has to devote so much mental power to simply getting through the 
day‟s chaos, then little time or energy may be left over to developing one‟s rational 
powers unless doing so directly alleviates the chaos. 
In some cases of knowledge acquisition, when dealing with the allocation of time 
and attention, we are faced with stimulus overload.  Even if we have excellent knowledge 
and inferential capacities, we are still ill-equipped to deal with the overload.  In the 
modern world, the amount of knowable information is growing with astounding speed, to 
the point that knowledge acquisition can mean a lot of time and attention must be devoted 
to just figuring out what information to not consider.  Coping with stimulus overload is 
frustrating and tiring and is a real obstacle to gaining knowledge and developing skills.  
In the face of such frustrations, especially when the learning is not immediately 
beneficial, some agents will shut down and discontinue their investigations. 
Habit and routine conserve valuable decision-making time and attention by 
allowing the individual to rely on his past actions as a basis for his current and future 
ones.  Shopping at my regular grocery store is easier than shopping at a new one because 
I already know where the things I want are (because I have used them before).  We are 
creatures of habit because repetition is very useful for our mental economy.  As long as 
this is the path that meets our pre-set standards, the fact that it is the path of least 
resistance means we can devote more of our mental efforts to other pressing issues. 
 
Motivation  At the heart of the attention/time allocation “problem” is the issue 
of motivation.  Our time and efforts are directed at this or that area because of reasons, 
good or bad.  This is how we can say that crises and problems “force” themselves on us – 
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our reasons for addressing them immediately are powerful enough to gain and hold our 
attention, powerful enough to push other things aside.  If it is true that a large part of our 
time and attention are devoted to managing external disorder and struggling to get by, 
then we will need to be presented with very good reasons to divert our attention away 
from what we are currently doing, especially if our current tasks are important to us.  A 
movie may not need much to hold my attention for two hours, so it may not have to be 
especially good or compelling, but I might have to be presented with very good reasons 
to explore new and obscure areas of study like theoretical physics; I know that, for some 
people, this is very interesting and therefore very compelling, but for me, here and now, it 
isn‟t compelling enough to draw me away from my other pursuits. 
 Motivation, as a key part of bounded human rationality, is not a simple or 
predictable thing.  Classic conceptions of human rationality often fail to address the 
complexity of motivation.  That is not always a problem, as long as we are dealing with 
the purely theoretical and not attempting to project to the practical world.  In a prisoner‟s 
dilemma, the reason to defect or cooperate is built into the problem; given possible 
results, the goal is to maximize one‟s outcome, and so one should act in accordance with 
whichever way the numbers play out.  Real, boundedly rational agents in real, 
complicated situations, however, cannot be expected to behave in such a simple, 
idealized way because motives as reasons for action are rarely simple. 
 As argued above, individuals rarely have coherent and consistent sets of 
preferences and goals, and motives are usually not clear and well-integrated.  If this is 
true, then we cannot expect persons to always act according to highly rational, well 
thought-out reasons.  Being selfish and impulsive is normal and ought to be expected 
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sometimes, no matter how much we might want selflessness and reason to prevail.  We 
can honestly try to work in concert with others, but that does not entail our motives are 
consonant with those of others.  There are power struggles and mind games and 
manipulation in many areas of life.  We are not always cognizant of our real motives, and 
it would be wrong to believe that we are usually driven by reasonable purposes.  The fact 
that humans are not ideally rational does not suggest failure in any way; however, 
expecting optimal rationality, especially in regard to motives, fails to appreciate the 
world‟s complexity and the human mind‟s status as a natural, situated object. 
 Since we have many different issues vying for our attention at any and all times, 
and since motivation is imperfect and subjectively based, it follows that to appreciate this 
or that as an important issue, worthy of our attention and time, will not be consistent 
across all people.  We are all likely to devote great time and attention to things that we 
perceive as important, but the perception of importance is not objective.  Some people are 
especially compelled by theoretical physics, and are willing to allocate a large portion of 
their time and attention to learning about it, but it is not so objectively valuable that we 
can expect all persons to divert their limited time and attention to it and away from other 
pursuits.   
It is in this way that being politically informed, sufficient to have some sort of 
basis for valuable informed consent, becomes especially unlikely for a majority of the 
citizenry.  Learning about the state and all of its complexities, its functions and possible 
realms of authority, and how all of this imposes on citizens, is not uniformly compelling 
to all people, and for many different reasons.  If a harried working mother is struggling to 
make ends meet, she may devote all of her efforts to getting by, or she may devote a good 
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deal of her time and attention to learning about and supporting social efforts to support 
harried working mothers, but she will not have the time to pursue both.  A wealthy 
suburbanite may be fascinated by state economics and will devote his large amount of 
leisure time to becoming better informed, or he may pick up golf or tennis.   
We will make the greater efforts to becoming sufficiently informed when we are 
motivated enough, but the simple existence of an issue is not always enough to give 
people reasons for action.  It might even be the case that, in some areas like political 
action, apathy is acceptable because it could mean lack of strong reason for concern.  
This is not to say that ignorant, chattel-like masses of citizens are wonderful things, 
because they are not.  One can be vigilant and ready to act politically when necessary 
without always having to act because of necessity.  The former seems like a valuable 
mental state for a citizen, whereas the latter should give us reason for alarm, because that 
state is in bad enough conditions that many citizens find it important enough to 
investigate and become better informed.  As long as the state is in an acceptable order, a 
mental division of labor will probably be in everybody‟s best interest, with only a portion 
of the population having truly deep knowledge of the state and its authority (enough to 
know when something is wrong) while other parts of the population teach math, grow 
vegetables, and deal in real estate.  As I will argue in Chapter 7, acquiescence because of 
low motivation might itself be considered a form of political action. 
 
If it is the case that most of our attention cannot be spent on areas of new 
investigation and is instead focused on coping with external chaos, and that we are 
willing to devote large portions of our time and attention to endeavors only when we are 
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strongly motivated to do so, then it seems to follow that, for most individuals, gaining 
any real depth of understanding about a breadth of public, political issues is not possible, 
likely, or a good idea.  There is simply too much to learn, and not enough time or energy 
in which to learn it.  Although this may have some serious implications concerning social 
class divisions, the fact remains that robust knowledge of the political may be a matter of 
luxury; those that are both interested and capable of spending the time and mental 
resources (because that time and effort are not forced to other issues) are substantially 
more likely to be the ones that are informed in any relevant sense of the word.  
Historically, the majority of the political knowing has been done by political 
professionals, academics and political and legal specialists, persons who have had lives 
structured to be conducive to such efforts.  We cannot expect that a majority of citizens 
have lives so well-ordered that they are capable of pursuing knowledge of complex and 
nuanced things that are not immediate to their survival, things like politics and public 
policy.  Similarly, we cannot expect a majority of individuals to feel compelled to 
becoming politically and socially informed, especially if their state is functioning in 
acceptable ways when their personal lives are not. 
If classical consent is to be the basis of the state‟s authority, then the world and its 
inhabitants would have to be well-ordered enough that individuals could really be 
sufficiently informed so as to give substantive consent.  Rousseau makes such arguments 
in the Social Contract: “In a word, besides the maxims common to all, there is within 
each People some cause which orders these maxims in a particular manner and makes its 
legislation suited to itself alone.”
78
  Each state and its citizenry must be so perfectly 
arranged that the economy is appropriately stable and the workload is properly 
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distributed, interstate relations are appropriately understood and attended to, and the 
inhabitants are able to devote their individual efforts to the political realm.  While we all 
might wish for such utopias, it seems inappropriate to expect real state authority to be 
grounded in fictitious arrangements, to idealize the lives and minds of individual citizens 
in such a way that their honest efforts will always be sub-par and irrational.  It is not in 
the interests of individuals or states for most persons to devote a large portion of their 
mental efforts to becoming highly politically informed because doing so necessitates that 
other important items be neglected.  Even if our environments become better structured 
and our citizens become better educated and more organized, there is still a lot of 
important work to be done, managing the chaos in our lives and in our minds.  Bounded 
rationality, external restraints, and subjective motivation will always pose a problem for 
most (if not all) people becoming sufficiently politically informed, enough to give 
informed consent, so the robust knowledge requirement of classical consent theory will 
always be unattainable.  
 On the subject of political epistemology, Simmons‟s voluntaristic argument is 
bound to fail because he simply does not consider whether the cognitive requirements of 
political consent can be met.  When we talk about purely theoretical persons, it is 
acceptable to idealize their cognitive faculties and choosing situations, but the very nature 
of Simmons‟s argument is an attempt to apply to the real world, to evaluate whether real 
states have or can have legitimate authority over their citizens.  The fact that a 
hypothetical agent would consent to his government‟s authority over him does not ground 
any political obligations for real agents: “once [actual] consent is abandoned as the 
ground [for political duty], we have also abandoned much of what is most compelling 
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about classical consent theory – namely, the clear, uncontroversial ground of obligation 




 The underlying assumption in Simmons‟s argument is that persons are really 
cognitively able to give political consent.  To a certain point, this seems logical; there are 
some real circumstances where we are cognitively capable of giving real consent, 
including the examples I gave in Chapter 3.  However, we cannot generalize this 
capability from one kind of circumstance to another because our knowledge is not 
equally strong across choosing situations.  Heidi is able to consent to Betsy choosing 
their movie for the night in part because Heidi is sufficiently knowledgeable about 
current movie selections and Betsy‟s excellent track record with picking quality films – 
there does not seem to be any additional, relevant information that is missing from 
Heidi‟s understanding.  From this, however, we cannot automatically conclude that Heidi 
is sufficiently knowledgeable about the content of possible political obligations.  The 
scope of currently available movies is small and Betsy‟s history of movie picks is 
obvious to Heidi, so becoming sufficiently informed is no great task for Heidi.  The scope 
of possible political obligation, though, is much wider, much more serious, and much, 
much more complex than today‟s top 10 movies. 
 If political consent is to be possible, then the would-be consenter must be 
sufficiently knowledgeable about the content of his consent, and in order to be 
sufficiently knowledgeable about the content of political consent, a would-be consenter 
would have to devote an inordinate amount of time, attention, and brain power to gaining 
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knowledge.  This simply is not possible for most (if any) people.  Therefore, if 
Simmons‟s argument is to be coherent and consistent, agents must be idealized, and this 
is in direct contradiction to Simmons‟s overall argument for political voluntarism.  
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Chapter 6: The Uniqueness of Political Authority 
 
In private relationships where classical consent theory‟s robust requirements can 
be successfully met, the consenter retains his authority over himself in a very real sense.  
While Billy gives up an important kind of personal power, the power to control what 
happens to his body, to Dr. Doug in order to have his surgery, we can say that Billy is 
still very much in control.  If he changes his mind at the last moment, Dr. Doug cannot 
rightly perform the surgery on him; if Billy does not want to follow Dr. Doug‟s orders for 
post-operative recovery, he is free to do so, even if following the orders is in Billy‟s best 
interest.  Billy controls the terms of the relationship – he determines how much power Dr. 
Doug is to have.  So, while Dr. Doug holds the scalpel and forceps, Billy holds Dr. 
Doug‟s right to hold the scalpel and forceps.  When it comes to private relationships, 
where individuals are active in and present for the creation and maintenance of those 
relationships, we can say that there is a sense in which power over one‟s body is an 
actual, rightful personal power
80
.  Since the individual has this power and is actively a 
part of the private relationship, he retains the power even if he consents to another‟s 
manipulation of his body.  In this case, there is something real to “give up” and the 
individual has to authority to do so, all the while remaining as free as he was before. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine political authority as a special type of 
authority.  Locke and Simmons, amongst others, argue that political authority is derived 
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from personal authority, which would entail that they are similar enough that such 
derivations could be made.  I believe that this cannot be the case – personal power and 
political power are so fundamentally different in source and content that one cannot be 
the product of the other.  Even if the practical and epistemic obstacles put forth in the last 
two chapters could be overcome, to the point that persons could be sufficiently informed 
and properly desiring, and signs of consent could be easily exchanged between state and 
citizen, I believe that political authority is not the kind of thing that can be established via 
the consent of citizens.  In this case, Lockeans are guilty of a category mistake regarding 
authority. 
 
Personal Powers v. Political Power 
Giving up power  When we examine the public relationship and the realms of 
authority the individual citizen would supposedly consent to, both giving up and retaining 
his personal powers, it is not the case that these powers even exist in such a way that the 
citizen can give them up or retain them.  Even the most minimal realms of state authority 
differ greatly from any personal powers that can be held by individual citizens.  States 
may have to tax and imprison, protect the land and resources, encourage some behaviors 
and discourage others.  States may have to raise armies and engage in wars.  States make 
laws to govern all people in the territory, for better or worse.  Even if we view individual, 
personal areas of authority quite liberally, there is no way that these requisite powers of 
the state are somehow embedded inside.  As Hampton argues, individual persons aren‟t 
ministates: is it really plausible to think that the authority with which a ruler legislates or 
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punishes offenders or conducts foreign affairs is something that each of naturally has?”
81
  
If the state tries to draw its powers from the powers of its citizens, it will come up empty. 
Political authority is of a different kind than personal autonomy.  The necessary 
powers of the state do not derive from individuals consenting and transferring their 
personal powers because individuals do not have those powers to begin with.  Whatever 
authority states have, those powers cannot come directly from individual citizens via their 
consent.  The allure of classical consent theory is that persons can enter into authoritative 
relationships without sacrificing their freedoms – they will still hold on to their personal 
powers in some strong sense, even if they consent to another‟s exercise of power over 
them.  The kinds of authority states must exercise in order to function even at a minimal 
level are not mere extrapolations from individual liberties, so we cannot say that citizens 
retain their personal power when entering into a political relationship, in the way that 
classical consent theory wants.  As I shall argue in the next chapter, we can maintain 
some link between individuals and states in terms of rightful exercises of power, but 
contra Locke and Simmons, this link can only be very indirect and not transacted via 
consent. 
 
Pre-Constitutional Relationship  We can begin to see why individuals have 
no personal political power to retain when interacting with the state by looking at the 
individual‟s initial association with his state.  Hume‟s point bears repeating, that states as 
things we are born into, and states view us as citizens at birth as well.  Obviously this 
does not establish any truth about the legitimacy of the state‟s authority, but it does 
remind us of the fact that the state has already established the terms of our association 
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long before we could possibly consent to its exercise of power over us.  Even though the 
state‟s laws and constitution are bound to change throughout our lifetimes, we still enter 
into citizenship being viewed by the state as not political authorities.  We are already 
claimed as subjects, and individuals rarely view themselves as anything but.  This bears a 
normative impact because, as I argued in Chapter 3, true consensual relationships meet 
classical consent‟s requirement for personal power preservation because there is a pre-
constitutional period where both parties are independent from one another.  If classical 
consent is to be the basis of legitimate power exchanges, the potential consenter must 
have plausible option of not entering into the relationship, or building into the terms of 
the relationship some opting-out possibility.  Individuals must have some say-so about 
the bounds of the authority‟s power and input about his role as consenter.  Consent is 
appropriate for evaluating power exchanges only when the option of not consenting is a 
real, feasible option, but citizens almost never have this option regarding the authority of 
states.  If in a private relationship, the would-be consenter never had a choice about 
entering into the authority relationship, we would conclude that his personal authority 
was violated and thus diminishes any legitimating power his consent might have.   
This is one of the reasons that I believe that political authority is of a 
fundamentally different kind than private, interpersonal authority.  Although there are 
many dissimilarities (territoriality, kinds of punishments, etc.), I find that looking at the 
parent/child relationship helps to understand how the founding terms of a relationship 
impacts the nature of authority.  Like when we are born into states, we are born into 
families having a particular place in the power structure; as children, our parents claim 
and exercise authority over us, whether we want them to or not.  As we grow, we may be 
143 
 
able to negotiate some aspects of our roles as “ruled subjects” of our parents, but the 
nature of the relationships is not alterable.  We do not expect the parent/child relationship 
to operate like other relationships in large part because the terms of its foundation are so 
very different – the same set of rules simply ought not to apply.  The same goes with the 
individual/state relationship.  Entry into the relationship is not done by independent agent 
and independent agent, but by ruler and ruled, one side forcing the other into his role.  It 
is not as if the political relationships is just some type of variant of the interpersonal, 
having different external traits but existing by the same set of principles.  Since the two 
are so fundamentally different, we should not be surprised that the basis for legitimating 
one kind of authority cannot serve as the basis for legitimating the other kind. 
Although the state‟s laws and constitution (written and unwritten) may change 
within one‟s lifetime, the thing we think of as “the state” may endure for longer periods 
of time.  Because the state is defined by some of its formal features (its laws, its physical 
location, etc.), it is able to persist much longer than any individual.  The lawmaking 
bodies, legislatures
82
, allow the state to perpetuate itself and its authority into the future, 
so when we are born into the state, we already have laws that apply to us, whatever we 
may think of them.  Many states have methods of allowing citizens to participate in 
government to a limited extent, but most often an individual‟s participation is in reaction 
to the laws and regulations already in place before his involvement. 
The pre-constitutional period in private relationships allows the participants to be 
active in the creation of the terms of authority, and this seems to be essential to the 
Lockean voluntaristic spirit.  The nature of the modern state, by contrast, seems 
antithetical to voluntarism as the basis of political power and personal obligation.  If 
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individuals are not allowed to be active participants in the creation of their obligations 
because the state claims and exercises power at the individual‟s birth, then the existence 
of those obligations are not the product of the person‟s will.  He is not as free as he was 
before, because there is no “before”. 
 
Post-Constitutional Relationship  Just as the forced entry into the public 
relationship prevents classical consent from legitimating state authority, the state‟s claim 
to great power over citizens for their entire lives prevents any attempt at consent from 
transferring authority.  Only when a person tries or succeeds in emigrating from his home 
state does that state even consider relinquishing it authority over that individual – and 
sometimes emigration does not prevent a state‟s claim to exercise its authority
83
.  Except 
for these rare cases, states claim authority over all individuals living within their borders 
for their entire lives, and may compel them to follow the laws, if such compulsion is 
needed, without exception.  This exception-less, complete claim and exercise of authority 
over citizens prevents the individual/state relationship from ever being consensual, and 
this is true by necessity. 
 As argued in Chapter 3, one party forcing the other to remain in the relationship is 
tyrannical and seems opposed to the spirit of classical consent: to allow the consenter to 
maintain a true sense of personal power by only lending some of that power to the would-
be authority.  Withdrawing from one‟s original political relationship by emigration is 
almost an impossibility for many citizens; the costs (financial and other) of leaving one‟s 
life behind and moving to another state can be more than many citizens can bear.  Also, 
even if one does have the resources to leave one‟s home state, there are further 
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difficulties with finding another state to immigrate to, but this is a necessity because 
almost all land on the planet has been claimed by some other state.  The consent tradition 
that follows from Locke centers on the value of the individual, arguing that persons are 
born with natural rights, and this creates a zone of personal power around the individual.  
The whole purpose of creating a state is to protect those persons, so to create a political 
relationship where the citizen has no plausible means of withdrawing from the 
relationship is contradictory.   
It is also in this way that the political relationship is of a fundamentally different 
kind than private relationships.  In private relationships, classical consent allows the 
parties to create an authority exchange so that one or both of their interests are benefitted.  
That authority exchange, however, has the option of being broken if either of the parties 
want their relationship to end or change.  The power given and received is truly an 
extension of the participants, whereas in the political relationship, one party (the state) 
enters into the relationship with the rules already written and its permanent authority 
already asserted and ready to exercise.  There is no power exchange at all. 
To be fair, Locke and Simmons do seem to recognize that post-constitutional 
autonomy is integral to a power exchange‟s legitimacy, as it appears to underpin the 
argument for the possibility of the dissolution of a government – if the rulers go outside 
of the authority originally granted them, the citizens have the right to withdraw their 
consent and dissolve the government‟s powers.
84
  Like the Lockean argument as a whole, 
this is a worthwhile attempt to maintain voluntarism, but it has not translated into the 
world of modern states.  If citizens cannot give their consent in the first place because 
they do not have political authority as part of their personal authority, then there is 
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nothing to take back when the government abuses its power.  The world it set up now 
that, even if a citizen could emigrate, he would only be emigrating to another state and 
the authority of its government.  The nature of modern state authority, as an ultimate 
power with ultimate authority, requires that this be the case. 
 
Open-endedness  The realms of state authority, such as public safety and 
economics and punishment, are not powers that individuals or non-state groups are 
capable of holding; rather, they are realms of authority that come into existence by the 
creation of the state.  In order to successfully protect the population and develop a public 
agenda, the state‟s claims to power have to allow for changes and adjustments as the 
needs of the state change.  There is no single perfect constitution that applies to all states.  
Each polity must consider its many features and special needs, and in order to secure the 
peace and prosper, each state must constantly adapt itself to its current situation.  New 
laws and regulations will become necessary, and if the nature of the state requires the 
possibility of change on some fronts, it theoretically must allow for change on all fronts, 
to claim unlimited power. 
Of course, no state can actually exercise unlimited power over all of its citizens, 
and no state would be interested in doing so.  As experience, as well as theory, shows us, 
besides being so morally heinous and contemptible, attempts at tyranny are not really in 
the state‟s best interest.  When governments try to exert too much control, rebellion is 
likely to follow, so actual exercise of complete power is bound to be self-defeating.  Still, 
open-endedness is an essential feature of state authority.  Even if no state ever wanted to 
exercise power in realm x, the state‟s authority must allow for the possibility of 
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exercising authority in realm x in order to secure its greater goals.  This is one thing that 
makes the state a unique type of agent: it is neither a single person nor a unified group, 
and it exists to serve a variety of interests over a broad sphere.  Because the state is a 
unique type of agent with a purpose unlike that of any other kind of group, we cannot 
expect its power to be comparable to any other in terms of type or extent. 
Open-endedness poses both practical and theoretical barriers for personal consent 
creating state authority.  On the practical front, as discussed in Chapter 4, there are no 
mechanisms for accounting for the will of individuals whenever a new realm of state 
authority is being considered.  On the theoretical front, though, the state has an existence 
and purpose beyond its individual citizens.  Take, for example, legislation to regulate 
harmful air emissions.  Releasing pollutants into the air is clearly in the interest of many 
individual citizens and companies.  The nature of state authority, though, is not simply 
concerned with aggregating individual interests, but must deal with a public good; even if 
a majority of citizens would be in favor of allowing more toxic emissions, the state can 
have a separate concern for the entire body.  It needs to be able exercise authority on 
unforeseen fronts if such authority is needed, so it cannot be derived from the consent of 
individual wills. 
 
Independence and Finality  Perhaps the most pertinent aspect of the modern 
state‟s power is its independence and finality as an authority.  Any relationship that we 
can call private necessarily takes place within a context of greater authority than that held 
by either party.  Mike and Karen are both citizens of states (probably the same state, since 
they are married, but that is neither here nor there), and many of their interactions with 
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one another are limited by the laws of their states, even though they understand 
themselves to have a very open-ended relationship of authority exchange.  While they 
have direct and ongoing consent with one another over a range of topics, essentially 
making them both consenter and consentee at the same time, authority and subject, states 
still exercise power over some of these same topics.  For instance, Mike and Karen have 
agreed to share their common monies, but that does not prevent the state from interfering 
in the handling of those monies; if all of their money is the result of a bank heist, the fact 
that they have consented to the other‟s spending of the money does not stop the state 
from seizing the stolen loot.  The fact that Billy has agreed to let Dr. Doug perform 
surgery on him will not prevent the state from arresting Dr. Doug if he has no medical 
license. 
My intent in mentioning this is not to delve into the particulars of state 
sovereignty, when it applies and over what realms.  Rather, I wish to point out state 
authority itself as a unique brand of power, one that applies from all and only states to 
their respective citizens.  Even though there is dispute about the extent to which states 
have sovereignty, even though there is dispute about the meaning of sovereignty, and 
even if whatever it is, is being altered or weakened by increased international interaction, 
the fact remains that modern states act over their citizens as if they are sovereign, and 
most states regard one another as largely sovereign.   
In private relationships, if there is a dispute between consenter and consentee, the 
parties have the option of appealing to the state to settle their dispute.  States need to have 
the authority to settle internal disputes in order to keep the peace and function properly.  
This is why the classical consent argument came about in the first place – to end state of 
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nature disputes.  Furthermore, as Raz argues, “we feel that legal systems not only happen 
to be the most important institutionalized system governing human society, but that that 
is part of their nature.”
85
  States are not just rule-makers; they are the rule-makers.  The 
groundwork provided by the state‟s authority determines the context in which other types 
of authority may take place.  Other authority relationships are sought to accomplish 
certain goals (seeing movies, having surgery), but state authority‟s purpose claims to be 
accomplishing the most important goal – life as a society. 
By and large, though, political authority does not exist beyond the borders of 
modern states.  While we may have large international policy bodies, and while states 
may make treaties with one another and exercise power over one another via economic 
transactions, there is no secure authority to hold the parties to the terms of their 
(seemingly consensual) compacts.  For better or worse, anything put forth by these 
international bodies amounts to nothing more than recommendations to be taken into 
consideration by the acting states. 
If this is the case, if state authority is by its very nature final and independent, 
then it cannot be the case that is derived from the personal power of individuals.  No 
decent argument can be put forth that any one individual has complete power over 
another, and the modern world is set up such that individuals are always non-final in their 
power.  If persons do not have this type of power to begin with, then it cannot be the case 
that state authority gains its standing by extrapolating from its individual citizens.  The 
trait of finality is not something that any one person has – rather, it is something that we 
create by making a new, unique type of power. 
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Political Authority as Sui Generis  State authority is markedly different than 
personal authority in two distinct ways.  First, political authority has a monopoly on 
power over a given territory: political authority is the existence “of a convention to treat 
the orders of one or more persons (i.e., the rulers) as both preemptive and final…in a 
wide variety of domains of decision (indeed, maybe even all domains), where these 
orders may contain directives that may mandate unpleasant and even highly dangerous 
behavior.”
86
    This first dimension of the state‟s authority is Weberian, and includes 
within the concept that the rulers have a cadre of supporters to enforce the rules.  The 
authority of the state exists to the degree that the rulers and their supporters are able to 
uphold the directives they make to the citizenry.   The finality achieves the resolution to 
the state of nature that Locke and Hobbes both dealt with.  Disputes may be adjudicated 
impartially and future disputes may be prevented by the enacting of laws.  Political 
authority operates on a macro level – it locates within an entire state (comprised of many 
individual persons) a power-holder and rule-enforcer.
87
   Personal power, however, exists 
only within a person as a Lockean ideal, that we are all born free and equal, and that we 
can exercise our freedom through our faculty of reason.  While personal authority may 
seem similar to political authority in this instance, as Locke and many others would have 
us believe, I argue that this similarity is merely symbolic or metaphorical.   
Second, political authority is unique in that it cannot be held by any one person or 
non-political group.  The types and domains of power that modern states may have are 
not the types and domains that individuals and non-states are capable of having.  Locke‟s 
state of nature argument has individuals holding the rights to uphold the law of nature 
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and punish offenders, but these natural rights presuppose the existence of objective 
natural law.  I simply cannot understand how this would be the case.  As Hampton 
argues, for instance, “It is hard to believe that each adult… naturally possesses the right 
to use a trial procedure of her choice to convict the offender and the right to inflict 
retributive or deterrent forms of punishment on the offender.”
88
   While I might approve 
of a murderer being locked away from the rest of society for the rest of his life because he 
needs to be stopped and I want him to suffer like his victim suffered, I cannot see how I 
(or any other individual or group) have a right to do so outside of the existence of a law.  
The existence of natural rights like legislation and punishment depend on the existence of 
an objective natural law, but the existence of Locke‟s natural law depends on “that 
measure God has set to the actions of men for their mutual security.”
89
   Unless a better 
foundation for natural law, beyond divine command, can be found, then the private 
possession of rights like punishment and legislation cannot be accepted. 
These considerations go to show that political power, held only by states, is 
fundamentally different in type from any power held by persons in private relationships.  
States regard themselves and one another as the highest authorities, and citizens regard 
their states similarly.  A state cannot persist if it does not have the power to control areas 
vital to its interests, relatively free from interference.  In order for persons to be secure in 
their bodies and possessions, states must have real power to construct laws, punish 
wrongdoers, and generally coordinate large-scale behaviors.  From this, we can see that 
political authority is fundamentally different from any authority conferred in private 
relationships.  Not only are the necessary powers of the state far too vast for any single 
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citizen to understand properly enough to intentionally consent to the state‟s power via a 
sufficient outward sign – those powers are not of the kind that can exist as the product of 
robust consent, nor should they.  Because the nature of the state‟s power is so different 
from the nature of any other type of power, we would be wrong to conclude that the 
method of securing that power (robust consent) will be the same. 
 
Political Directives and Political “Intentions” 
 After showing that political authority is of a fundamentally different kind than 
private authority, I will now take a page from Raz and look at the unique content of 
political directives.  After all, the point of having a subject/authority relationship has to 
do with directions
90
 being given from one party (the authority) to the other (the subject) 
for some particular, practical purpose – the management of actions.  As we shall see, the 
intentions behind such directions given by states differ dramatically from those given 
from private authorities, and the reasons for following them make it clear that public 
relationships create an authoritative atmosphere unlike any possible in private, 
interpersonal relationships. 
 First, we must look at the intentions behind the state‟s actions.  Persons of the 
classical consent tradition, including Locke and the Lockeans as well as Rousseauians, 
have seen the state‟s authority as a product of individual wills; in order for persons to 
have their interests and needs met in a way that anarchy (state of nature) cannot provide, 
they unite to form a state.  The purpose of the state, in this tradition, is to aggregate and 
interpret the wills of the individuals, who have given their consent to the body politic to 
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act on their behalf, so the outcome – the “will” of the state – is just a reworking of the 
original will of the individual.  However, as we have seen, serious practical problems 
prevent this reworking from ever actually happening in real states: there are problems of 
accounting for consent via sufficient outward signs, of getting the intent of full consent to 
the state as a whole from any possible lower-level consentings, and so on.   
Moreover, the domains of state authority cover different spheres from personal, 
individual interests.  Although classical consent theory‟s advocates and dissenters can 
agree that the main function of the state would have to do with the security of persons 
and possessions, the necessary laws and regulations for accomplishing this security have 
to cover a wide range of areas like public health and social welfare and other mass 
coordination of behavior.  These public actions, however, (carried about by public 
intentions, if you will, or the state‟s intentions for safety, prosperity, and peace) are often 
contrary to any given individual‟s private desires and interests.  A wealthy person is 
interested in preserving his wealth, and so may not want heavy taxes to pay for social 
welfare programs; the cautious driver might feel that he ought to be able to drive faster 
than the speed limit, as he believes his actions would not put the public at greater risk.  
The conscientious citizen will hopefully realize that the laws are put into place for a 
greater good to himself and society as a whole.  He may realize that he ought to pay taxes 
to fund social welfare programs to combat poverty, and in return combat crime, so that 
his overall security is ensured – whatever his humanitarian feelings about helping the 
poor may be.  He can realize that he ought to drive the speed limit to best coordinate with 
other drivers, thus securing his overall well-being. 
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One might argue that all citizens ought to be so thoughtful and realize that they 
ought to follow laws for greater security for themselves and others, and that we ought to 
be motivated to submit to state authority for these reasons.  These are worthy ideals, and I 
wholeheartedly encourage civic-mindedness, even though robust consent to the state is 
impossible.  However, when we look at the situation from the state‟s point of view, we 
see that the individual citizen‟s attitudes toward the laws – their intentions and particular 
interests altogether – are to a large degree superfluous.  For although the state‟s interests 
have some overlap with individual interests (public health overall and Billy‟s health, for 
instance), it is impossible that the state‟s actions like creating and enforcing laws and 
regulations accord wholly with particular individual wants and needs. 
Even the most minimal state must claim and exert authority over many domains, 
and so must act with the overall, public plan in mind, a goal that is at the most indirectly 
related to individual interests and desires.  This is a fine point similar to that made by 
Kant in the Groundwork, concerning motives and maxims: we may have a wide variety 
of motivations concerning x, truth-telling for instance, including greed and duty, but it is 
only when we use duty as our maxim that the intent to tell the truth has moral worth.  The 
similarity to state‟s intentions and individual interests is this: while individual interests 
are important and greatly inform the state as to what it ought to do (this point will be 
further developed in the next chapter), the state does not and cannot directly use these 
interests as the basis for its actions if it is to be effective.  First, there are simply too many 
individual interests in a given state and no way to really account for them, so even if the 
state wanted to construct a public interest out of private ones, there is simply no way to 
accomplish this.  Second, though, if the state is to perform its minimal functions, its 
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motivation must be primarily concerned with the big picture, with only indirect regard to 
individual interests.  This public interest is more than a mere aggregation or direct 
function of individual interests.  It is a creation by state actors (legislators and executives, 
and less directly, private citizens).  The domains of authority are created to cover interests 
that did not exist apart from the state.  Of course, states must account for the needs and 
wants of individuals so as to prevent social discord
91
, but they must also go beyond this 
and fashion laws and regulations to further their ends.  This often means ignoring some 
interests, and punishing some persons who pursue their own interests.  As even the 
smallest states can have thousands of citizens, attention to all or even most individuals is 
impossible.  Legislators have the job of fashioning large-scale coordinative structures, 
creating trends in economies and the like.  These interests exist only for states, and are 
not simply distilled from individual interests. 
 
Pre-Emptive Reasons 
As I have already noted, the public relationship is unique among authoritative 
relationships in that entry into the relationship is automatic, and the terms of the 
relationship have been established prior to any one particular person entering.  These 
terms set up the state as a political authority, the highest and most pervasive level of 
authority, in relation to individual citizens.  Also unique to the public relationship, 
though, are the force and meaning of the state‟s mandates: states, through their governing 
bodies, issue orders that are to be taken as pre-emptive reasons for action, to use Raz‟s 
phrase.  Although Raz intends this kind of reasoning to apply to many types of 
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authoritative bodies, I believe that serious consideration of the term applies especially 
strongly to political authorities, much, much more so than authorities in private 
relationships.   
 
First-Order and Second-Order Reasons for Action  According to Raz, a 
preemptive reason combines a positive first-order reason and a negative second-order 
reason for action, namely following the authority‟s rules and mandates: we must obey the 
rules and mandates (positive first-order reasons for action) and ignore or exclude 
essentially all reasons for not obeying (negative second-order reasons against action).  
When applied to the state, this would mean that, even if we believe that we have good 
reasons for not obeying the government, the state‟s authority asserts that those reasons 
are to be overridden by the order to obey.  This also would mean that, even if we 
personally believe that a law or regulation is a good one and ought to be followed in 
virtue of its goodness, then that reason is to be set aside by the trumping reason that the 
law came from the government.  States expect citizens to comply with laws and 
regulations, even if they do not want to, simply in virtue of the fact that the come from 
the state‟s acting bodies.  However, if we keep in mind that public relationships involve 
two active bodies (government and individual citizen) that have reasons for acting certain 
ways with regard to one another, we must realize that the notion of preemptive reasons is 
incompatible with real, voluntary consenting relationships.   
In truly consensual relationships, even though one body is the subject, the 
recipient of the other‟s orders, neither body is actually passive, reason-wise.  Even though 
Billy has placed himself under Dr. Doug‟s care and has agreed to follow his orders, Billy 
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is still a very active part of the relationship.  When Dr. Doug gives an order to rest or take 
a certain medicine, Billy does not view the doctor‟s order as an ultimate mandate, 
eliminating all other reasons for action.  Billy is an active participant in the creation of 
their relationship‟s constitution, and Dr. Doug‟s orders are only orders in a weak sense.  
This kind of robust consent guarantees that Billy is always in a position to say “no” to 
what Dr. Doug says.  Furthermore, since Billy is only following Dr. Doug‟s orders to 
enhance his own health and well-being, any directive that does not cohere with Billy‟s 
own, pre-existing beliefs about his health are not likely to be followed. 
For consensual private relationships, the negative second-order reason is not 
actually exclusionary, but is only a recommendation.  The second-order reason for action 
in a private, voluntary transaction would be something like, “one ought to follow the 
authority figure‟s orders if one believes those orders are good.”  In private relationships, 
we seek the authority of another to advance our own self-interests, so the conditional 
portion of the second-order reason has weight only if the authority‟s orders mesh well 
with our pre-existing reasons for action.  If the relationship is truly voluntary, then the 
order‟s recipient is in the position of deciding whether the content of the order and the 
order‟s source are sufficient in his mind as reasons for obeying.  This evaluative reason 
maintains the spirit of robust consent as a process carried out by free, active, informed 
agents that are capable of being prominent forces in the direction of their lives.  Both the 
authority figure and the subject are cognizant and respectful of this, as the authority 
figure must accommodate the agent by obtaining his consent before giving orders.   
This is the case for all truly consensual private relationships.  The subject must 
balance the authority figure‟s orders and the reasons behind them with other pertinent 
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information before he can meet the sufficient knowledge and proper intent requirements 
of classical consent theory.  The object of robust consent is authorizing the recipient‟s use 
of power in a given area and, following from that, impacting what the consenter is 
expected to do.  So, in order to form the proper intent, the consenter must sufficiently 
understand that his consenting authorizes the consentee‟s use of power and binds him 
(the consenter) to obey if necessary.  In truly consensual relationships, an authority‟s 
orders are not given or received as preemptive reasons for action, but are only guidelines 
or recommendations, however strongly they may be worded. 
 
Political Mandates  The individual/state relationship calls for an entirely 
different reasoning structure.  An individual citizen is only a passive party to his state‟s 
power over him because political authority cannot be the result of the individual‟s 
consent.  Political power concerns a set of interests that is at most tangentially drawn 
from individual interests; the state is concerned with creating and maintaining the public 
agenda, so its interests are public, not private.  An individual‟s personal agenda may be 
tied to the public agenda, but the public reasons for action are not directly derived from 
individual reasons – or individual consent.  Because the state acts on reasons of its own, 
and not from individual reasons, individual citizens are passive recipients of state power.  
This is true even for state legislators and executives as well; their input into the 
construction of state laws and regulations is given with a public “hat” on, but received 
privately, assuming that those laws are to be applied to the officials.  All individuals, as 
citizens, are addressees of the state‟s authority because full robust consent is impossible, 
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whereas in private relationships, there is a strong sense in which individual consenters are 
both subject and authority. 
Because individual citizens cannot directly contribute to the state‟s construction 
of the public agenda, they are limited to indirectly defining the domains of the state‟s 
authority.  As we have seen, state legislators and executives must have leeway in 
deciding what areas are to be under the state‟s authority, in order to meet the state‟s 
primary functions of providing security and encouraging prosperity.  Creation of the 
public good is dependent on public interests, and these interests are bound to vary 
between states, so the limits of state authority have to be flexible and adaptive.  
Therefore, while individual interests and opinions influence the public agenda, and are 
bound to influence what legislators come up with, individual input to the limits of state 
authority is only indirect, and is not the result of robust consent. 
And, since the formation and pursuit of the public agenda is a creation of the state 
and not a direct result of individual consent, the degree to which a state is responsive to 
the expressed opinions of its citizens is more a moral quality than a political one.  Many 
proponents of classical consent theory view the state‟s authority and its legitimacy as one 
and the same thing, but this is incorrect.  Political authority is merely its exercise of a 
particular kind of power – one not derivative from individual powers – involving a 
special set of interests, over people in a certain location.  In modern states, if we want to 
identify the political authority of a particular location, we simply look for the highest, 
most abstract level of political orders given.  If a thing is a state, it has an authoritative 
body; without such a body, there is simply anarchy.  Because the nature of the state‟s 
authority is what it is, however, we can judge its value as being good or bad.  This is a 
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large part of legitimacy.  As I will cover more in the next chapter, the degree to which a 
state takes into account its citizens‟ interests and opinions can be a major factor in 
determining its legitimacy, but for now we should just keep in mind that a state‟s 
responding to its citizens is not a factor in determining if it is a de facto political 
authority. 
We can see here the fundamental difference between public and private 
authorities.  Since private authority is created with the direct intent for one party to issue 
directives to the other, the mandates of the new authority can be viewed as a direct 
extension of the consenter‟s will.  By contrast, even though individual citizens indirectly 
contribute to the existence of the state‟s authority, a) the connection is too far removed to 
say that there is any direct power derivation between the authority and the ruled, and b) 
the state does not exert its power with the aim of accommodating the individual citizen‟ 
desires.  As Raz states, “Orders are made with the intention that they should prevail in 
certain circumstances even if they do not tip the balance [of the individual’s reasons for 
action].”
92
  As much as we might want it to be otherwise, the state does not issue 
directives with the goal of persuasion; the purpose is to override the citizen‟s own reasons 
for action, to end the disorder of the state of nature. 
 
Executing the Law 
Since the state‟s authority exists in its own right and operates to serve its own 
interests, we can conclude that its mandates are given as preemptive reasons for action, 
unlike those of private authorities.  If the public agenda is to be advanced, compliance 
with the law must be largely secured and orders are to be subject to enforcement.  In 
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private consensual relationships, one might say that the authority figures have the 
capacity to punish, but this is true only insofar as punishment because of refusal to 
comply was part of the constitutional phase of the original consenting act.  When there is 
no original consenting act, however, and when force might be used to preserve the very 
structure of the relationship, then that power of enforcement exists simply in virtue of the 
relationship existing, and is not dependent on the input of the subjects. 
This is not to say, though, that might makes right, or that de facto authority entails 
de jure authority.  All this argument implies is that might makes might, and that de facto 
political authority is not a function of de jure political authority based on a classical 
consent model.  Because robust consent cannot erect, much less justify, the state‟s power, 
a model other than classical consent theory is needed to establish a basis for legitimacy, 
as I shall cover in the next chapter. 
Returning to the notion of preemptive-ness, we can see that the state‟s orders are 
given and received with at least goal of overriding individual private reasons.  While 
there is no way for the state to actually step in and ensure that people think certain 
thoughts, it has the power to strongly influence citizens‟ priorities – to create forceful 
negative second-order reasons for refraining from action.  For those persons who might 
have positive first-order reasons for breaking the law, like stealing to gain money or 
killing to exact revenge, the possibility of punishment (a power held by the state that is 
not a result of a citizen‟s consent) provides a good second-order reason to ignore one‟s 
personal first-order reasons and embrace the state‟s first order reason to obey the law 
because it‟s the law.   
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Obviously there are plenty of cases where individuals do not find the possibility 
of punishment to be a good enough reason to abandon one‟s desire to commit a crime, 
since crimes are regular occurrences in states.  Some argue that, for certain sets of crimes, 
many criminals do not engage in this kind of cost-benefit analysis, but common sense 
also tells us that there are plenty of would-be criminals who do refrain from breaking the 
law when the possibility of punishment is strong enough.  In any case, however, the 
state‟s agents will not care how a criminal weighs his reasons for and against actions of 
public interest.  Setting aside the complexities and failures of actual legal systems, states 
punish offenders to serve certain ends (retribution, prevention, etc.).  In consensual 
private relationships, conflicts of interest between the authority figure and subject do not 
necessarily lead to punishment: they can simply dissolve the private contract, since the 
authority has his power in virtue of the subject‟s say-so.  This is clearly not the case in 
public relationships.  Criminals do not have the chance to opt out of laws they do not 
wish to obey (save maybe the possibility of fleeing the state), and few individual citizens 
have the power to directly change the state‟s laws
93
.  Modern states are officially the final 
arbiters of their laws, so citizens who may want to opt out of the law have no official 
higher recourse.  Since robust consent to the state is impossible, the state‟s authority does 
not exist in virtue of individual contributions; and since this is true, and there is no 
original consenting act determining the bounds of authority, individuals cannot be in the 
position to dissolve the contract by definition. 
The political significance of not adhering to the state‟s negative second-order 
reason for action – that the individual suppress any reasons he might have to break the 
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law – lies only in cases where the law is broken.  As long as individuals obey the laws, 
the state will have no interest in their motives, whether the person acted from his own 
first-order reason or the state‟s first- and second-order reasons.  What is unique about the 
state‟s power as a whole, though, is that persistent possibility of issuing mandates that 
really are preemptive reasons for action because they are backed up by the highest level 
of authoritative power. 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to argue that one of the main reasons that 
Locke and Simmons‟s argument for political voluntarism is bound to fail is because of a 
category mistake regarding authority.  To a degree, making this mistake is 
understandable.  There are some instances where it makes sense to say that individuals 
truly have proper authority; Heidi really did have authority over her movie-watching 
choices, and Darren truly had authority over his work-life.  They were able to properly 
transfer that authority to other agents because it was theirs to begin with.  Given that all 
of the basic and additional requirements were fulfilled and fulfillable, consent was the 
right method of transferring their powers to others. 
 The voluntaristic argument and Simmons‟s argument for philosophical anarchism 
are bound to fail, however, because they are based on the assumption that there is only 
one kind of authority to be had and in only one way.  Locke‟s argument that all rightful 
authority is ultimately derived from the law of nature, mandated by God, is coherent but 
unsupportable (for many reasons that I cannot go into here).  Simmons seems to give 
authority based on the law of nature the same treatment, even if he does not directly 
mention a religious basis.  Without anything supporting the law of nature argument, it 
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seems like the bottom of the Lockean argument has fallen out, and we are not compelled 
to agree that authority must be a simple concept.  Furthermore, there is plenty of reason 
to believe that authority is not a simple concept; the authority of a teacher over a pupil, 
for instance, seems fundamentally different from a government‟s authority over a citizen. 
 No matter how much we may dislike the idea, the fact that there are different 
kinds of authority poses a powerful challenge to the Lockean position that we are all born 
completely free and equal.  Even if it is only temporary, there is a time in our lives that 
our parents or guardians have real, non-consensual authority over us, for instance.  This 
leaves the door open to the possibility that perhaps our communities have real, non-
consensual authority over us.  Maybe the whole society can have real, non-consensual 
authority over us.  One of my fundamental disagreements with Simmons concerns his 
easy acceptance that only freely given consent can ground authority.  I agree that we 
ought to value individual liberty and authority where possible – this is a moral goal.  It 
just so happens, though, that we cannot put individual authority first in the political 
relationship because it cannot exist in the modern state.  It could very well be the case 
that individual authority exists in other kinds of political relationships, but the modern 
state just has not worked out that way.  
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Chapter 7: Meta-Political Activity and Social Freedom 
 
 
 The goal of the previous three chapters has been to show that classical consent 
from the individual to the modern state is not merely an impracticality that does not 
happen, but an impossibility that cannot happen.  Even if we could get around the 
enormous practical problems of giving and receiving consent, we are unable to meet the 
robust cognitive requirements of consent to the state.  Furthermore, the authority of 
modern states is not something that is derived from personal authority and thus cannot be 
given to the government via consent. 
 Simmons gave the following option when faced with the fact that consent from 
the individual to the state does not actually happen: we must either a) abandon the 
voluntaristic spirit and admit that authority may exist without being rooted in individual 
consent, or b) abandon the idea that real states can have legitimate political authority – 
and embrace philosophical anarchism.  I understand Simmons‟s desire to reject a); the 
moral idea that individual freedom and equality must be respected is compelling.  
Recognition of individual liberty, based in human reason, is very important and should 
not be set aside easily.  Our rationality, our ability to make valuable decisions, is what 
makes us special amongst the universe‟s other specks of dust. 
 My divergence from Simmons centers on accepting the real world as it is: real 
political authority does exist, and is seems to exist necessarily and apart from the consent 
of individual citizens.  The very nature of modern political authority demands that it exist 
apart from the consent of individual citizens.  We cannot meet the strong demands of 
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classical consent theory, no matter how much we may want to.  There is simply not 
enough reason to reject option a), even if it goes against our moral ideals. 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is quite simple.  I want to explore one way that we 
may embrace the voluntarisitc values of individual rationality and political participation 
while dealing with modern state structure as it is.  Even if we cannot engage in consent-
based relationships with our state governments, we need not abandon the impetus behind 
voluntarism – the belief that persons are intelligent and valuable and capable of being 
forces in their own lives.  I want to reconcile these values with the reality of the structure 
of modern states. 
 
The Reality of the Nature of the State (not to be confused with the state of nature)  
If we are to ever make sense of the individual/state relationship as unique and 
complex, not based on consent but trying to maintain some of the Lockean voluntaristic 
spirit, we should review the important characteristics that make this important 
relationship sui generis.  Assuming that the workings of this relationship have some 
impact on how we perceive the state‟s legitimacy, and assuming we want our perceptions 
to be based on the real world and not any idealizations of it, we must address persons, 
states, and political workings as they are, not just as we want them to be.  Expecting the 
real world to live up to inappropriate, unfitting idealizations tells us very little about the 
nature of political authority and a state‟s legitimacy. 
First, large-scale political power is, I believe, a necessary feature of modern 
states.  Short of catastrophic events decimating most of the world‟s population, we are 
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not likely to move toward smaller loci of political power, and the possibility of a one-
government world doesn‟t seem strong at this moment.  For most persons past, present, 
and future, the state they inhabit exists before they are born and will continue to exist 
after they die.  Although some states exist for shorter stretches of time, many others 
endure for hundreds of years with stable political structures.  Furthermore, new modern 
states arise out of a variety of circumstances, and sometimes those circumstances are 
unpleasant and do not conform readily to the picture painted by classical consent theory.  
Even if some states come into existence by a method similar to a social contract, these are 
not necessarily the norm, nor should states that come about via other methods be 
considered de facto illegitimate.  History shows us that violence, like warfare and 
revolution, is often responsible for the formation of new states, and even with states 
founded by some persons agreeing to work together, there are at the same time other 
individuals and groups trying to stop the founding of that new authority.   
No matter the method of creation, though, state government is bound to come 
about.  It is incorrect to say that one state‟s authority must be of a fundamentally different 
kind than another state‟s authority, simply because their origins differ.  All states claim 
sovereignty, the sole, supreme, and final authority, over the peoples and lands within 
their borders.  All states exercise power in policing, executing the law, making treaties 
with other states, among other things, and they all expect a large degree of obedience 
from their citizens.  To go along with this, the creation and maintenance of all states are 
much more similar than the social contract theorist would let us believe.  Although I will 
go into greater detail later in the chapter, but it should suffice for now to say (in an over-
simplified way) that all states are created when a group of people get together and exert a 
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unique type of power over others (and perhaps themselves), and the authority is 
established and maintained when both sides continue to act in their pre-established ways, 
the rulers doing the ruling and the ruled being ruled. 
Even if this is a crude over-simplification, it is essentially true, and an account of 
the individual/state relationship needs to be able to deal with fact that the most open, 
liberal democratic republics are not so different from the most closed-off, restrictive 
states that they should necessitate a fundamentally different theory of individual/state 
interaction.  No matter how open and accountable a government is, the fact remains that 
most individual citizens will not be able to make substantial changes to their state‟s 
policies, organization, or the essence of the state‟s power.  Most citizens will be subject 
to political forces without their explicit or indirect consent because that is simply the 
nature of the modern state.  Whether the population numbers in the billions, million, or 
even (just) thousands, there is simply too much stuff to coordinate, such that many or 
most cannot make a dent in the state‟s power qua individuals.  The ruling is going to be 
done by a few, no matter what the state‟s constitution looks like.  Furthermore, as Bodley 
shows us, the ratio of ruler to ruled becomes smaller and smaller as the size of a 
population grows, which decreases the likelihood that an individual could make a 
sizeable impact at the state level. 
While it is true that the individual is mostly powerless against the full, all-
encompassing authority of the state, it is equally true that state authority cannot exist 
without individuals.  States do exist and change because of the actions of persons; it is 
not as if the state is some self-sustaining, abstract object.  Laws are written by people.  
Policing is done by people.  Economic activity is done by individuals and groups (which 
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are made up by individuals).  States and their governments are constantly changing.  
Rulers come and go, new laws are made and old ones are altered or eliminated, and the 
very constitution (written and unwritten) itself is always under review, interpretation, and 
revision
94
.  A state‟s bureaucracy and realms of authority are large and immensely 
complex, and the state‟s authority works only when individuals do their small parts in 
coordination with others.  Furthermore, it is not just the work of official government 
agents that is required for the state authority‟s successful exercise.  The efforts of 
legislators and police officers are important, to be sure, but those efforts would be useless 
unless many, many more non-governmentally sanctioned individuals also participated in 
ways useful to the state‟s exercise of power (much more on this later).  Political authority 
is a wholly human construct, so it cannot be the case that individuals are unable to impact 
the authority exercised over them. 
Many or most of a state‟s citizens are rational, moral agents who are active in 
complex social networks.  People have families, jobs, hobbies, and other special interests, 
all of which make them interact with others in ways important to themselves.  Because of 
this, plenty of individuals are likely to be socially and politically interested on larger 
scales, since social and political policy directly impacts their lives in profound ways.  
Even though few people ever devote their lives entirely to the political world because 
such allocation of attention is unfeasible, it is also true that few people are ever 
completely removed from it.  The driving forces behind voluntarism, I believe, are the 
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beliefs that human rationality is inherently valuable and that persons ought to be able to 
make choices that impact themselves and the world around them.  There must be a reason 
that Simmons and others hearken back to the law of nature – it is not simply the existence 
of the law (which it may not) that matters, but also what values that law embodies, apart 
from any religious beliefs.  Even if I do not agree that there is some immutable law of 
nature, I still appreciate and support (at times) the moral motivation of the argument. 
If all of what I have said so far is true, then the picture of individual/state 
interaction seems full of conundrums.  States exist before and after us, but they also 
change within our individual lifetimes.  State authority is almost entirely beyond the 
power of individuals, yet it cannot exist or function without the efforts of those same 
individuals.  Classical consent is impossible in the individual/state relationship, yet there 
is something so alluring and compelling about the concept that political philosophers 
return to it time and again as an explanation of individual/state interaction and the basis 
for legitimate state authority.  These seeming contradictions amount to something similar 
to what Hampton calls the „paradox of being governed‟
95
:  “If the reason for creating a 
political institution is that people cannot govern themselves…, and the political regime 
that is created is one in which the people rule, the exercise appears useless.”
96
  Political 
authority is and must be above the sway of individual citizens, yet it amounts to nothing 
but the sway of individuals.  Or, to put it in a way consistent with my argument thus far, 
the individual/state relationship cannot be one that is founded on classical consent, yet the 
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relationship does not seem capable of existing or functioning without overt actions by 
individuals. 
 
The Two-Tiered Nature of Political Authority 
 The Lockean tradition puts forth the idea of consenting individuals “lending” their 
personal authority to political leaders so those leaders can bring peace, order, and 
prosperity to the body politic.  Political authority is just a kind of rerouting of personal 
authority, and the consenting individuals retain the right to judge the ruler and revoke 
their consent, removing the leader(s) from power (assuming a sufficient number of 
individuals simultaneously do the same).  If personal authority is just on loan to the 
leaders, individuals do not lose their freedom.  According to this strain of social contract 
theory, the leaders are the people‟s agents, temporarily authorized executors of the 
combined personal authority of the citizens.  I argued in the last chapter, though, that 
political authority is not really related to personal authority, so rerouting is impossible.  
The two types of authority are fundamentally different from another, and once we 
appreciate this difference, political authority can make sense in its own right. 
 Kant and others, according to Hampton, recognize that agency contractarianism, 
when taken at face value, is inconsistent; rulers cannot rule if they cannot rule.  Executive 
authority is useless unless it stands a good chance of being respected by most of the 
people most of the time.  One of the most unique and relevant features of political 
authority is its finality.  Hampton uses the metaphor of an umpire in a baseball game; 
when the players “hire” (paid or not) the umpire, it is necessary that he have final 
authority over how the game is conducted.  He decides when a ball is foul and when the 
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runner is safely on base, and the players have to abide by his decisions if they want to 
remain in the game.  If the players or coaches had the opportunity to override the 
umpire‟s decisions or dismiss him every time he did something they disagreed with, then 
he has no real authority over any part of the game.  On the face of it, agency 
contractarianism
97
 has the same problem.  If a ruler‟s authority is completely dependent 
on the whims of those that empower him, then he has no real power to do his job.  Power 
isn‟t power unless those subject to it really are subject to it. 
 To resolve this seeming inconsistency and make sense of agency-based 
democratic government, Hampton turns to Tarski‟s stratification solution to the liar 
paradox.  In order to figure out whether any given sentence is true, including the sentence 
“This statement is false,” Tarski argued that we must distinguish between object language 
and meta-language to evaluate truth.  Object language refers to things in the world; for 
instance, “The tree is 40‟ tall” and “The flower is red” refer to the height of trees and the 
color of flowers, respectively.  In order to evaluate the truth of those statements, we must 
abstract away from the object language to a meta-language, a separate sphere just for 
making truth evaluations.  “The tree is 40‟ tall” is true or false depending on the height of 
the tree; “The flower is red” is true or false depending on the light-refracting properties of 
the flower.  Similarly, “This statement is false” can be evaluated without incurring an 
automatic paradox by using the meta-language. 
 Hampton rightly adopts the stratification solution to resolve the seeming 
inconsistency of contractarian yet final government through an agent-like ruler.  The truth 
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is that the inconsistency only arises when one assumes that there is only one type of 
authority, and only one way to rule.  As I have already argued in previous chapters, this 
assumption is incorrect.  There are different types of authority-based relationships, and 
personal authority is of a different kind than political authority.  The seeming 
inconsistency is dissolved when we apply the stratification solution to the individual/state 
relationship.  While it is true that the citizens are ruled with finality by the government 
and that the government depends on the citizens for its power (essentially being ruled by 
them), it is quite false that the same kind of “ruling” is happening in both situations.  
Although the different types of rule are importantly connected and interdependent, they 
are still two kinds of things – they involve different persons operating by different rules 
in different environments. 
 
Object-level Governance  To continue the Tarskian metaphor, one kind of 
ruling happens in the object-level legal system.  The activities of this level are the 
creation, interpretation, and enforcement of object-level laws, and these activities are 
performed by object-level rulers alone.  We can call them the rulers because they make 
the rules.  Examples of this type of law include creating a taxation system and enforcing 
it, entering into treaties with other state-level authoritative bodies, and creating and 
enforcing a penal code for object-law violators, just to name a few.  The object-level 
legal system applies to all citizens, or “the ruled”; they must obey these laws or the state 
will punish them if it so desires.  If a citizen is also a ruler, then he has two different roles 
and operates in two separate realms of action.  Under the stratification solution, it is not 
inconsistent for a single individual to be both ruler and ruled, and we can think of plenty 
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of real-world examples where it is perfectly coherent to say that a ruler broke part of the 
law even as he ruled.   
Most of the ruled will not be part of the object-level system for reasons already 
discussed, and so they cannot directly contribute to the laws that they must obey.  There 
are just too many practical problems with all persons in a state being object-level rulers.  
To begin with, the issues of coordination would be massive – having to coordinate 
millions of people legislating on a very large number of issues would likely be impossible 
given limited time and resources.  Furthermore, most individuals are not equipped 
mentally to be both effective object-level legislators and normal people with normal lives 
and normal (non-political) responsibilities; there would just be too much to handle.  The 
stratification solution makes these problems much less daunting by pointing out that free, 
open societies can function well with only some individuals doing the ruling (as political 
professionals), and all non-political-professionals can still have valuable roles beyond 
object-level legislating. 
The object level of governance includes the bodies that most of us associate with 
government in the official sense.  Legislators create laws and codify them in official legal 
documents.  Executives (who perhaps are the same as legislators) enforce the contents of 
those official legal documents in official executive ways.  A judiciary (which is perhaps 
part of the legislative or executive body) also helps enforce the official legal documents.  
The workings of object-level governance are usually the formal kinds of events and 
documents that can be put on paper or be pointed to as the content and structure of the 
state‟s authority.  “They” (object-level rulers) make the rules and “we” (non-object-level 
rulers) follow them, or “they” will punish “us.”  Object-level laws are obvious in their 
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nature and power and they impact individual citizens directly and regularly, so it is easy 
to understand why so many people have identified them as the entirety of political 
authority, and why agency-like government seems paradoxical.  If “they” “rule” “us” but 
“we” “rule” “them,” inconsistencies seem unavoidable. 
 
Meta-Governance  The stratification solution identifies the meta-political level 
as a real working realm of useful political authority that is significantly different from the 
object level, but which impacts it in important ways.  Meta-political activity involves 
citizens participating (or at least being allowed to participate) in the governing 
convention – the set of arrangements that make and keep a structure/constitution and its 
specified rulers in power, and is governed by an implicit or explicit (or both) rule of 
recognition (more on this below).  All those persons specified as the ruled by the 
constitution must act according to the object laws or they may be punished.  However, 
the ruled also make meta-judgments and perform meta-actions concerning the ruler‟s 
object laws, especially evaluating if the rulers have been respecting constitutional and 
social rules and norms.  As rational, private individuals, the ruled evaluate whether a 
certain law, say an anti-drug rule, is acceptable; does it meet our needs, is it fair, is this 
what I wanted when I voted for or supported the ruler?  When it is necessary or desirable, 
the ruled have ways to force the rulers to make changes to the object law or threaten them 
with removal from office (these ways will be addressed below).  It is unlikely that most 
meta-political activity will be official or obvious in the way that object-level political 
activities are, because of the pragmatic and epistemic issues already discussed.  However, 
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as we will see, the lack of official status or directness does not diminish meta-political 
power. 
A state‟s rule of recognition is the (primarily unofficial) code that identifies, 
empowers, and controls the state‟s constitution and decides who will fill the roles of 
rulers.  It is a social practice or set of practices that arise from the actions and interactions 
of all of society.  As Coleman argues, the rule of recognition does not derive its validity 
or power from some official source: “It is not valid or in some sense correct; it just is.”
98
  
It just happens because we as social creatures live together and work together.  Hampton 
identifies three types of rules that are involved in a rule of recognition. 
 
The Rules of the Rule of Recognition  One type of rule is the structuring or 
constitutional guidelines that define the offices that will produce the object laws.  The 
U.S. Constitution is an example of this first type, as it specifies how rulers will be 
elected, what those rulers must do in order to create a new object law or eliminate an old 
one, among other things.  The Constitution happens to be an official legal document, but 
this official codification is not necessary for establishing the existence of the first type of 
rule.  Common law and conventions have been sufficient in many cases for establishing a 
state‟s authoritative structure.  To use the sports metaphor again, my friends and I could 
easily create a new kind of game that operates by a new set of rules.  As long as all 
participants agree that we will only pick our leaders (referees and game-legislators) in 
this way and that they will be the ones producing and enforcing the game‟s rules, part of 
the rule of recognition is established.  We don‟t have to be operating under some 
previously existing authority structure – thus eliminating the paradox of theoretically 
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exiting the state of nature and creating the first authority – we just have to agree now.  
The same principle applies to creating a new state and its constitution: this part of the rule 
of recognition gets its authority because people treat it as authoritative, not simply 
because of any official status it might have. 
Another type of rule in the rule of recognition is what Hampton refers to as a 
meta-meta-rule: the procedures for altering the structural or constitutional rules just 
described.  These rules can be part of the constitution itself or part of a separate system, 
and again, they need not be officially codified, although they can be.  Through means like 
constitutional conventions, part of meta-political activity involves citizens deciding if the 
state‟s authoritative structure is empowering rulers and producing object laws in the ways 
they like.  Even if the constitution-altering dimension of the rule of recognition can be 
part of some official legal document, its true force comes from its wider social support 
and the citizenry‟s authorizing power. 
The most important (in my opinion), yet least official, dimension of the rule of 
recognition is comprised of the implicit, normative, moral rules that the rulers generally 
observe and have the object law conform to.  These are the rules of public opinion, the 
sentiments and judgments held by the citizenry as a body, made public and observable 
through a wide variety of public activities, to be discussed below.  This dimension of the 
rule of recognition is complex and dynamic, and is beyond formalization, yet I believe it 
is the most powerful and empowering.  Although constitutional and meta-constitutional 
rules are vital for establishing and regulating a state‟s authoritative structure, they are not 
really part of active, day-to-day governance; they provide the framework, but this third 
type of rule of recognition rule fills in that framework and gives the rule of recognition its 
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character.  This dimension of the rule of recognition is actively responsible for putting 
rulers into office, keeping them there, dictating what issues will be part of the public 
agenda, and overall influencing how the state will be.  It is the day-to-day active socio-
political atmosphere that makes the state exist as a real thing, beyond a bureaucracy 
ordered by rules. 
It is through the rule of recognition and the public‟s meta-political activity that 
ruler‟s authority is created and sustained.  Again, the traditional social contract story 
presents the transaction between ruled and rulers as one of lending pre-existing personal 
authority and amassing it somehow as political authority, but the stratification view 
contends that political authority is a new thing that arises out of a sphere of activity 
(meta-political activity governed by the rule of recognition).  Acceptance of the rule of 
recognition is a complex phenomenon, as Hart argues, and no treatment I give it here will 
fully describe how it empowers previously private individuals.  By people working 
together in seemingly mundane ways, the power of the rule of recognition is built up bit 
by bit until it is strong enough to sustain an entire state.  This web of empowerment is so 
interwoven and overlapping that governing conventions can stand robustly in the face of 
plenty of random disgruntled citizens and lawbreakers, dissidents and would-be 
revolutionaries.  Unless enough of these people come together with the common 
knowledge of the others‟ dissatisfactions, some plan to make dramatic changes, and the 
belief that revolution is worth the very high risks, the most these people can do is produce 
minor changes (unless their lack of efficacy is due to oppression by the rulers).  Effecting 




Despite its unofficial nature and lack of pre-established authority, the rule of 
recognition is a real rule with real normative power.  It is conventional, yet it has the 
power to guide decisions made by state agents.  The rule of recognition provides a 
standard of behavior and a set of expectations of the rulers, and if they want to get into 
office or stay there, the rulers must meet those expectations.  If the citizens are unhappy 
with their performance, they have ways of removing the rulers from power; democracies 
can hold elections to find more appealing rulers, and non-democratic states can depose 
their leaders through coups or other means.  The authority-creating power of meta-
political activity provides strong reasons for rulers to conform their behavior (and thereby 
the state‟s object laws) to the rule of recognition‟s standards.  The rule of recognition is 
complex and hard to pin down, providing rulers a great deal of room to move and 
interpret when making object law without fear of being ousted
99
, but that line can only be 
pushed so far before they face coming into conflict with the atmosphere of meta-political 
activity. 
 
Types of Meta-political Activity 
 Before developing the stratification solution any further, it would be useful to 
briefly discuss different types of meta-political activity.  Object-level political action is 
both obvious and simple in its activity: rulers make and enforce laws.  While the details 
of performance of this activity vary between states, this variation is not very large, and in 
all cases, the results of this activity are evident and immediate.  Meta-political activity 
and its fruitfulness are neither simple nor obvious nor direct, though many mistakenly 
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focus on the simpler, more obvious, more direct cases.  What follows is by no means a 
comprehensive list of meta-political activities, but it should be clear that all of these have 
similar political results; by performing these activities, individuals are able to affect the 
political atmosphere and force rulers to rule in favorable ways. 
 
Official Meta-political Action  One of the most obvious methods of meta-political 
activity just mentioned, and the one that tends to be the focus of political attention, is 
voting in elections.  By voting for rulers in elections, the individual has the opportunity to 
help decide who will serve as a ruler, so indirectly and transitively, that individual has the 
chance to contribute to the object law.  Similarly, participation in a constitutional 
convention (the political meeting kind, not the British parliamentary kind) will indirectly 
impact the creation of object law; if the individual citizen is involved in how rulers are 
elected or how they must act to enact laws, then he can affect how object laws come 
about.  I believe that these two methods of meta-political activity, especially the former, 
are usually the focus of those interested in politics, because their results are direct and 
evident, and often these results are very powerful.  I certainly do not underestimate the 
importance of voting and constitutional conventions, but it is necessary to note that these 
do not happen in a vacuum.  Far from it.  Rather, these are the results of many other 
important types of meta-political activity.  Voting for rulers or political parties is useless 
without candidates and parties to vote for, and it is the unofficial, indirect meta-political 
activities that bring a candidate to the fore.  The impetus to participate in a constitutional 
convention comes from other social activities. 
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 I want to briefly mention referenda and ballot initiatives, since their location in 
the meta/object level distinction is not clear.  By and large, these do seem like object-
level political activities since the citizen acts in ways that directly and immediately 
results in object-level laws.  However, since they are not and cannot be the normal way of 
creating and enforcing object-level law, and since it is still “the ruled” doing the voting, it 
is not 100% clear to me that they should be placed in the object-level of the stratification.   
No matter where we place referenda and ballot initiatives, though, it is not at all 
obvious that they are high-quality options for creating object-level law.  It is true that 
empowering private citizens seems valuable in itself, and that some instances of private 
citizens starting down this road, legislators have been motivated to address the issues in 
question in more formalized, object-level ways.  It also seems true, however, that when 
private citizens carry their pursuits on in ways that end in ballots initiatives and 
referenda, the results can be suboptimal.
100
  First, the initiatives and referenda can result 
in badly drafted law, since “the wording of the measure as initially proposed ends up as 
statute if the measure is passed.”
101
  As I have argued in previous chapters, the division of 
cognitive labor allows some persons to specialize in law-related fields so the rest of the 
citizens can specialize in other fields.  A private citizen or group‟s lack of specialized 
knowledge can actually hamper their own pursuits if they create law that cannot be 
applied properly, thus making their efforts counterproductive. 
Continuing along this line of argument, when the individual citizen gets to the 
polls, the number and complexity of ballot initiatives and referenda can be (and often are, 
in the real world) overwhelming.  Again, the mental effort of learning about and 
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understanding all of the items may very well be impractical, so the actual votes may not 
be representative of the desires of the voters. 
Another possible criticism, according to the ACE Project, is that these seemingly 
private initiatives can be monopolized by highly influential special interest groups.  
While this hijacking is to a large degree sadly unavoidable, both in initiatives/referenda 
and the lobbying to object-level legislators, it seems especially disheartening and counter 
to the spirit of direct democratic efforts.  Well-funded interest groups might have the 
money to advertise, advocate, and draft initiatives at a disproportionate rate to their 
opposition, so one could make the argument that the lack of balance in power does not 
complement the “one person, one vote” attitude of direct democracy. 
A final potential criticism of ballot initiatives is that they are more likely to lead 
to the “tyranny of the majority” than normal object-level legislation.  At least in theory, 
rulers in democratic legislatures can use systems of checks and balances to ensure that the 
rights of less-than-popular minority groups are not overridden by the moment‟s majority.  
While the desire for a state‟s laws to evolve and mature is well-founded, that morality 
and maturity might be better achieved through the slower, more methodical approach of 
state-level legislative action than the possibly fast-moving, capricious approach of some 
sects of private citizens. 
I recognize that this form of activity allows the typically private citizen to act as a 
ruler, and that this has the potential to dissolve the object-level/meta-level distinction that 
I advocate.  While the criticisms listed above certainly don‟t doom the prospect of direct 
democratic activity, I hope to have shown that such activity may not be the best option 
for the private citizen who wants to make substantial changes in the overall political 
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game.  Indirect meta-political activity can be just as powerful, I believe, and we should 
not view object-level activity as “better” and meta-level activity as “worse.” 
 
Assistance to Authority This category includes activities like performing jury duty 
and working for law enforcement.  While the citizen has no direct impact on the 
formation of object-level law, he can help enforce the law and thus assist the state in 
exercising its authority.  By serving on a jury, a citizen recognizes the state‟s mandates as 
the ones to be followed, and even if jury duty is legally compulsory, the individual still 
has the option of breaking that law and sending a message that he does not approve of the 
state‟s authority; even though the likelihood of this defiance changing the state is 
minimal, doing so is still an option, and one can perhaps raise public awareness of 
political problems by doing so. 
 A state‟s object-level laws typically need dispersal and enforcement in order to be 
effective
102
, so by acting in the role of a law enforcer or other agent of the state, one has 
the capacity to contribute to the state‟s political atmosphere.  The work of law 
enforcement professionals and volunteers makes the state‟s authority active and vital; it is 
the muscle and skin of the state‟s body, metaphorically, while the object laws make up 
the underlying bone structure.  The work of these persons is very important for setting the 
tone of the state‟s use of power, so even if they are not directly making the object law, 
they are critical to giving it meaning and substance. 
 
Community Activity  The state‟s laws come from the top level of administration 
and apply downward, but individuals mainly live and operate on a much smaller scale, in 
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their local communities.  By being active in one‟s community, one has the chance to 
contribute to part of the political atmosphere, and that will in turn trickle upward to the 
state level.  Community boards and neighborhood assemblies, for example, give 
individuals the opportunity to interact with one another in a public arena, not simply as 
friends or families, but as citizens, to work on common interests and enterprises.  These 
community-based activities are often much more accessible than state-level interaction, 
so people have a useful local avenue of acting socio-politically.  And, when taken into 
account with activities from other communities, an important dimension of the state‟s 
political picture becomes apparent.  The stratification solution recognizes that political 
influence can come from many different parts of life, and community is often an 
important point of peoples‟ lives. 
 A particularly crucial dimension of community activity is the local education 
system, so serving on school boards is another useful avenue of meta-political activity.  
Even if some of the object law comes down from the state level, it is enacted at the local 
level.  Community educational systems can be massively influential in that community‟s 
social tone, so school board participants have the potential to urge rulers to act in 
desirable ways.  Again, the impact to the state-level object law is indirect and subtle, but 
this type of meta-political action is a key piece of the whole puzzle. 
 
Economic Work As the American climate has proven so clearly recently, politics is 
often tightly entwined with the state‟s economy, so it follows that economic activities are 
critical meta-political activities.  Business owners, bankers, and economic regulatory 
professionals all greatly contribute to the state‟s political climate.  Even individuals as 
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consumers factor into the political climate.  Acting in particular economic ways has the 
power to force great change in the object-level law; taxes, interest rates and loaning 
systems are all dependent on greater social conditions, which are in turn dependent on the 
actions of individuals. 
 Another low-key but important dimension of meta-political activity lies within the 
workplace.  Like with community work, workplace activity is local and immediate to the 
lives of individuals, so it is a more accessible form of political expression.  Union activity 
and other worker interactions greatly impact both the lives of individual people and the 
greater social picture at the state level.  Unions are often key voting blocks in elections, 
and candidates have to work with them to get their votes.  By being active in a group‟s 
authority structure, an individual can have the power to exert a lot of pressure on political 
professionals, indirectly affecting the object law at very high levels. 
 
Social Works  In conjunction with community-based activities like neighborhood 
assemblies and school boards, other local-level social activities can have a serious impact 
on object-level governance.  Churches, for instance, can provide not only community 
assistance in the forms of soup kitchens and counseling services, but also the opportunity 
for groups of individuals to gather and act as a unit.  Religious congregations can have 
hundreds or thousands or tens of thousands of members, and religious affiliations can 
bring together millions of like-minded individuals.  With numbers like these, it is 
unsurprising that many politicians have to be sensitive to religious parties and responsive 
to their desires. 
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 For the religious and non-practicing alike, other service groups contribute to the 
political landscape.  Urban and rural community projects build district unity, and civic 
education projects bring prominence to the idea that individuals can express themselves 
in public, social ways.  Again, even though the effects are indirect and often quite subtle, 
these normal activities that private individuals can engage in contribute to the state‟s 
political atmosphere. 
 
Persuasion  The most powerful type of meta-political activity is probably 
persuasion or advocacy.  Rulers cannot make object laws unless they are put in office, 
and they cannot be put in office (or removed from said office) without social support.  
Political campaigning requires the work of many, many people besides the candidate 
himself, and by being part of the candidate‟s team, the individual has the chance to 
eventually exert tremendous power over future object law.  If the candidate actually wins 
and becomes a ruler, the individual can still have such power as a team member, since it 
takes the mental and physical effort of many people for legislating to happen.  This is true 
at all levels of politics, from local and grass-roots movements to state-level party action. 
 I want to digress briefly on the place and value of grass-roots movements in the 
context of the object-level/meta-level distinction.  As the name implies, the idea of a 
grass-roots movement suggests “naturally”-occurring local efforts that grow from the 
ground up.  At first, this type of activity might seem at odds with the top-down nature of 
object-level governance, but it is really quite congruous as long as we keep the 
object/meta distinction in mind.  In truly political systems, as opposed to outright 
tyrannies, the two levels work “organically” with one another, adjusting and altering as 
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the situation calls for it.  Grass-roots movements have the potential to be just as useful, if 
not more so, than some top-down party systems.  New ideas have to come from 
somewhere, and there is no reason to believe that one kind of organization is obviously 
better than another at producing those ideas. 
 Another persuasion-based meta-political activity is lobbying, where the individual 
brings issues to the attention of rulers in the hopes of making or changing object law.  
Although lobbying often gets a bad reputation as greed run amok, such activity is often 
useful.  Rulers cannot know everything first-hand and may not be aware that there is a 
desire in part of the citizenry that x or y happen.  By participating in special interest 
advocacy, the individual can urge rulers to spend more money on public education or 
healthcare, for instance, perhaps to the point that object law is affected. 
 An integral part of persuasion as meta-political activity is the dispersal of ideas: 
the media.  Whether sectors of the media try to advocate for a particular side or remain 
neutral, they are largely responsible for where the public gets its political information.  
When an individual acts as a member of the press, he influences what people believe and 
how they are likely to act, politically, economically, or otherwise, based on those beliefs.  
The effect of the media on object law is indirect but powerful.  This applies to all types of 
media, like television and newspapers, to more modern, technology-based avenues like 
blogging and online forums. 
 Another method of persuasive meta-political activity, aside from official 
lobbying, is simply being socially active by holding demonstrations or rallies.  Even if 
there is no direct appeal to the ruler to make or change the object law in certain ways, 
public demonstrations indirectly contribute to the larger political atmosphere.  Gatherings 
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of large groups united by a cause can draw the attention of rulers, and if they are moved 
by that cause and the group‟s devotion, there is the chance of object law being impacted. 
 
Acquiescence? In responsive, well-run regimes, it is easier to dismiss the 
importance of meta-political activity because there is not an obvious struggle between the 
rulers and the ruled concerning the content of the rule of recognition.  One might 
conclude that meta-political activity is only worthwhile when it is overtly active, but this 
isn‟t obviously true.  It could very well be the case that acquiescence is a sign of a well-
run state, one where object-level governance and meta-political activity are sufficiently in 
tune, to the effect that a battleground mentality in meta-level actors simply isn‟t 
necessary. 
 As Hart argues, citizens may acquiesce, but this may be analogous to the 
acquiescing of a client to his hired lawyer.  By leaving the laborious, detail-oriented work 
to the professionals, the rulers in this case, individual citizens have the ability to focus on 
their other concerns as private people.  As long as enough private citizens keep an eye on 
the bigger picture, there may not be a need to constantly focus on the minute details. 
 Even though acquiescence is not necessarily problematic, Hampton reminds us 
that the object-level political game is ultimately the people‟s to lose.  Apathy does leave 
the door for corruption open, so acquiescence needs to be balanced with appropriate 
levels of vigilance.  A happy medium can be found, at least in theory, between apathy 
and the constant struggle of individual citizens against their rulers, so that object-level 




Making Sense of Political Authority through the Two-Tiered Structure 
 If one focuses on object-level governance via consent alone, then the picture of 
ruler/ruled interaction is puzzling: while the rulers are “above” the ruled, in the sense that 
authority only flows downward, there is no satisfying explanation as to how the rulers 
came to be “above” the ruled.  Besides the fact that true consent happens rarely if ever, 
and never enough for an entire population to create and maintain a state‟s authority, 
theoretical problems with classical consent are unavoidable.  If, however, we draw a new 
picture of the nature of state authority, one that acknowledges the interdependency of the 
two tiers of political authority, many of those plaguing problems dissolve.  Picture two 
concentric circles, the inner circle being the object-level authority, and the outer being the 
meta-level authority.  Even if the inner circle is the seat of technical power, its entirety 
still lies within the real but unofficial power of the outer circle.  When the outer circle 
tightens up via meta-political activity, the inner circle must adjust or get squeezed out of 
existence.  Every little squeeze has the potential to enact change at the object-level, and if 
enough squeezing is done in concert, then that change becomes likely. 
 As Hampton explains, one of the most important resolutions made by the two-
tiered view goes back to Hobbes‟s attempts to establish political authority.  When we 
look at persons in the state of nature who are, essentially, in a prisoner‟s dilemma, it 
cannot be in their interest to cooperate with others since there are no assurances that those 
others will hold to the deal.  Consensual contracts cannot be rightfully formed (including 
those that would create political authority), according to Hobbes, without the authority 
existing to uphold them, so we can never emerge from the state of nature.
103
  The state of 
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nature conundrum is resolved by focusing on conventions á la Hume, rather than on acts 
of consenting and contracting.  The establishment of state authority can be and is 
accomplished by persons coming together and agreeing to create that authority by a 
variety of “unofficial” means (meta-political activity); the state‟s authority emerges over 
time through these means.  No formal consenting acts are necessary.   
State authority just happens, almost organically, and once it emerges, the power to 
enforce object-level legal agreements becomes possible.  The dilemma is dissolved, and 
legal and political justice become separate from morality.  The newly-formed state has 
the potential to impartially judge disputes according to object-level laws, whereas before 
the state is formed, any judgments would not have the force of law behind them, only the 
power of private morality and physical force.  The same thing goes for punishment for 
transgressions: before the creation of object-level law, retaliation and retribution may 
occur, but they cannot really be called punishment in any official sense because they have 
no legal standing. 
The two-tiered approach also explains how all states come into existence, and 
does a much better job at this than consent-based approaches, for they imply that if the 
state is not formed consensually, then it cannot have legitimate political authority.  Plenty 
of state structures have come about through violence, warfare, and coercion, and these 
will always entail that many new citizens are not consenting to their takeover.  Intrastate 
revolutions and coups are likely to be illegal, and will probably be against the will of 
some (at the very least the pre-existing rulers and their supporters).  While violence, 
coercion, and hostile takeover are unfortunate and should not be encouraged, they are still 
exemplars of meta-political activities.  Warfare, whether inter- or intra-state, is a set of 
191 
 
actions by non-rulers made to effect changes in the state‟s structure.  Violence has the 
potential to influence rulers enough to make changes in object-level governance.   
Classical consent theory maintains that a state‟s power becomes legitimate by one 
factor: the way that power came into existence.  For Locke, legitimate use of power arises 
by double consent process (first to joining the commonwealth, then by the will of the 
majority), so any group that does not complete this process cannot erect a legitimate 
government.  According to Simmons, the legitimate use of power results from the direct 
consentings of individuals, so any group that exercises power without the consent of the 
individuals is illegitimate.  Because of this direct reliance on the distinct actions of 
individuals, classical consent theory cannot make good sense of state authority that arises 
from non-consensual means, and it seems to prevent the state‟s authority from ever 
attaining legitimacy.  The two-tiered approach, however, because it focuses on 
conventions and not consent as the relevant acts of individuals, and because it clearly 
separates political authority from moral/political legitimacy, can make sense of states 
arising from hostile actions, and it allows for the possibility that even a state formed 
through violence can still achieve legitimacy.  However violently a state is formed, the 
rulers can change their behaviors to work for the good of the citizens and allow for them 
to have input through meta-political activity.  If they want to stay in power and not be 
overthrown, they have to be responsive to the meta-political actions of the citizens.  
Given enough time and enough positive change, a once illegitimate state structure can 
achieve greater legitimacy, just as a state that is legitimate from the start can continually 
improve its moral standing.  The opposite move can happen as well; a once-legitimate, 
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well-formed state has the potential to slide into illegitimacy through unjust actions and 
the quashing of meta-political activities. 
Finally, the two-tiered approach brings to light a distinction between real political 
states and tyrannies that only pretend to be political states.  There can be, have been, and 
are instances of “states” where the governing convention is so weak as to be non-existent, 
and where the ruling is so tyrannical that it eliminates almost all chances for true meta-
political activity from the majority of the population.  These instances, which Hampton 
calls “mastery states”, occur when the ruling cadre has so much control over the lines of 
interpersonal communication (technological or otherwise) that individuals cannot discuss 
with one another their dissatisfaction with the rulers or otherwise participate in 
convention-altering activities.  Furthermore, the rulers have sufficient coercive power 
such that, even if individuals could share their concerns with one another, they (the ruled) 
face too much real danger to dare rebellion. 
In these mastery states, the ruler‟s authority cannot really be called “political” 
because too many of the mastered subjects have no chance to play in the political game.  
Although there cannot be any pure mastery or pure agency states, there are instances of 
essentially mastery states and essentially agency states along a continuum of meta-
political activity.  For those states tending toward the former end of the line, where the 
majority of citizens have little to no chance to participate in the meta-political arena, the 
two-tiered approach has no hold.  There is no fluidity and interdependency between ruler 
and ruled, no responsiveness or respect, and there is no hope of attaining legitimate 
political authority.  Mastery states are so broken and deficient that we cannot make sense 
of them by using the two-tiered model. 
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Meta-political Activity, Continued 
Divergences from Hampton  The contents of this chapter, especially the 
stratification solution founded on a complex, non-explicit rule of recognition, relies 
heavily on the argument put forth by Hampton, but I would like to take some time to 
explain how my argument diverges from Hampton‟s in some places, and simply develops 
underdeveloped arguments in others.   
This may seem like nitpicking, but I believe that the following statement by 
Hampton should not supported: 
Although the relationship is not literally contractual either in nature or origin, it is 
nonetheless similar enough to actual agency relationships instigated by contracts 
to make forgivable any metaphorical talk of a “social contract” between ruler and 
ruled…On the convention model, each subject of a regime gives a kind of 
“consent” to it as long as her behavior is either supportive of our at least not 




The words we use to express concepts need to accurately reflect the content of those 
concepts.  I understand the reason behind the heavy usage of the term “social contract” in 
past and present political philosophy, and how that usage has pervaded colloquial 
political talk; given the fact that modern democratic citizens are inundated with the term, 
it is easier to stick with it.  However, it really is a stretch to conclude that the relationship 
between ruler and ruled is sufficiently agency-like to justify the continued use of the 
term.  Such heavy reliance on the phrase has, I believe, created an expectation in the 
users of the language that cannot be fulfilled.  This is one of the main threads running 
throughout this entire piece: part of the reason that traditional consent theory is bound to 
fail is because the word “consent” does not apply to the individual/state relationship.  An 
inappropriate standard of behavior is set, and when we as players in the political game 
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constantly fail to meet the standard, we seem befuddled as to why.  Even though the use 
of the term “social contract” is understandable in a historical sense, letting the incorrect 
usage slide simply for convenience‟s sake does not seem philosophically justified.  I 
know that rallying against the term is a losing battle, practically speaking, but I believe 
that using proper terminology will increase the probability of gaining proper 
understanding of the individual/state relationship. 
 The same argument must be made against Hampton‟s use of the term “convention 
consent.”  Leaving aside the fact that the use of “convention” is confusing to those not 
familiar with Hampton‟s argument
105
, the use of “consent” as a term is too misleading to 
justify.  I finding myself having to side with Simmons here because his usage of the term 
“consent” is clear, distinct, and embodies the cognitive and voluntaristic properties that 
make consent meaningful.  I will concede that Hampton‟s term “endorsement consent” 
has some overlap of important properties with actual consent, since the term refers to 
outward activities performed by individuals to express inward, positive thoughts (which 
are often present when a person gives their consent).  Many of the other things that I have 
been calling “meta-political activity,” though, aren‟t necessarily consent-like enough to 
earn the label.  Serving on the local school board does not imply that one has sufficient 
knowledge of the state‟s constitution and governing convention;  participating in civic 
education projects does not clearly convey one‟s intent to transfer some kind of personal 
power; journalism concerning social issues does not have a specific recipient for the 
transfer of the journalist‟s personal power.  Meta-political activity, “the countless small 
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actions of unknown people,”
106
 weaves the governing convention in many ways, but most 
of these ways are not consent-ish enough to capture the true meaning of consent.  And, as 
with “social contract,” “convention consent” has the very strong potential to mislead the 
term‟s user into thinking that his action has the potential to engage him in a power-
sharing relationship.  Furthermore, use of the term might have the potential to create in 
rulers the expectation that they‟ve received the approbation of the ruled or the belief that 
their power is automatically legitimate.  Political legitimacy is a complex phenomenon, 
and even if there are plenty of instances of “endorsement consent,” much more must be 
done to attain that legitimacy. 
 Another area of divergence from Hampton deals with the types of activities that 
count as meta-political.  Hampton focuses primarily on the more formal aspects of meta-
level action, and to a certain degree, this is understandable.  It is by resorting to a 
different type/level of activity that the prisoner‟s dilemma of transitioning from the state 
of nature to civil society is found – non-legal conventions make way for legal state 
authority.  Similarly, the most official and formalizable way for non-ruling individuals to 
affect legal change is by participating in overt meta-political activities like constitutional 
conventions.  Focusing on the more formal aspects of meta-political activity makes good 
theoretic sense when trying to elucidate the two- (or more) tiered distinction, but I believe 
these formal components comprise only a part of the field of meta-political activity.  The 
scope of informal but effective social activity is much more vast and compelling than 
Hampton (and most other people) gives it credit for.   
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The Neglect of the Stratification Solution  Why has the idea of the stratification 
solution and the contents of the strata gone unrecognized or underemphasized?  Why 
have consent theory and other forms of social contractarianism remained the primary 
focus of discussions on political authority, despite their obvious fundamental flaws, while 
indirect socio-political activity‟s value has been neglected?  I believe that this has 
occurred for a few reasons, starting at the beginning of social contract theory itself.  The 
origins of social contract theory deal with the rights of individuals (which was fairly new 
in the enlightenment era) and how they must be balanced with and protected from the 
power of the state‟s authority.  With this focus on the direct interaction between ruler and 
ruled through object-level law, it is easy to leave to the side the more indirect power of 
meta-level activity.  It is object-level activity that levies taxes and imprisons criminals 
and invades the lives of private individuals in numerous ways.  When the potential for all 
of these invasions and abuses are present, it makes sense to want to deal with or attack 
the threats head-on, instead of indirectly.  The stratification solution reinforces the 
position of individual citizens as ruled, as the subject to the power of others, so it is much 
less likely to appeal to those who are concerned with potential abuses of power and 
invasions of freedom by the rulers.  Classical consent theory is grounded on the natural 
rights and freedoms of individuals, and the stratification solution cuts that off at the head. 
 The stratification solution is also likely to be underappreciated in instances where 
the regimes are well-managed and responsive to the meta-level because citizens are not in 
a constant, vicious battle over the governing convention‟s role or power.  If individuals 
are generally free to live their lives, they may not feel the need to be constantly vigilant 
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about the ruler‟s activities, and thus may not feel as compelled to view themselves as 
political actors.   
 
The Legitimizing Strength of Meta-political Activity  Compared to that of classical 
consent theory, the legitimizing strength of meta-political activity may seem 
unacceptably weak.  According to classical consent theory, a state‟s legitimate exercise of 
authority is determined simply by its being the result of the consent of the subjects – de 
facto and de jure authority are one and the same.  Since meta-political activity is only 
very indirectly related to object-level governance, supporters of traditional voluntarism 
may argue that it cannot be a sufficient method of individual/state interaction because it 
makes the actions of individuals essentially useless. 
As I have maintained throughout this piece, I sympathize with those attracted to 
the voluntaristic spirit.  If one subscribes to natural rights and natural freedom, it is 
difficult to accept any system that distances the will of the individual from so many of the 
realms that impact his life.  How can any tax system be justifiable when citizens cannot 
directly determine how much money they are to give to the government and how that 
money will be allocated?  How can a person be truly free if his only choices are to 
vaccinate his child or be punished?  How can any use of power over a free man be 
acceptable if he has not made it acceptable?  Simmons‟ desire to adhere to the spirit of 
voluntarism, even in the face of philosophical anarchism, is understandable when 
voluntarism paints such a positive picture of individual persons and the stratification 
solution keeps those individuals from effecting significant political changes. 
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I concede that most meta-political activities cannot directly bring about object-
level political change, and that one citizen amongst millions probably cannot make a 
difference.  The traditional political voluntarism of Locke and Simmons is impossible in 
the modern world of states, both in theory and in practice.  However, just because we 
cannot make classical consent theory fit the world of modern states, there is no reason to 
abandon the moral impetus behind it.  Meta-political activities are real things that persons 
can do to bring about changes in the political realm, and are the direct result of the 
exercise of rationality.  Even if we cannot have meta-political activities carry the weight 
of traditional consent, we need not abandon them altogether.  It is still important to 
encourage individual participation because we think it is important.  Even if the rightness 
of promoting human rationality is not rooted in some immutable law of nature, that 
rightness can still be rooted in human-constructed values.  While political authority may 
not be directly rooted in personal authority, it can still be indirectly related to personal 
authority.  This, I believe, should be enough to satisfy our moral yearnings. 
The acts of a lone individual may not impact the state‟s legitimacy as an 
authoritative body, but that legitimacy ought to be largely dependent on how 
governments respond to the pressures exerted via meta-political activity.  There cannot be 
an easy formula like that provided by classical consent, but if we have responsiveness to 
meta-political forces be a key component of legitimacy, then a good deal of the 
voluntaristic spirit is maintained.  For instance, if there is a strong movement within the 
citizenry for more spending for and better quality of care for war veterans, and the 
government responds by increasing spending on veteran care and legislating higher 
standards of quality for Veterans Affairs, then we would have good reason to argue that 
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the government has attained a higher level of legitimacy than if it had been unresponsive 
to the movement.  If a region‟s education performance became weaker and the 
community called for the government to rectify the situation, then a government that 
worked on improving scholastic performance might have a greater degree of legitimate 
authority than a government that did not work to improve education in a failing area.   
While a government cannot be and should not try to be responsive to every 
interested group, it can take the citizenry‟s meta-political activities into account when 
considering and creating the public good.  I believe that the degree to which a 
government is responsive to public movements ought to be a key component in 
determining if that state‟s exercise of some power or other is morally acceptable (it will 
be legally acceptable by definition).  Other important factors to determining legitimacy 
might be respect and advancement of personal and human rights, domestic peace, 
economic prosperity, good relationships with other states, and also the degree to which 
the state‟s citizens are allowed to act in meta-political ways without facing suppression, 
like freedom and accessibility of the press and ease of political demonstration, just to 
name a few.  The stratification solution cannot provide a simple formula for determining 
when a state‟s use of force is legitimate, but it can point us in the right direction and 
highlight some very important factors to consider. 
 
The Rightness of the Stratification Solution  Classical consent theory could never 
be the basis of determining the nature and legitimacy of state authority because it cannot 
fit the reality of the individual/state relationship: the practical requirements like the 
giving and receiving of sufficient signs cannot be met, and the cognitive requirements 
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like proper intent and sufficient understanding cannot be met.  There is a basic lack of 
fitness between the kind of relationship and the means of evaluating it, and this lack of 
fitness is what drove Simmons to the conclusion that philosophical anarchism must be the 
only acceptable option.   
The stratification solution and the valuation of meta-political activity fit the 
individual/state relationship as it is, inconveniences and all.  First, the practical aspects 
are more easily accommodated because there are no particular necessary methods of 
performing meta-political activity like voting or contracting, and there are no strict rules 
for accounting for those meta-political performances.  Citizens simply act in ways that 
they see fit and that are valuable to them, and rulers observe those acts the best that they 
can and try to take them into account when creating and enforcing object-level law.  
Second, the cognitive and performative demands of meta-political activity are within the 
means of ordinary citizens, instead of being doomed to fail by too-high standards.  
Political knowledge acquisition and informational computation are done by persons at 
standards that are appropriate to themselves and that fit within their larger epistemic 
systems.  Finally, the stratification solution reinforces the necessary powers of the state as 
independent and final in an important sense (the legal sense, which resolves disputes and 
keeps the peace), while maintaining the spirit that individuals are free and valuable in an 
important sense (the moral sense, which stands behind or beyond legality).  Persons never 
have political authority on their own as part of some natural freedom, but there is still a 




Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
 I was motivated to pursue this topic for a dissertation because the picture of 
political interaction painted by classical consent theory has been inspiring and compelling 
human interaction for several centuries now, despite its oft-noted, obvious flaws.  The 
voluntarist‟s assertion of human rationality, freedom, and inherent equality should be 
commended, and many sociopolitical advances can trace their roots to John Locke‟s 
philosophical arguments.  My question became, how can moral ideas so fundamental to 
the accomplishments of our civilization have so many problems when we attempt to 
apply them to real modern states?  My project has been to reexamine the conceptual 
underpinnings of consent and explore whether consent is even possible in individual/state 
interaction; if consent is impossible in these interactions, it would explain why classical 
consent never occurs in the real world. 
 
 In Chapter 2, I began by tracing classical consent theory back to its beginning: 
John Locke‟s Second Treatise on Civil Government.  Locke starts the Second Treatise by 
asserting the existence of the law of nature, which was laid out by God and discoverable 
by human reason, wherein all men are in “a state of perfect freedom to order their 
actions…within the law of Nature…[This is] a state also of equality.”
107
  The law of 
nature asserts that all men are free and equal and are prohibited from harming one 
another.  Men prefer to live amongst one another for convenience and help, rather than 
try to survive on their own while at the same time attempting to protect themselves and 
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their property.  Disputes are bound to occur when men live and work together, and the 
state of nature does not provide for a common judge.  For greater ease in protecting one‟s 
property by sharing the defense burden, and for want of an impartial, third-party judge, 
men consent to create a civil society run by a government and ruled by concrete laws.  
Even though man is now subject to the laws erected by the state, those laws are an 
extension of his will because he originally consented to create the commonwealth in the 
first place.  Man maintains the freedom asserted by the law of nature because he only 
lends it to the commonwealth for the benefit of living in civil society; if the government 
acts beyond the bounds of the power lent to it and in opposition to the law of nature, man 
is allowed to withdraw from civil society and is not obligated to obey its laws. 
John Simmons, a neo-Lockean, is among those that note that any purported act of 
consent must meet certain requirements if it is to maintain the spirit of voluntarism and 
legitimize any use of power by one party over another.  From the works of several 
consent theorists, Simmons included, four distinct requirements emerge.  First, the 
consenter must intend that his consenting act create a new authority over him; if the act is 
not the direct result of his will, then some of his natural freedom is lost in the transaction.  
Second, the would-be consenting act must be free from coercion or force.  Third, the 
consent must be given through a sign that both consenter and consentee agree upon as 
sufficient to signify a transfer of power.  This requirement holds that consent be a real, 
performative thing, obvious enough to both parties as the point in which the consenter 
lent his personal freedom to another.  Finally, the consenter must be sufficiently informed 
about the details of what he is giving up and what kinds of powers he is agreeing may be 
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exerted on him; if relevant information is missing, it could impact his decision, so being 
under-informed compromises the accuracy of the will of the consenter. 
Simmons rightly points out that, for a variety of reasons, individuals rarely have 
any interactions with their governments that might qualify as consent as laid out by the 
definition of the term.  There is no method that fully conveys the will of the individual to 
the government and there is no system for intercepting and interpreting any signs of 
would-be consent, so consenting acts sufficient to legitimate the use of power by the 
government over the individual citizen simply do not occur in the modern world.  
Simmons then presents the reader with a dilemma: either we must abandon the standards 
of classical consent, thereby abandoning the natural freedom and equality they protect, or 
we must accept that no states are, have been, or will be (probably) legitimate holders of 
political authority – this is the position of philosophical anarchism.  Since Simmons is 
unwilling to abandon the freedom and equality afforded to us by natural law, he 
concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only acceptable position. 
In Chapter 3, I begin by sympathizing with Simmons on the appeal of voluntarism 
and exploring some relationships where classical consent seems to be the correct method 
of legitimating the use of power by one party over another.  Everyday power exchanges 
between friends, say, or the authorization of a doctor by a patient are instances where 
persons intentionally and temporarily alienate their personal power for their own benefit, 
like for pleasure or medical treatment.  The four traditional requirements of classical 
consent theory are easily satisfied in situations like this, but I argue that this easy 
satisfaction is the result of less-obvious background conditions.   
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First, the agents in these (what I call private) relationships have no pre-existing 
authority relationship and were not forced into entering the authority relationship.  I 
believe that it is possible that a pre-existing authority relationship might mitigate the 
legitimacy of a new one because the agents have been exposed already to a power 
inequality, and forcing any agent into an authority relationship seems to be in direct 
opposition to his pre-existing freedom.  Second, the private relationships are built on the 
condition that the power exchange is temporary.  Central to the classical consent tradition 
is that any alienation of personal freedom be temporary and that the agent remains as free 
as he was before the exchange, so any permanent or open-ended alienation of freedom is 
antithetical to natural law.  Third, the private relationships are small and open enough 
where parties can regularly communicate and adjust the terms of their arrangement if 
necessary.  Even when the parties include an abstract agent like a large company, that 
company has a real agent that the would-be consenter can reference and work with to 
maintain his personal freedom.  If a relationship is to respect the autonomy of agents in 
the real world, and if the real world may involve unforeseen chances in the conditions of 
the relationship, it follows that the relationship must be able to adjust its terms to respect 
the autonomy of the agents involved.  Fourth, the realm of authority up for exchange in 
private relationships is a private subject matter, meaning that the would-be consenter and 
consentee are, in an important way, the only relevant parties to the exchange.  In a 
doctor/patient exchange, for instance, authority over the patient‟s body does not involve 
any other parties in any relevant way.  The power up for transfer is definitely held by one 
party (the patient) and can definitely be held by the other (the doctor).  For private 
relationships, the agents are the sole arbiters of the terms, which seems necessary for 
205 
 
maintaining the integrity of the consenter‟s natural freedom.  Finally, the authority 
relationship is self-legislating and self-adjudicating, meaning the wills of the consenter 
and consentee are the only wills involved.    The parties are the only ones to make and 
enforce the rules, so the chances of outside influences impacting the freedom of the 
would-be consenter are eliminated.  I believe that, in private relationships, the 
requirements of classical consent theory are not only fulfilled, but are also fulfillable.  
There is a special type of fitness between the nature of the relationship and the method of 
evaluating its legitimacy – the background conditions adhere in the right way.  The 
chapters that follow explore the possible fitness between the nature of the individual/state 
relationship and the demands of classical consent theory. 
In Chapter 4, I argue that the individual/state relationship diverges greatly from 
private relationships firstly in the potential realms of power to be exchanged.  In private 
relationships, the authority transferred from one agent to another usually only covers a 
small number of topics, like power over a person‟s body for a doctor.  In the public 
relationship (the individual/state relationship), the areas that governments must have 
power over in order to even exist and minimally function are quite numerous.  Besides 
mutual protection and the final adjudication of disputes, governments must also be able to 
carry out punishments and offer incentives to prevent future harms, and they do this over 
a particular territory (this is a product of the way the modern world has arranged itself).  
Furthermore, if we interpret “protection” with greater subtlety and foresight, the 
protective function of the government‟s authority might need to cover regulation of the 
environment, public health, economic transactions, and education.  Modern states have 
evolved to require top-down authority structures and high degrees of centralization, and 
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the larger and more complex a state becomes, the greater the numbers of laws to 
coordinate people‟s behaviors must also become.  The potentially necessary realms of 
political authority diverge greatly in quantity and quality from those of private 
relationships. 
Because of the massive scale of states and their laws and their territorial nature, 
consenting acts between the individual and his government are practically impossible.  
First, it is difficult to locate an agent of the state that could appropriately interact with 
individual citizens such that the person‟s consent could be sufficiently conveyed.  A 
state‟s government is both a collection of working persons and the organizational 
structure they operate within, but the state itself is much more abstract.  There is no 
reason to believe that individual citizens consent to the government‟s employees or the 
set of laws or the abstract entity.  Second, the state‟s territorial nature and top-down 
structure removes the individual citizen from whomever he might give himself to; a 
single government agent might represent thousands or millions of individuals, and lower-
level officials cannot convey any consent given up the ladder of power.  Third, at this 
time, there is no method of consent giving and receiving between the individual and state 
that sufficiently signifies the full weight of consent.  Methods like voting, paying ones 
taxes, and remaining in the state have been counted as consenting acts by some 
philosophers, but there is no way that they meet the four classical requirements.  When 
we multiply the number of citizens by the number of potential realms of political 
authority, the gross impracticality of political consent becomes even more obvious.  
Classical consent theory requires that the act of consent-giving be performative and 
concrete so that both parties can reference it and the terms set during it, but this cannot be 
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done in modern states.  Fourth, in opposition to one of the background conditions detailed 
in Chapter 3 and because of the territoriality of modern states, citizens have no choice but 
to be in some kind of association with a government.  Since states claim authority over all 
those born within their boundaries and since we all have to be born somewhere, we are 
all claimed as subject of some state‟s authority from birth.  While emigration is 
theoretically possible, it is practically impossible for most people, and those that can 
emigrate automatically relocate to another state and its claimed authority.  If individuals 
are to retain the freedom laid out by the law of nature, there must be a viable choice to 
not be a subject of another‟s authority, and the modern world is laid out such that all 
inhabitable (and plenty of uninhabitable) land is claimed by some state. 
In Chapter 5, I argue that the public relationship‟s interactions are unable to meet 
the requirements of classical consent theory, not only because of the impracticality of 
coordinating behavior or the uniqueness of territorial authority, but also because of a 
deeper, more fundamental problem.  Before a person can contemplate giving his consent 
to another‟s authority through a sufficient sign and free from coercion, he must first 
sufficiently understand the content of the potential authority transfer.  My position is that, 
because of the sheer quantity of potential realms of political authority, individual private 
citizens are unable to sufficiently understand the object of their would-be consent.  
Because so little has been written about the mental capabilities of citizens, my argument 
borrows from other disciplines the necessary skills to gain sufficient understanding of the 
political realm. 
In order to properly understand the government‟s potential realms of authority, a 
citizen has to have a version of idealized rationality, beyond the mental capacities of 
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typical individuals.  First, agents need to be able to know a tremendous amount of facts 
like laws and the facets of their lives that might be impacted by the government.  Second, 
they need to be able to manipulate, order, and work with those facts; they need to be able 
to consider multiple options for choices and contemplate the consequences of those 
choices.  Third, they have enough time to learn all of the relevant information and make 
their choices, are not encumbered by outside worries or problems, and are motivated to 
do the work necessary.  If, in the political arena, classical consent is to be possible, an 
agent must be able and willing to do all of these things to give their consent the 
appropriate content.  In order to do this, though, the agent would have to have mental 
capacities that real persons simply do not have, and this leaves classical consent‟s 
requirements unfilfillable. 
First, even though we are the smartest creatures on the planet, we are not able to 
reach anything near full understanding of the political realm.  Our brains are not able to 
absorb infinitely much information, and levels of knowledge vary greatly between 
individuals.  Furthermore, the modern world increases in complexity at an alarming rate, 
well beyond the mental abilities provided us by evolution.  Political society operates 
efficiently only because of the division of mental labor; we can be productive by some 
people knowing some of things, and not necessarily the things that others know.  Second, 
we are similarly limited in our inferential and computational capabilities.  We are 
suboptimal at figuring out the consequences of our choices, especially when we are 
under-informed.  Often times, it is more fitting and useful to satisfice (come to a good-
enough but suboptimal conclusion) rather than optimize our decision procedures, and this 
seems especially true in sometimes abstract areas like state-level political ideas.  Third, 
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unlike idealized agents, real persons operate in often-constraining environments.  We do 
not always have control over what information is available to us, and progress personally 
and socially is dependent on some people doing some of the learning and transmitting the 
important information on to others.  Fourth, all real persons are subject to time and 
attention constraints: there are only so many hours in a day, and many potential areas of 
investigation, but it is necessary that we allocate our efforts based on what we must do 
and are motivated to do.  Necessities and emergencies, practically, must come first, so 
real agents have to deal with deciding what to do, based on what time and energy they 
have left.  Finally, at the heart of all of this, is the topic of motivation.  No matter how 
much we hope to be different or better, human motivation is imperfect, complex, and 
highly personal.  Even if all other factors like knowledge and time were equal, the 
peculiarities of individual personalities would yield different choices in the same 
situation.  Since people are sub-optimally rational and vary greatly in time, environment, 
and motivation, knowledge (and the desire to learn) of the political realm and potential 
areas of political authority are bound to diverge widely.  There cannot and should not be 
an expectation of a high level of political knowledge across all people, and since not even 
the most intelligent and devoted person is able to obtain a deep knowledge of realms of 
political authority, it follows that average citizens cannot give substantive consent to their 
state‟s authority. 
Chapter 6 is devoted to arguing that, even if we could overcome the practical and 
epistemic problems outlined in Chapters 4 and 5, a government‟s authority is so vastly 
different in kind and source from a private individual‟s authority that they cannot depend 
on the same method of legitimizing.  The potentially rightful powers of the state cannot 
210 
 
be transferred from individual to the government because those powers do not rightfully 
exist in the individual to begin with.  First, there is typically no pre-constitutional phase 
where persons can negotiate the terms of the authority to be exercised over them; we are 
instead almost always born with government‟s claiming authority over us.  Modern states 
are set up to endure over time, despite changes in rulers, so that they may claim power 
even over future citizens.  As we saw with private relationships, agents must be able to 
contribute to the terms of their power exchanges in order to maintain their freedom, and 
this does not happen between private citizens and the government.  Second, there is very 
rarely a post-constitutional period where citizens can terminate the power asserted over 
them, and even when an individual can relinquish his citizenship, the modern world is set 
up that doing so involves becoming the citizen of another state.  Again, not being able to 
leave an authority relationship seems antithetical to the spirit of voluntarism.  Third, in 
order to be a state‟s agency, a government has to at least claim open-ended power over 
many aspects of the state.  The state has a public good beyond the goods of its individual 
citizens, so the state needs to potentially exercise power over new realms apart from the 
input of individuals and whatever personal authority they may have.  Fourth, as Locke 
himself noted, a primary purpose of creating a government is for authority to be exercised 
with finality and independence.  Rulers cannot rule if their rule can be trumped, and if 
that rule can be revoked because it is actually held by individual persons, then the rule 
has no concrete foundation. 
Political power is its own kind of power, separate from any kind of power 
individual citizens may have, and operating on an entirely different level.  Its very 
purpose is to be different from the power held by any other individual or group.  It is 
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meant to have different goals, those that arise from people living together in society.  The 
government‟s laws are meant to be final, no matter the will of the individual, to maintain 
peace and achieve prosperity.  The state‟s directives are issued with the purpose of 
overriding the will of the person, whereas a private authority‟s directives are not expected 
to trump individual reasons and instead balance and influence them.  Most importantly, 
governments create, interpret, and enforce laws in ways that individual persons do not.  
Part of state power includes the ability to punish political wrongs, and while we may 
inflict harm on one another privately, we cannot truly punish privately – the very notion 
is a public one. 
I begin Chapter 7 by examining the true structure of political authority.  
Arguments in support of classical consent theory have failed both practically and in 
theory because they have been based on the assumption that there is only one kind of 
authority, and that political authority arises when individual private citizens lend their 
rights to self-protection and self-determination to another body for their own benefit.  As 
I argued in Chapter 6, though, political authority is of a fundamentally different kind than 
personal authority; the former is the creation of the latter, not just a resetting of it.   
If there is only one kind of authority, a “paradox of governing” arises because the 
subjects of the law are also the creators of it (via authorizing the government through 
classical consent), and if subjects can modify the terms of their subjection, then they are 
not really subjects at all.  In all states, though, including modern states, there are actually 
two kinds of authority which are related but not identical.  Jean Hampton uses Tarski‟s 
object language/meta-language distinction as a model to explain the two different types 
of authority in play in states: the object-level law and meta-level law.  In all political 
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societies, there is a limited set of rulers who alone create object-level law like taxation 
and the punishment of transgressions, which apply to all citizens with finality and without 
their direct input.  However, governments come into existence and are sustained because 
of a second type of power, which is not formalized but is the result of the private power 
held by private citizens.  My argument in this dissertation has been that classical consent 
is impossible because private citizens are unable to interact directly with political power 
– and employing the stratification solution shows why this is the case.  The structure of 
political society in large modern states creates a significant distance between the ruled 
and the laws that govern them, but acknowledging the existence of the meta-political 
arena shows that individuals can make political differences in an indirect way. 
Object-level government is the result of a rule of recognition, a formal and 
informal, written and unwritten set of practices and guidelines that arise from the 
conventions of a political society.    Some states have written constitutions that establish 
the structure of a government and rules for determining how it will operate, and all states 
have unwritten codes of conduct and modes of interaction that, when taken together, 
delineate the bounds within which governments and their agents may operate.  This is 
how we can say that (especially democratic) governments have some agency-like 
features, even though those governments are not under the direct control of their 
constituents.  When citizens go about their private actions in a variety of ways, they 
establish formal and (mostly) informal conventions within which governments must 
operate, lest they be ousted.  Methods of meta-political, convention-creating activities are 
many and diverse, from serving on a police force to participating in a protest, from 
running a business to buying from that business, just to name a few.  Even though a 
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particular individual citizen cannot directly contribute to the laws to which he is subject, 
he can create the atmosphere in which governments are created and sustained.   
The power of meta-political activity should not be underestimated simply because 
it is indirect or unofficial.  Furthermore, the stratification approach alleviates some of the 
problems that consistently plague consent theory.  First, the paradox of government and 
state creation is eliminated because those powers come about through different means.  
Hobbes‟s argument in Leviathan fails because the method of state creation (contracting 
with a potentially-governing body) is impossible without the ability to contract, which 
Hobbes argues is impossible without the authority of a government.  Government 
creation is not paradoxical under the stratification solution because the rules of civil 
society arise unofficially and without political authority, whereas the laws of a 
government arise officially sanctioned by the rule of recognition.  Second, the 
stratification solution has a government‟s legitimacy depend on multiple factors like 
social justice and other social/moral qualities determined by the rule of recognition, 
rather than a single (and impossible) factor – the consent of the governed.  States come 
into existence through a variety of means, many of them through violence and coups, and 
classical consent theory would automatically bar all real states from achieving legitimacy 
because no states have been or could be established via consent.  Legitimacy is a meta-
political, moral quality, the achievement of which can fall along a continuum, rather than 
depend on a single and non-existent event.  Third, the stratification solution offers a 
compelling explanation as to why free states are fundamentally different than tyrannies.  
In free states, even if they are considered monarchies, oligarchies, or democracies, the 
214 
 
citizens are able to operate in convention-creating, authority-creating activities, whereas 
tyrannies use force to prevent governing conventions from ever coming into being. 
 
As I stated in Chapter 2, Simmons gives us the following dilemma: since people 
do not consent to the rule of governments in any way that conforms to the four robust 
requirements, we must either (a) reject voluntarism as the basis for legitimate state 
authority, or (b) concede to philosophical anarchism.  This is, I believe, a false dilemma 
because Simmons, Locke, and many others wrongly recognize authority as being only 
one kind of thing.  The purpose of this dissertation is to show that there are two different 
types of power in every political system, and each has a distinct and important role to 
play in governance.  If (a) and (b) really were the only two options, and if one wants to 
stand on the side of individual freedom, then (b) seems to be the only acceptable choice.  
There is another option, however, one that maintains the voluntaristic spirit as far as is 
possible in the real world, while allowing governments the possibility of achieving a 
large degree of legitimate authority.  Direct political democracy is simply impossible 
once a group reaches a certain size, and that size is much smaller than any state in 
existence today.
108
   Even if the practical problems could be worked out, the epistemic 
and ontological ones will remain.  Indirect political democracy, however, allows private 
individuals to actually contribute to the political atmosphere in a variety of real ways 
which are consistent with their practical and mental capabilities. 
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 Evolutionary anthropologist Robin Dunbar and other indicate that this size seems to be around 150 
people, the size of a clan.  Beyond this size, persons cannot keep track of the complexities of the group 
dynamic, which appears to be essential to direct democracy.  While I am very interested in learning more 
about this correlation between group size, brain size, and modes of interaction, this seems to be more of an 
anthropological issue than a philosophical one. 
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For both Locke and Simmons, their commitment to voluntarism and consent rests 
on the belief that humans are naturally free of political obligations.  Locke‟s argument 
depends largely upon the existence of a deity who created order and purpose as part of 
life, although Locke argues that reason is capable of directly understanding natural law.  
Simmons only touches lightly upon his belief in natural freedom, without going into 
much depth about that natural freedom‟s source.  Unless we subscribe to a religious view 
in which the order of the universe is established, the source of Locke and Simmons‟s 
natural freedom as a part of the political world seems to be lacking a solid foundation.  
The political voluntarism of option (a) cannot be supported against its obvious problems 
simply because we like the idea of individual moral freedom (which I do).  While I 
understand why Simmons wants to choose option (b), and while I understand the serious 
allure of voluntarism, I cannot accept that state authority can never be legitimate, not 
even in theory.  The stratification solution shows that the realm of political power is not 
the same as personal, moral power, so we should not expect the two types of power to 
operate by the same set of rules, or that one should be a variety of the other. 
Even though doing so may seem to be a sin in the modern world of individuals, I 
believe that looking into other, more communitarian, sources of political obligation 
(Simmons‟s primary concern) is worthwhile.  Enlightenment may have pulled us from 
the strife at the hands of tyrants so characteristic of much of human history, but there 
have been other periods of real democracy without the intense focus on individuals.  I 
believe that instances of true democracy may be able to shed some light on the 
legitimizing power of modern meta-political activities.  Political authority and obligation 
need not be vacuous concepts simply because of the way the modern world has worked 
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out, and we should not give up on the idea of legitimate governance simply because it is 
complex.  We are complex creatures living in a complex world, so we cannot expect the 
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